

DISCOURSE AND COMPLEX IMPLEMENTATION: MILITARY  
BASE CONVERSIONS IN TEXAS

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . ii

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . 1

    The Base Closure Conundrum. . . . . 2

II. DISCURSIVE FORMATIONS . . . . . 17

    Political Administration. . . . . 20

    Discourse Theory. . . . . 28

    Nascent Forms . . . . . 38

    Summary . . . . . 45

III. COMPLEX IMPLEMENTATION. . . . . 47

    Developmental Goals . . . . . 47

    Strategic Planning. . . . . 53

    Implementation Process. . . . . 64

    Summary . . . . . 73

IV. DISCURSIVE COMPLEX IMPLEMENTATION . . . . . 75

    Evaluating Discourse. . . . . 77

    Discursive Heuristics . . . . . 80

    Community Development . . . . . 86

    Empirical Referents of Discourse. . . . . 99

    Field Research Methodology. . . . . 107

V. THE BASE CONVERSION PROCESS . . . . . 115

    Opportunities For Redevelopment . . . . . 116

    Timelines . . . . . 129

    Summary . . . . . 142

VI.	COMPLEX REDEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH TEXAS. . . . .	145
	Unforeseen Developments . . . . .	146
	Comparison and Contrast . . . . .	170
	Discourse Revisited . . . . .	180
VII.	DISCOURSE VERSUS TOP-DOWN IMPLEMENTATION. . . . .	188
	Dual-Track Retention in Lubbock . . . . .	190
	Dual-Tack Retention in San Antonio. . . . .	194
	Planning and Organization in Lubbock. . . . .	200
	Planning and Organization in San Antonio. . . . .	218
VIII.	CONCLUSION. . . . .	229
	Discursive Complex Implementation Theory. . . . .	229
	The Process . . . . .	231
	Military Base Conversions in Texas. . . . .	233
	Findings and Discussion . . . . .	239
	A Model of Success. . . . .	240
	A Model of Failure. . . . .	244
	Discourse Revisited and Revised . . . . .	247
	Implications of Base Conversion Research. . . . .	251
	REFERENCES . . . . .	255
	APPENDIX . . . . .	264

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

By April, 1997, the last T-1A Jayhawk trainer aircraft is scheduled to vacate Reese Air Force Base in Lubbock, Texas. The millions of dollars and hundreds of jobs which have benefited the local economy on an annual basis will fade away as operations on the base cease. Members of the community and political leaders are faced with the question, "What do we do next?"

The San Antonio area is faced with a similar dilemma as they confront the realignment of Kelly Air Force Base. Although they have more time to deal with the problem, the scale of difficulty is somewhat greater than that faced by Lubbock. Kelly employs some 12,000 people and the impact from its drawdown represents a significantly larger share of the local economy than does the closure of Reese AFB. However, local leaders and citizens have already jumped on board the privatization bandwagon to minimize the impact of the realignment.

Chase Field Naval Air Station in the South Texas town of Beeville was closed in 1993. Where base housing once stood is now a commercial real estate development which generates \$1 million in income for the community. Hangars once used to house trainer jets are now home to air maintenance facilities. Barracks which used to be home to sailors and airplane mechanics are now the site of a

minimum-security state prison. Local citizens had little time to prepare for the closure of Chase Field, which was announced in 1991. Yet they managed to find uses for the base facilities in an effort to save the economic well-being of their town. In fact, by most accounts, the Beeville community is better off than they were when the base was operational.

Local governments in Texas are increasingly being called upon to deal with the problems associated with base conversion. These events open a multitude of questions regarding the role of local governments and the nature of policy implementation. At stake are thousands of jobs and millions of dollars in investment opportunities, as well as the questioning of the operative theory behind existing patterns of local public administration. This work delves into the dynamics of the complex implementation of base conversion solutions in Texas and examine the theoretical repercussions of such activities on current debates within the literature of public administration.

#### The Base Closure Conundrum

Over the years, many local governments have relied on military installations as a source of revenue and employment opportunities for their citizens. The seemingly permanent and predictable economic benefits were often taken for granted, until the federal government began downsizing the

base infrastructure of the Department of Defense following the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, many communities put forth a great deal of effort to save their bases from the budget-cutting axe of BRAC (the Base Realignment and Closure Commission), but gave little thought as to what they would do if they actually lost their installations. Due to the emphasis on base retention, many localities found themselves ill-prepared for the base conversion process once final closure decisions had been made and approved (Center for Public Service *Military Base Conversion and Community Assistance Program* brochure 1995).

Although the impact of closing a military base may have crippling economic effects on a community, this is by no means the only possible outcome. Closed installations can represent considerable economic development opportunities. However, due to the expedience of depending on the federal dollars associated with operational bases during the Cold War, little effort was made by localities to realize the potential of economic diversification. Reasons for this include convenience, the difficulty of mobilizing diverse interests within a community and the risk of significant amounts of investment capital. Pentagon downsizing has forced local governments to adapt in the immediate post-Cold War era by delegating to them the task of base conversion. Most local governments have little experience with such

activities, which demand creative methods of planning and implementation.

The appearance of new and unique public policy dilemmas, such as base conversions, often call for substantially innovative ways of implementing policy solutions. Fox and Miller (1995) offer an alternative paradigm which challenges orthodox views of implementation. They assert that such problems can be addressed through a discourse which is based on sincerity, intentions, engagement and substantive contribution. The ultimate goal of Fox and Miller is the realization of authentic discourse, which facilitates the resolution of public policy predicaments through negotiation. However, at present, public institutions exhibit only nascent tendencies (Fox and Miller 1995: 74-75, 129-158) towards authentic discourse and must be guided by those recursive practices (or reoccurring habits) which will lead to the ultimate goal or ideal outcome.

The immediate goal of most communities anticipating base conversion is economic development in the form of capital investment and the creation of skilled jobs. The methods by which economic development is achieved are exceedingly complex and often include elements of strategic planning, with combinations of different types of public and private solutions as the intended outcomes. Mercer, Woolston and Donaldson (1981), Stein (1990), and Mercer

(1992) suggest that localities regularly engage in complex implementation in order to expand local infrastructure, economic productivity and revenues. What is less clear, or often taken for granted, is the nature of the complex implementation process.

The main questions this work seeks to answer are: How applicable is discourse theory as presented by Fox and Miller (1995) for policy implementation? Can it be observed? And, how do local governments engage in the implementation of complex economic development plans? Base conversions in Texas provide unique examples from which answers to these questions may be derived. Planning committees, subcommittees and Local Reuse Authorities (LRAs), which are chiefly engaged in the implementation of base redevelopment plans, may represent nascent forms of discourse. The case studies used in this work will attempt to describe to what extent this is true, if at all. Additional comparisons will be made with base conversions from other states for the sake of validity and reliability.

### Discursive Formations

Chapter II focuses on more democratic methods of organizational communication, policy formulation and implementation. It might make more sense to call this type of administration "unorthodoxy" because of its opposition to traditional methods of administration. However, such a

characterization is, at least on the surface, too simplistic and does not differentiate between the distinguishable forms of bottom-up administration. The second chapter is devoted to one particular type of bottom-up theory--discourse--as well as its nuances and origins.

Many have jumped onto the anti-government bandwagon, arguing that bureaucracy has grown too large, unresponsive and inefficient (see Knott and Miller 1987, Hummel 1994). Though as Goodsell (1994) argues, this is by no means universally accepted. Nevertheless, there appears to be a growing movement in the public administration literature in favor of alternatives for addressing policy demands.

Whether these arguments originate from the ideological left or right, they seem to have one thing in common: They seek to reduce the constraints and dehumanization of formal hierarchical organizations and the orthodox thought upon which these structures are based. Some wish to do this through privatization, finding alternative methods of service provision, or opting out of the system altogether. However, there are those who have suggested that the best way to address public policy dilemmas is through the creation of less formal communicative structures which encourage debate and negotiation. Discourse theory is one of these.

Fox and Miller (1995) provide a model of discourse which is intended to revolutionize the way public policies

are created and carried out. Discursive behavior is distinguished from other forms of communication by an open, inclusive debate which is characterized by sincerity, the questioning of agendas, willing participation and substantive contributions. The discourse is not controlled by outside forces or administrative hierarchy, it is instead designed to transcend such hierarchies, with participants policing the debate themselves. The main goal of discourse is to formulate a practical response to the question, "What do we do next?"

Discursive formations are temporary or transitory organizations which are created for specific purposes. These need not exist *a priori* to the discussion, as they are based on the metaphorical notions of Arendt's polis, Dahl's polyarchy and Habermas' discourse. These authors emphasize the creation of more informal structures which are designed to facilitate politics through negotiation. According to Fox and Miller, at this time most public institutions exhibit, at best, only nascent tendencies toward discourse.

### Complex Implementation

Chapter III discusses the implications of economic development, strategic planning, local control and bottom-up implementation. The goal of most communities anticipating base conversion is economic development, usually in the form of job creation and income replacement. The means by which

economic development is realized often includes substantial strategic planning activities, with combinations of public and private solutions as the intended outcomes.

Although there may be exceptions and variations due to circumstantial differences.

The process by which these solutions are realized is known as complex implementation. The factors which determine whether a local government will succeed at complex implementation efforts are highly contextual. This is likely to be true for base conversions, not only for the previously elaborated reasons which effect localities, but also because of the differing levels of specialization and existing infrastructure which characterize military bases.

The process through which many communities make the transformation from dependence on military spending to economic development and diversification incorporates basic elements of strategic planning. Whether a community achieves a successful base conversion may depend in part on the effectiveness of its strategic plan. One of the objectives of this work is to ascertain the nature of the process by which strategic plans are constructed at the local level. A key assumption is that strategic planning is an essential element of the complex implementation process, and as such, must be utilized by local governments attempting to undergo a base conversion.

Other important facets of economic development are likely to include local control and bottom-up implementation. Stein (1990) indicates that local governments engage in a variety of developmental activities and that they are generally successful. Bottom-up theory suggests that the level of implementation which is most appropriate is that which is closest to the problem (Lipski 1976, Hjern 1983, Elmore 1985). Bottom-up theory also focuses on structuring administration to be more responsive to grass-roots demands, which is also helpful for economic development ventures.

#### Discursive Complex Implementation

Chapter IV seeks to combine ideas of discourse and local complex implementation. These ideas are not conceptually far apart, as Fox and Miller (1995) assert that discourse is a form of bottom-up implementation. The criteria, or warrants, by which discourse is evaluated include sincerity, agendas, willing participation and substantive contributions with regard to what to do next about public policy dilemmas. Such views do not contradict theories of local implementation. In fact, the practice of "inclusion" in base reuse efforts is not theoretically different from discourse, although it is not as well developed. For the purposes of this work, the two terms are used synonymously.

In an edited volume, Clarence Stone and Heywood Sanders have collected the writings of like-minded colleagues who describe through case studies the practice of municipal consociationalism, or coalition-building for the purpose of negotiating complex redevelopment solutions at the local level. They demonstrate that with community consensus and federal dollars, local governments can indeed successfully implement economic development plans. Some urban politics literature suggests that local governments formulate conceptions of how they would like their locales to be perceived by other cities and individuals. Developmental projects are the manifestation of such conceptions (Pagano and Bowman 1995). Local complex implementation should provide a conceptual link between inclusion and policy outcomes.

In addition to inclusion and implementation process theory, field research and case study methodologies are discussed in this chapter. Babbie (1989), Nachmias and Nachmias (1987), and Johnson and Joslyn (1991) discuss the benefits of qualitative research in the field of political science. The prime focus of this work is on three Texas base conversion efforts, although other cases, both in and outside of Texas are used periodically for the sake of comparison. The cases to be discussed were chosen for their similarity of context, former missions and infrastructure. Though there are questions about the generalizability of

case study/field research, there are plenty of social science examples which utilize this methodology due to its greater internal validity and reliability. A few examples include the sociological study of the immediate pre-World War II America by Margaret Mead (1942); the community power studies of New Haven, Connecticut, by Robert Dahl (1971), Raymond Wolfinger (1973) and Nelson Polsby (1980); the Congressional behavior work of Richard Fenno (1978); and the policy creation model of John Kingdon (1984).

#### The Conversion Process and Implementation Timelines

Chapter V discusses the base conversion process and takes a more empirical turn by comparing a number of cases on conversion timelines. The conversion process may be construed as three steps or phases which are complemented by a succession of three organizations. The first phase involves the base retention effort and preliminary planning and is usually supported by a retention committee of some kind. The second is the strategic planning and organizational development phase and calls for a broad-based coalition of local community interests to articulate desired redevelopment solutions and how to implement them. The third is the complex redevelopment phase and involves the implementation of strategic reuse plans, which is usually carried out by a redevelopment staff operating under the supervision of a Local Reuse Authority, or LRA.

Timelines are often used by the military as a means to assess implementation progress. Base conversion efforts can also be measured in this fashion. BRAC provides a recommended conversion timeline which can be used as a reference or yardstick for evaluating redevelopment activities. The Progress of three Texas cases--Beeville, San Antonio and Lubbock--is compared with a similar successful implementation case--Alexandria, Louisiana, and two unsuccessful efforts--Victorville and El Toro, California. The inference of the timeline comparison is that communities which have made planning and organizational progress are likely to engage in discursive behavior.

#### Complex Redevelopment

The case of Beeville, Texas, is the main topic of Chapter VI. It is one of the few cases from the 1988 and 1991 rounds of closures to produce tangible economic policy results. Though there were delays in the implementation effort and economic elites argued against the community's long-term plans, the overall effort has been a success, based not only on the community's criteria, but also according to the timeline. The annual income and jobs generated from the conversion effort have more than replaced that which was lost by the base closure. Local reuse officials maintain that the reason for their success was due to the inclusion of all affected interests in the community.

There have also been positive externalities from the reuse effort. The base economy is now tied more closely into the city's economy, enhancing the multiplier effect. Municipal revenues are up. New construction is at a twelve-year high. A new shopping center is going up near downtown Beeville. Additional development on basic infrastructure, such as a new sewage treatment plant, is being planned.

The Beeville case is compared to the cases of Alexandria, Louisiana, as well as Victorville and El Toro, California. Alexandria is generally held to be the textbook example of a successful multi-solution base conversion. The former England Air Force Base is home to an industrial park, magnet school, colleges and a hospital. The results at Beeville are comparable to those of Alexandria, although they have not received as much attention for their efforts.

Victorville and El Toro are both characterized by inter-local infighting. George Air Force Base in Victorville was designated for closure in 1988, but the reuse effort has been hampered by lawsuits from the neighboring town of Adelanto and interference from outside interests and politicians. El Toro Marine Corps Air Station was designated for closure in 1993, but local cities are fighting the county for the right to administer the conversion. At issue is whether an airport should be built on the facility. Both communities have suffered from the failure to reach a consensus.

## Discourse versus Top-down Implementation

Chapter VII compares the cases of San Antonio and Lubbock, Texas. Both were victims of the 1995 BRAC, with San Antonio facing the realignment of Kelly Air Force Base and Lubbock facing the closure of Reese Air Force Base. San Antonio has made a great deal of progress at strategic planning and was ready to begin the final implementation phase after only six months. Lubbock stumbled out of the gate and has attempted to involve only governmental agencies in its planning and reuse decision making. Consequently, Lubbock's progress is somewhat less than that of San Antonio's. However, some progress is being made in Lubbock. But without full support of the business community and grass-roots interests, the potential policy outcomes are not yet clear.

The benefits of having an inclusive, bottom-up oriented discourse are demonstrated by the San Antonio case. A workable strategic plan and \$500,000 in redevelopment grants are but two. Lubbock, on the other hand, does not anticipate having a complete strategic plan until August, 1996--more than a year after the closure decision--and has received only \$131,000 in redevelopment grants. The planning committee in San Antonio included over 150 individual citizens, whereas in Lubbock there have been only nine on the reuse board, all of whom are politicians or representatives of governmental institutions of some kind.

The San Antonio effort is bottom-up, the Lubbock effort is top-down. The implications for discourse and complex implementation theories in this comparison are substantial.

### Preliminary Expectations

Base conversions should represent the practical and theoretical fusion of discourse, complex implementation and local control. While base closures are not the economic disasters they are portrayed to be, it still takes a great deal of capital and organization to successfully convert a military installation to private uses. There are a number of procedures in which local governments must educate themselves, such as planning, grant writing, property acquisition, the organizational structure of base conversions and environmental requirements. The inclusion of all concerned local public institutions, business interests and individuals is probably necessary for the success of conversion efforts.

Conversion timelines are a way in which the progress of planning and implementation can be observed. The existence of substantive outcomes can help us infer the practice of discursive complex implementation. Within the first year of a BRAC closure decision, certain procedures must be carried out in order to have a successful conversion. Planning committees and subcommittees must be of sufficient numbers and representation to legitimately claim that they are

inclusive. Consultants and reuse staff, including an executive director, base transition coordinator and environmental coordinator must be hired in order to contribute a sufficient level of expertise. Developmental grants must be applied for and received within a reasonable amount of time. Screening for surplus property as well as homeless and Native American claims must be negotiated along with interim leases and caretaker agreements.

From the cases studied in this work, it may be possible to construct tenuous models of both success and failure of base conversions. The conceptual link between discourse theory and policy outcomes is complex implementation. This is demonstrated by the sequential link between inclusive planning (discourse), redevelopment (complex implementation), and tangible base conversion results (policy outcomes). Most of these activities take place in the second and third phases of base conversion. Any model of success must take these conceptual steps into account, whereas failure will be judged to have resulted from a breakdown in the sequence.

## CHAPTER II

### DISCURSIVE FORMATIONS

This chapter discusses the newest theory of bottom-up policy implementation--discourse. Discourse theory as presented by Charles J. Fox and Hugh Miller (1995) is best known by its warrants, which are rights or licenses for participation in, and evaluation of, discussions about what to do next with regard to complex policy questions, such as base conversions. A difference between discourse and other theories of administration is that the emphasis is on politics through negotiation, as opposed to edict or competition. The context in which discourse happens is characterized by the postmodern phenomenon of societal fragmentation. Discourse takes place in arenas known as discursive formations, which exhibit transitory characteristics and differing degrees of authenticity, as judged by the practice of the warrants for discourse.

The appearance of new and unique public policy dilemmas, such as base conversions, often call for substantially innovative ways of implementing policy solutions. Fox and Miller (1995) have offered a potentially new paradigm which challenges orthodox views of implementation. They argue that such difficulties can be addressed through a discourse which is based on sincerity, intentions, engagement and substantive contribution. The ultimate goal of Fox and Miller is the realization of

authentic discourse which facilitates the resolution of public policy demands through negotiation. However, at present, public institutions exhibit only nascent tendencies (1995: 74-75, 129-158) towards authentic discourse. In order to remedy this condition, administrators must alter those recursive practices (or routine habits) which currently obstruct discursive tendencies.

Many scholars have taken to bashing public agencies, arguing that bureaucracy has grown too large, and is unresponsive, dehumanizing and inefficient (see Hummel 1994, Knott and Miller 1987). The perception of 'bureaucracy' as institutions restricted by too many rules, unidirectional communication and rigid, hierarchical organizational structures, gives that word a pejorative connotation in contemporary usage. Though, as Goodsell (1994) argues, this is by no means a unanimous determination. In his polemic on behalf of public administration, he demonstrates widespread, popular content with public agencies and services through the discussion of numerous surveys on the topic.

Nevertheless, there appears to be a growing movement in the public administration literature and the general polity in favor of alternatives for addressing policy demands.

Regardless of the disparate ideological origins of prevailing anti-government ideas, they seem to have one thing in common: They advocate the reduction of the constraints and dehumanizing mechanisms of formal

hierarchical organizations, and the orthodox thought upon which these structures are based. This anti-governmentalism originates with negative views of "the state" or an increasing cynicism regarding the nature of present-day society. Some wish to reduce the role of the state through the public choice mantra of privatization, by increasing the role of non-profit organizations ("points of light"), or by opting out of the socio-political system altogether (see "L.A. Gated Communities" in Etzioni 1995: 243-50).

However, there are those who have suggested that a more positive way to address public policy demands is through the creation of less formal communicative structures which encourage the exchange of ideas and the resolution of substantive differences through negotiation. This kind of "unorthodoxy" is actually more humanistic and designed to reach a greater degree of consensus than economically rationalist solutions, which are often only available to the highest bidder or are designed to promote selfish ends. One purpose of this work is to examine the feasibility of discursive formations in addressing complex implementation problems. For this reason, such structures deserve further explication.

#### Political Administration

Discourse is built on the idea of politics through negotiation, which has its basis in a body of political

science and public administration literature. It is preferable to pluralistic models of competition between elites or hierarchy because of its emphasis on equal communication. A number of social scientists have offered descriptions of new and different organizational structures as alternatives to orthodoxy, which has guided policy implementation for most of this century. Some have done so intentionally and others have done so unintentionally, their ideas having been coopted into the theoretical bases of later works. But the one thing they all have in common is a desire to attempt the redress of political grievances through negotiation. This feature, along with the transitory nature of discursive formations, is what separates discourse theory from the practice of mechanistic orthodoxy and the contemporary preoccupation with scientific rationalism, which also seeks to provide alternatives to orthodoxy.

One such theory of rationalism is Paul Sabatier's (1988, 1991) advocacy coalitions. Sabatier's theory is not unlike other pluralist models of behavior. It is useful for explaining "analytically tractable" problems involving competing interests. These interests may be purposive or, more likely, particularistic. Elites and institutions structure these interests hierarchically, except for those concerned with single-issue policy outcomes (Sabatier 1988). A corollary to the theory is that the more conflict there is

between coalitions, the less likely there is going to be change in contemporary policy practices. Under these conditions of conflict, change comes only as a result of exogenous events or actors.

Discourse theory can be used to critique the postmodern behavioral tendencies of advocacy coalition theory.

Advocacy coalitions are rational, pluralist, fragmenting collections of policy subcultures which are controlled by bureaucratic and media elites. Sabatier's theory assumes the existence of the *representative-democratic accountability feedback loop*, which Fox and Miller describe and argue is mythical except in "hyperreality." It assumes that purposive and particularistic interests operate *a priori* or independently of the articulation of public policy problems. This would suggest that these coalitions exist only for the sake of self-interest as opposed to any sense of the public good.

The actors involved in Sabatier's policy subsystems involve the same set of policy actors which might take part in a situation-regarding discourse, but are held hostage to the feedback loop. This loop is necessary to his theory as it assumes learning through the reiterative process of formulation-implementation-policy analysis-reformulation. The theory also indicates that subsystems are necessarily comprised of competing coalitions which talk past each other rather than among themselves. This contributes to what Fox

and Miller call the postmodern problematic. If advocacy coalitions do in fact behave in such a manner as to add to the "white noise" of hyperreality, then they contribute to the problems of society, rather than providing any substantive solutions.

Due to the focus on competition for particularistic benefits, the units of analysis used in the measurement of this type of behavior differ from that which might be used in the empirical verification of discourse theory. The differences in units of analysis lie between that of the rational actor versus those of the discursive community. The assumptions underlying the behavior of the different units also diverge. While rationality does not preclude altruism--it assumes individual or institutional self-interest--while a community exists in the pursuit of some sense of the common good or public interest.

The differences between discourse and the institutional elitism of advocacy coalition theory are clear. Whereas rationality assumes that the behavior of collective actors will in some way manifest the sum of their component parts, discourse theory assumes that a discursive community (or perhaps a nascent form) will take on a dynamic which is distinct from that of its individual membership. In this sense it is more organic. In addition, advocacy coalition theory does not address what happens when new and intractable problems appear without the existence of

institutional elites *a priori* to the issue area. By anchoring itself to institutional elitism, advocacy coalition theory precludes itself from the formation of non-institutional, ad hoc organizations which come together to deal with unexpected, transitory policy problems.

Besides its institutional entrenchment, advocacy coalition theory is time-dependent. That is to say that coalition behavior only manifests itself over time. Sabatier does not trust the existence of coalitions which have not had a decade or more to coagulate. Discourse is more flexible in this regard. One does not need to be bound to a particular institution or set of institutions for a period of time in order to achieve some long-lasting significance. In fact, such bounded institutionalism is likely to be a barrier to the formation of discursive patterns of administration, rather than an explanation of what happens with regard to local, complex economic development problems, such as base conversions.

#### Politics Through Negotiation

If Fox and Miller are correct and discourse is a viable alternative to orthodoxy and institutional behavioralism, then there must be a transition phase from which the currently discredited institutions evolve into newer, more appropriate discursive formations. Before institutions and practices can evolve, however, administrative theory must

first evolve in order to provide practitioners with an heuristic guide. The following discussion is an attempt to demonstrate that this type of thinking has progressed to the point where there is now a body of literature within the discipline which could loosely be described as possessing facets of discursive thought.

Hannah Arendt describes how the polis can be applied to modern politics. "[T]he Greek polis, the city-state, defined itself explicitly as a way of life that was based exclusively upon persuasion" (1963: 2). Within this context, men were able to more fully realize their "freedom" and take "action" within the "public realm" in order to solve collective dilemmas. Phillip Hansen interprets what he sees as Arendt's metaphor of the polis as a critique of the modern state, which is "large, bureaucratic and impersonal" (1993: 52) and restrictive of a genuine politics. "It also provides additional grounds for what I have argued is Arendt's attempt to encourage a rethinking of both political institutions and practices, and our ways of thinking about how we think" (Hansen 1993: 53).

Many years ago Robert Dahl described his ideal notion of polyarchy, which was a pluralist concept emphasizing the evolution of popular and liberal (though not totally democratic) political systems throughout the world. Polyarchies are designed to be "highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation" (1971: 8). But

they are more than just participatory organizations-- polyarchies are both competitive and cooperative--and compromise is seen as being both necessary and desirable (1971: 202-3). Dahl also states the necessity of practicing polyarchy at even the lowest levels of government because it "facilitates training in the art of resolving conflicts and managing representative governments" (1971: 226) as a way to prepare individuals for eventually solving large-scale national problems. Though Dahl's polyarchy tends to focus on electoral political institutions, it may also be useful for administrative problems arising from a lack of inclusiveness.

Cochran (1982) rails against the contemporary, liberal "paradigm of autonomous individualism" which dominates the public debate in favor of a more communitarian solution. He advocates the development of a better societal character and community, and contends that politics can be a facilitator towards the advancement of these goals. His notion of character includes at least two inseparable elements: moral qualities and social roles (1995: 18-19). Inherent in Cochran's notion of character is the commitment to take responsible and positive action within society. His definition of community reflects the reciprocity between communion and hospitality. Communion refers to the shared experiences between individuals, while hospitality refers to a type of mutual generosity. Politics, according to

Cochran, is a means through which a greater sense of character and community can be brought to bear upon society in an attempt to draw people closer. When this happens, society will be less fragmented, less alienated--and presumably--more willing to confront policy quandaries.

Deborah Stone argues against the assumptions of rational choice, in favor of both a polis and a political community, similar to the ideas of both Arendt and Cochran. For Stone, the polis cannot exist without a community, which is defined as an entity which assumes both a collective will and a collective effort (1988: 14). In her polis there exists a public interest, influence, cooperation and loyalty in the pursuit of solving common problems. Perfect information does not exist in the polis, despite the assumptions of the economic rationality argument.

Instead, politics is waged as a battle of symbolism and metaphor. Numbers, statistics, words and phrases are such political manifestations and are sufficiently ambiguous to intentionally cause confusion among many political participants and observers. Drawing from Berger and Luckmann (1966), Stone postulates that reality is socially constructed, and that political language and images help to define what is tangible in the polis. Those who define the use of these symbols and metaphors control the political agenda and the tone of the debate. Political reasoning then, according to Stone, "is always conducted as part of a

struggle to control which images of the world govern policy" (1988: 309).

Many discussions regarding the meaning of discourse center around the works of the German philosopher, Jurgen Habermas. Specifically, a great deal of focus has been placed on his *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, which was not translated into English until very recently. Thomas McCarthy describes the Habermasian notion of discourse as a form of communication which must include validity and an ethic based on "value standards which can be rationally criticized and revised" (1992: 56) depending upon the actions, intentions and experiences of the participants. Discourse is desirable in order to reach a consensus regarding the general interest. This type of communication is conducted within the context of the "public sphere," which according to Craig Calhoun, is where "practical reason was institutionalized through norms of reasoned discourse in which arguments, not status or traditions, were to be decisive" (Calhoun 1992: 2). So, making one's case is more important for discourse than one's institutional position.

All the preceding ideas seek to address a certain angst regarding the administration of society's problems. A key assumption of these authors is that current practices and structures are not sufficient for addressing contemporary policy demands. As a result, they have provided different solutions for this dilemma. Fox and Miller draw heavily

upon many of these works in their attempt to provide a more mature notion of authentic discourse, and to describe emergent forms which exhibit certain nascent discursive tendencies.

### Discourse Theory

Many of the preceding authors--particularly Arendt, Stone and Habermas--have been incorporated, and in many instances have been further developed or explicated in Fox and Miller's (1995) work, *Postmodern Public Administration: Toward Discourse*. Arendt has articulated a desire to return to the persuasion of the ancient Greek polis. The persuasion inherent in Arendt's and Stone's poleis is a key assumption of discourse, or politics through negotiation and argument. The inclusiveness, competition and cooperation of Dahl's polyarchy corresponds to Fox and Miller's agnostic tension which is necessary for the definition of public problems and the debate over proposed solutions. Along with polyarchy, Cochran's notions of character and community, as well as Habermas' concept of the public sphere help to provide a context similar to Fox and Miller's public energy fields, which are the arenas for authentic discourse. Stone decries the preoccupation with rationalist policy analysis in favor of the admission that politics is conducted not through economic rationality, but through a kind of symbolic manipulation which emphasizes the importance of language.

For her, society would be better served if it functioned more like the polis, supported by a strong sense of community. Habermas, as expressed through his converts, advocates an active, engaged discourse which takes place within a public sphere. All of these are included as foundational assumptions by Fox and Miller.

Discourse theory considers that the assumptions upon which Weberian structures and probabilistic bureaucratization (1995: 97-98) are based are not sufficient for solving today's public problems. Increasingly, hierarchies and one-way communication are seen as impediments to the effective delivery of public goods and services. This has prompted Fox and Miller to construct a new and improved course of action for public officials in an attempt to answer the question "What do we do next?" when confronted with unexpected or difficult policy dilemmas, such as military base conversions.

### Postmodern Politics

Fox and Miller indicate that discourse is most appropriate for situations where communication is poor or non-existent. For them, such a situation exists in the contemporary polity, which they characterize as the condition of postmodernity. This condition is characterized by an increase in the relative strength of subcultures at the expense of the thinning macro-culture. Postmodern

politics is symbolized by neo-tribalism, or the condition in which groups or individuals persist in talking *past* one another. Images, words and symbols control the postmodern public debate. A good example of this is the multitude of negative attack ads to which voters are subjected during the course of an election cycle.

In the postmodern context, politics exists in the realm of hyperreality, where it is separated from actual or genuine discourse (Fox and Miller 1995: 42-72). Many political symbols are epiphenominal (1995: 46), or without any real substance, such as the debate over whether President Clinton is a "skirt chaser" or a "family man." After a brief period of time, these epiphenomenal symbols become self-referential, meaning that they rely upon themselves for authenticity (1995: 46-58).

The contemporary public perception of administrative politics rests on the assumed existence of the "representative democratic accountability feedback loop" (1995: 14) in which the sovereign people express their desires and efficacy through the electoral process. Elected officials then instruct the bureaucracy--through legislation--how to administer public policy. The problem with this model, according to Fox and Miller, is that it assumes: (1) that the popular will is authentically represented by the electoral system; (2) the existence of a top-down implementation process and; (3) that rules are

necessary to prevent proactive public administration and to subvert popular sovereignty (1995: 14-17).

Fox and Miller argue that the "representative democratic accountability feedback loop" is a myth because it is not really democratic, nor is it accountable. Too many rules--a byproduct of the feedback loop--results in a great many of them being disregarded by administrators. "Correspondingly, the more rules there are, the more must implementers *choose* a particular concatenation of them to attend to" (1995: 19). This is not to say that there should not be any rules, only that they should have a broader aim and not be a constraint to proactive public administrators, who probably have a better sense of more specific popular wills than does the electoral system. The authors provide an excellent example of how to avoid complex systems of rules, which can result in substantial confusion. When instructing children on how to behave, "the best strategy seems to be to find an appropriate level of abstraction. 'Be nice to your friends' works better than an infinite list of 'don'ts' to cover every occasion" (1995: 19).

According to scholars of policy implementation, the initial step in addressing public policy problems is to define them (Cochran et al. 1993, Dye and Zeigler 1993, Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983). "Deciding what the problems are is even more important than deciding what the solutions will be" (Dye and Zeigler 1993: 145). In Fox and Miller's

postmodern context, this has become exceedingly difficult as there are disparate voices from across the spectrum--none of whom speak or understand the same vernacular--each defining public problems in different ways. Examples include Rush Limbaugh on the one hand, who believes that we have no problems except the ones caused by "big-government Liberals, treehuggers and feminazis," and the politically correct ("P.C.") daytime T.V. talk-show crowd on the other, represented by Jenny Jones, Ricki Lake, and their cohorts, who see everything as being either a racist or sexist conspiracy on the part of white men. Both factions, by the tone and structure of their debates, reduce the level of conversation down to that of a monologue (I'm right and you're wrong...) and lower the opportunity for the free exchange of ideas. Hence, in this context, problems are not even adequately defined, much less addressed.

### Authentic Discourse

Fox and Miller advocate the creation of a public forum, which has as its main design, communication for the purpose of addressing public policy demands through negotiation. For them, this is an attempt to resolve the dilemma between strong neo-tribalist tendencies and the thinning of the macro-culture. The means by which this is to be achieved is through the establishment of patterns of discourse, that is to say, persistent, multi-directional communication which is

of a sufficient level to include as many people as possible without degenerating into anarchy. Discourse should take the middle ground between the monologic (single-direction) communication practiced by the news media, and the "anarchic babel" (1995: 13) represented by neo-tribal societal factionalism. But in order to achieve discourse, we must first join together and seize the agenda from the practitioners of non-discursive communication.

What is meant by the term "discursive formations" is any situation characterized by a community of individuals who are highly motivated by their intent to resolve public issues through the free exchange of ideas. Discursive formations, as portrayed in this work, can represent actual discourse, such as that which is supposed to take place in an energy field, or it can represent a nascent form which exhibits discursive tendencies. It is something of a generic description of anything having to do with discourse, regardless of its degree of authenticity.

Fox and Miller's authentic discourse is the ultimate standard to which public administration should aspire. But discourse and public energy fields as Fox and Miller have described them, do not currently exist on a large scale. Our job as academics and administrators is to become more aware of how symbols are manipulated, and then become symbolic manipulators ourselves so that we may, through inclusive debate, alter current administrative practices in

such a way as to encourage genuine discourse. The ideal may not be within reach any time soon, but with a little effort, substantial progress may be realized.

### Warrants For Discourse

There are several criteria, or warrants with which we can assess the authenticity of discourse. These include sincerity, situation-regarding intentionality, willing attention, and substantive contribution (Fox and Miller 1995: 129-59).

Sincerity is necessary in order to build bridges of trust between those who would participate in the discourse. Situation-regarding intentionality "assures that the discourse will be *about* something, about contextually situated activities" (1995: 123). One's agenda, or intentions are designed in relation to the particular context for which the discourse is to take place. Willing attention refers to the active participation in the discourse. Not only must one maintain an interest in the dialogue, but one must also join in from time to time and listen critically and attentively to the arguments of others. Substantive contribution includes providing expertise, ideas, or maintaining the level (authenticity) of discourse by policing the conversation of one's peers (1995: 129-59).

Who then has a right, or one of these warrants, to participate in the discourse? In an effort to be as democratic as possible, Fox and Miller advocate the inclusion of anyone whose intentions are genuine, as long as they are willing to participate with others as equals in the pursuit of the public interest. "Communication requires equal participants. Unequal communication is oxymoronic; talk between unequals is either command or acquiescence" (1995: 116). Sincerity is important in these situations in order to build trust between participants who, at least initially, may know very little about one another. The participants must also be willingly engaged in the process, providing substantive contributions in accordance with the overall agenda, which is negotiated among the members of the group.

Discourse theory assumes that language which is used to dominate, exclude, reduce, lie or misrepresent should be identified for what it is--non-discursive--and henceforth be exposed and eliminated. Participants should "police the discourse" as a way to maintain a certain level of substantive discussion. This is intended to help prevent self-interested tendencies from taking over the debate and forcing their agenda upon others.

We want to valorize for public policy discourses the exclusion of claims that are insincere, claims that are only self-serving, claims from those unwilling to attend to the discourse, and claims from "free riders." (Fox and Miller 1995: 120)

Warrants for discourse will be awarded to sincere individuals engaged in the policy process, who wish to participate in public discussions in order to define, formulate and implement substantive decisions for complex public policy dilemmas.

An ideal public discourse which wishes to address a base conversion quandary, for example, should include those interested officials--both elected and appointed--from city, county, and state governments, as well as members of the business community, hospitals, local citizens' groups, colleges and universities, local school and special administrative districts. Every effort should be made to include as many interested parties as possible through the media, town hall meetings or less formal seminars. Any base conversion which proceeds in a manner which is closed, hierarchical or excludes significant segments of the community cannot be considered to be an example of a discursive will formation. Nor, presumably, is it likely to experience a successful outcome. The perpetrators of such a conspiracy would then not be permitted to maintain their warrants for discourse.

Austin attorney Jim Steed, who chaired the citizens' task force during the conversion of Bergstrom AFB, has said much the same thing. As Austin moved to convert the base to an international airport, it faced a number of obstacles. Though Austin is unique among base closures--the community

asked for it to be closed so that it might improve its public air infrastructure--it has a number of vocal interest groups which hound the government on almost every issue. Steed indicates that there is no way around conflict and turf battles. However, this is not necessarily a barrier to conversion, provided it is taken care of in an inclusive manner. The general idea is to keep the public informed and to allow them the right of participation (Howard 5 Aug 1995).

Steed indicates that any committee which does not operate in an open manner is asking for trouble. The inference is that a lack of substantive discursive activity will result in an unsuccessful conversion, because it will lack legitimacy and public support. Steed also believes that it is important for every faction of the community to be involved, if only to reduce criticism levelled against public officials. Such groups may play an important role in vital stages of the conversion effort, such as hiring a consultant or providing examples of prior base conversions which were less successful. It is also important in a normative democratic sense. With inclusion, communities can make the most of democracy and negotiate solutions which benefit the entire polity.

## Nascent Forms

Nascent forms of discourse presently exist, but need further encouragement in order to develop into more mature discursive patterns. Temporary networks which transcend the boundaries of institutions, hierarchies and levels of government are among what Fox and Miller mean when they refer to nascent forms. "We find that policy networks, interagency consortia, and community task forces exhibit potential for discourse" (Fox and Miller 1995: 13). The participants in such ad hoc arrangements include "specialized experts, policy analysts" (or the proverbial 'policy wonks'), managers and administrators, "interested citizens, process generalists, and others (who) participate together to work out what to do next" (1995: 13).

The more such individuals participate in the discourse, the stronger it will become. It will also become more democratic, contributing to greater equality among its participants. The more democratic it becomes, the more elite forms of special interest manipulation, such as "good old boy" networks, will be limited. As this happens, the level of discourse should rise.

According to Fox and Miller, nascent forms of discourse exist on a type of communicative continuum which stretches between unidirectional, monologic manipulation on the one hand, and expressionist anarchy on the other. Along this continuum exist recursive patterns which have embryonic

discursive tendencies. Some of these patterns exist only within elite formations, while others lean the opposite direction, towards mobocracy and disorder. The trick for establishing authentic discourse is to find the middle ground which is inclusive, but not to the point of degenerating into disorder and confusion (1995: 129-59).

### Monologic Manipulation

Unidirectional communication ("few talk") can take place in television news broadcasts and commercials, elite policy networks, closed hierarchies or in situations where the loudest voice shouts down dissenting opinions or persists until others have become disinterested, such as in a parliamentary filibuster. The way in which our society addresses policy dilemmas is closer to monologic manipulation than discourse. Political problems are defined by narrow sets of interest groups or policy elites, whose particular "spin" is expressed through a small number of homogenous wire services and cameras to newspapers and television news networks, and then to the public, which has few venues or opportunities for response. If these elites do not view the coverage they receive as favorable, they can counteract such portrayals with their own attack ads or paid "infomercials," which are also monologic.

According to Dye and Zeigler (1993: 85), changes in policy are "a response to elites' redefinition of their own

self-interest rather than as a product of direct mass influence." The lack of a strong, sustained public opinion on most issues provides an opportunity for elites to dominate the policy process in their own monologic fashion. "Opinions flow downwards from elites to masses. Public opinion rarely effects elite behavior, but elite behavior shapes public opinion" (Dye and Zeigler 1993: 158).

Dye and Zeigler base their claims on systematic survey evidence which suggests that the public perception of issue importance is dictated by the amount of attention a particular matter receives through media coverage. This argument leads political scientists to advance the idea that the media tells us what to think about. But monologic communication seems to have digressed to the point where not only does the media tell us what to think about, but *what to think* as well. Anyone who refuses to accept the validity of this proposition only has to dial up a live radio talk show in order to be told what to think. Conservative radio talk shows are probably the most blatantly monologic, but there are others of different ideological persuasions which are guilty of the same practice.

Talk shows are a new way in which "few-talk" elites can perpetuate monologic communication while giving the appearance of democratic interaction with the general public. Radio talk shows are probably the most monologic of all, though television call-in shows are little more

advanced. A person calls a particular political talk show, makes an argument, and is either praised or excoriated depending upon the ideological orientation of the host.

Dye and Zeigler discuss the new politics of television talk-shows. They argue that policy elites prefer this format due to its direct, controlled, unfiltered tendencies. Participation by the studio audiences of talk shows gives the appearance of democratic inclusion. But generally, the audiences are not well-informed about policy and tend to ask simplistic questions, the answers to which provide politicians with their requisite platforms. Dye and Ziegler speculate the the hosts are generally not as confrontational as other types of journalists, who often seek to build up candidates so that they may tear them down later. "Talk-show hosts generally let guests tell their own stories. They are less adversarial than reporters" (Dye and Zeigler 1993: 151).

Other social constructs which maintain monological patterns of communication include elite policy networks and closed hierarchies. Elite policy networks, also known as "good old boy" networks operate on an exclusive system of personal contact. The cliché "it's not what you know, but who you know" aptly describes such arrangements. Though the Whitewater hearings may have not found any significant wrongdoing on the part of the Clintons, they have served to demonstrate the nature of the "good old boy" system in

Arkansas, which is composed of a faction of businessmen, lawyers and government officials who all work towards the common goal of financial profit. This is a common way of life in most parts of the rural South. Closed hierarchies are familiar to those who have studied Weberian orthodoxy or worked in the military, large corporations or government agencies. It is postulated in this work that "good old boy" policy networks and closed hierarchies represent significant barriers to successful base conversions, but this will be addressed in the concluding chapter.

#### Expressionist Anarchy

The opposite of monologic manipulation is expressionist anarchy or "many-talk." This occurs when there are too many demands made without adequate problem definition or the submission of substantive solutions. The discussion, if there is any, is unorganized and formless. Fox and Miller examine the phenomenon of computer networks and bulletin boards as merely a situation where different people communicate among themselves, but with little or no access to policy elites.

Although they do suggest that these networks have the nascent potential to become more organized, they also maintain that this type of metaphorical "many talk" does not currently have any structure. This is because there is no sincerity, intentionality or substantive contributions being

made. Nor is there any situation where "what to do next" is being discussed.

Perhaps a good example of expressionist anarchy is a case of actual mobocracy. The Los Angeles riot of 1992 demonstrated a complete breakdown of social order and represented a feeling of illegitimacy towards the municipal government by the polity. This anarchy was caused by the fueling of racial hatreds by the law enforcement establishment, which was ultimately personified in the Rodney King beating and confirmed by the acquittal of its uniformed perpetrators. The response to the question "what do we do next?" was not a reasoned, sincerely engaged course of action negotiated through the political process. It was instead an unorganized, emotional outburst of violence, looting and destruction.

The news media literally helped fuel the fires by providing a venue which encouraged the expression of anti-governmental opinions and destructive behavior, and reinforced these images with near-constant repetition. There was no collective will formation or even a remote sense of community among the diverse participants. There were no ends which were not "devoured by the means," as Fox and Miller might say (1995: 139). The "many-talk," or in this case, the symbolic message conveyed by the mass destruction of property, became the end in itself.

## Policy Networks

Fox and Miller (1995) indicate that forms of expressionist anarchy are unsustainable over the long term, and that eventually some of these forms, such as the many voices spoken through the Internet, will eventually associate with others of similar interest and create subgroupings. This "some-talk" (1995: 141-157) may become sustained and "may even develop into serious policy deliberation" (1995: 141).

This "some-talk" tendency is characteristic of policy networks which exhibit nascent discourse. These networks transcend formal hierarchies, the distinctions between elected and appointed officials, and governments and citizens, in their attempt to negotiate suggestions for what to do next. "There are occasions where meaningful, situation-regarding discourse occurs" (1995: 149). On the other hand, there are occasions where barriers to discourse develop and nascent tendencies are reduced to nondiscursive, monologic communicative forms.

Fox and Miller indicate that the proactive public administrator is likely to encounter nondiscursive policy networks as often as they might discover occasions of actual discourse. It is important in these instances to maintain a critical eye for sincerity, intentions and substantive contributions when discerning the differences between these forms. Stillman describes the existence of a "fifth estate"

of government which is "a rich mixture of informal and transitory hierarchies" (1991: 80) which can include any and all public or private interests concerned about public policy problems. This new estate exists within the context of a global system of technocracy clusters, or technology-based hierarchies which interact on a world-wide basis. However, this is not the same thing as discourse, as these networks can either exhibit monologic or anarchic tendencies, depending on who controls the debate, or whether it is controlled at all.

#### Summary

The elaboration of these different discursive formations--authentic discourse, monologic manipulation, expressionist anarchy, nascent forms and policy networks--is necessary in order to provide an heuristic guide for analyzing the implementation of complex base conversion plans. Though actual discourse may not be discernable in the planning process, planning committees, subcommittees and Local Reuse Authorities (LRAs) may exhibit nascent discursive tendencies. One of the main research questions of this work is to determine if discourse can play an important role in the creation of complex implementation plans at the local level, and if it can be empirically verified. If this is in fact possible, an inference (but

only an inference) may be drawn as to whether discursive behavior has a positive effect on policy outcomes.

Discourse theory has the potential of arming public administrationists and administrators with new knowledge of how the public sphere functions. It also has the potential for changing the way public policy problems are addressed. Regardless of whether true discourse exists, administrators should become aware of others' intentionality. They must learn to assess the differences between sincerity and manipulation, monologic and anarchic communication. They should attempt to harness nascent forms of discourse and channel them in positive directions. This is necessary in order to ensure that a complicated existence is made more manageable for the public at large.

With current levels of education, the availability of technology, and the knowledge of what constitutes actual discourse, there is no need for elite guidance or control of the policy debate. Social pressure among participants in the energy field should suffice to maintain an acceptable standard of conversation. The acceptance of these parameters will also limit the anarchy which periodically attempts to reduce democracy to its lowest common denominators, neo-tribalism and anarchy.

## CHAPTER III

### COMPLEX IMPLEMENTATION

The goal of most communities anticipating base conversion is economic development, usually in the form of skilled jobs and income replacement. The means by which economic development is realized often includes elements of strategic planning, with combinations of different types of public and private reuse solutions as the intended outcomes. The process by which these solutions are realized is known as complex implementation. Mercer, Woolston and Donaldson (1981), Stein (1990), and Mercer (1992) indicate that localities regularly engage in complex implementation in order to expand local infrastructure, economic productivity and revenues. What is less clear, or often taken for granted, is the nature of the complex implementation process. This chapter addresses the question of how to implement complex policy solutions at the local level.

#### Developmental Goals

The main goal of most economic development efforts is job creation. Economic development involves the effects of structural change on an economy, polity or social system (Aharoni 1977, Frey 1983, Mercer 1992). Frey indicates that many societal and political factors are overlooked when it comes to analyzing economic activity. He argues that economic policies are made in a social framework and that

neither the economy nor the political system can be isolated from one another (1983). This is true because as political scientists, we generally accept Easton's (1953) idea that politics is the allocation of scarce resources and values. Economics as a method of allocation is also important because that is how most goods and services are distributed in our society.<sup>1</sup> Addressing the complexities of base conversion is directly related to how structural changes are implemented within a social, historical, political and economic framework.

This argument should not be confused with the structural Marxism advanced by Peterson's *City Limits* (1981). In fact, it is more in accord with Clarence Stone's "regime paradigm" in which structural constraints are "mediated through the political arrangements that enable a prevailing coalition to govern a community" (1987: 16). It is impossible for cities or communities to operate only as economic actors, at least not if they claim to represent the public interest. "[A] community cannot know in concrete terms what the public interest is, independent of political activity" (Stone 1987: 15).

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<sup>1</sup>Easton actually argues that values are allocated authoritatively, implying that this must be done by government. However, Frey, as well as Dye & Zeigler (1993) argue that economic activity is controlled by elites and does not reflect the will of the people. Therefore, economics is conducted in an authoritative fashion without regard for democracy.

The sociology of a particular community will play an important role in determining the nature of its politics. Stein argues that in cities characterized by substantial socioeconomic cleavages and heterogeneity, politics is often adverse to the public interest. "Greater socioeconomic diversity provides greater opportunities for competing political parties to exploit the city's diversity by pandering to the demands of special interests" (Stein 1990: 27). Conversely, in smaller, more homogeneous communities, the reverse is likely to be true. This work makes the same assumptions as Clarence Stone, Heywood Sanders, Robert Stein and others, that cities actively engage in economic development. The socioeconomic context, as well as the political context will play a role in how local governments engage in the economic development activities of job creation and income generation.

### Growth and Progress

Economic development is not the same as economic growth, although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Economic growth can be both a means to development and a measurable outcome. Growth is usually explained in terms of per capita earnings or some other measure which denotes changes in income (Aharoni 1977). Economic development however, is a somewhat more subjective concept. This is because it is based in part on the notion

of progress. One society's notion of progress is often different from another's, resulting in differences of opinion with regard to the consequences and externalities associated with economic growth.

Current notions of progress in the United States seem to be preoccupied with organizational downsizing, the decentralization of authority and privatization. Base closings and conversions represent one small facet of this overall trend. The need for greater frugality, efficiency and responsiveness seem to be the driving forces behind this tendency (see Osbourne and Gaebler 1992). However, the immediate effects of these practices may be more akin to economic recession than economic growth. Downsizing may result in greater levels of unemployment or a temporary reduction in service performance as reorganization takes place. This is usually the case when a military installation is closed. Without adequate preparation for the externalities of Pentagon downsizing, communities will experience higher rates of unemployment and negative economic growth. In some cases, it can mean the death of an entire town.

Such consequences can be averted or neutralized with appropriate economic development initiatives. In other words, developmental goals and subsequent growth can be achieved through the implementation of a strategic plan which addresses the unique characteristics of a community

and its military installation(s). This is not an unreasonable demand to place on local governments, because to a great extent, cities and counties are largely engaged in activities which are designed to enhance local economic performance. According to Stein (1990), cities actively pursue developmental policies that generate economic resources that can be used to benefit the community's economic welfare. He substantiates his argument with an empirical analysis based on Buchanan, Peterson and Miller's notion that "the functional repertoire of municipal governments is dominated by developmental and allocational service responsibilities" (1990: 31-32).

Stein is an institutionalist in the mold of Ostrom and Ostrom (1977), who assert that exclusion and jointness of consumption contribute to the inadequacy of both public and private markets. In order to remedy such inadequacies, different institutional arrangements must be constructed depending upon the nature of the goods or services to be provided. Stein differentiates between provision and production of goods. "The provision process entails three separate steps or stages of decision making: planning, financing, and monitoring" (1990: 46). This notion is not unlike that found in the strategic planning literature, and as such is potentially useful for addressing base conversion dilemmas. Though Stein may help provide a solution, he also points out the possibilities for externalities to arise

during this process. "Implicit in the planning stage of service provision is the decision about who will benefit from the provision of a particular good or service" (Stein 1990: 46). If one party is seen to benefit from proposed conversion plans while another loses, there is potential for conflict, which could result in barriers to successful conversion.

Stein defines production as "the combining of inputs (capital, labor, and entrepreneurial skills) resulting in a finished good or service, and the distribution of the finished good or service" (Stein 1990: 47). In his model, he integrates the provision and production of goods and services into differing modes of service arrangement. "The major distinction between these modes is whether the municipal government takes a regulatory or traditional role in arranging for the service" (Stein 1990: 48). His notion of traditional service arrangements involve municipal government implementing most of the provision modes, while the actual production is relegated to a third party. The regulatory service mode, however, is more akin to privatization in the sense that the government takes only a supervisory role and ascribes most of the provision and production functions to other units of government or private contractors (Stein 1990: 48).

The factors which determine whether a local government will succeed at complex implementation efforts are highly

contextual. This is likely to be true for base conversions, not only for the previously elaborated reasons which effect localities, but also because of the differing levels of specialization and existing infrastructure which characterize military bases.

### Strategic Planning

The process through which many communities make the transformation from dependence on military spending to economic development and diversification incorporates the basic elements of strategic planning. Whether a community achieves a successful base conversion may depend in part on the nature of its strategic plan. One of the objectives of this work is to ascertain how strategic plans are constructed at the local level. A key assumption is that strategic planning is an essential element of the complex implementation process, and as such, must be utilized by local governments attempting to undergo a base conversion.

According to Melcher and Kerzner, strategic planning is "formulating and implementing decisions about an organization's future direction" (1988: 1). This preoccupation with the future is crucial for planners, as institutions tend to get caught up in the present-day realities of organizational and budgetary maintenance, using the past as a guide for operations. This kind of temporally-based bureaucratic inertia makes it difficult for

decision-makers to adapt to an ever-changing environment. Melcher and Kerzner discuss the top-down nature of planning in the corporate sector, which gives us an insight as to its origins, but does not provide us with a model which is commensurate with addressing contemporary public policy problematics such as base conversions.

Benveniste (1989) argues that the strategic planning process is similar in both the public and private sectors. He emphasizes adaptability, and the reduction of bureaucratic inertia through the creation of elastic and flexible organizations. Learning, networking and the removal of "deadwood" planners from decision-making is important to the success of a strategic plan. These activities can be hampered by organizational segmentation and poor channels of communication. He also asserts that change emanates from both the top and bottom of organizations and that this multidirectional communication should be harnessed in order to enhance innovation.

Most of the literature on strategic planning stresses the implications for the private sector (Melcher and Kerzner 1988; Karger 1991). The context of the private sector emphasizes corporate, top-down methods of decision making and intense competition in the marketplace. Karger describes management by objective (MBO) in this corporate context. He argues that MBOs must proceed according to plan if they are going to be successful. The ultimate objectives

must take into consideration both external and internal limitations and both long- and short-range implications (1991). The focus in private sector strategic planning seems to be strictly on goals. However, as we shall see, that is often not the case in the public sector, where process is emphasized in addition to goals.

Perhaps the foremost authority on public sector planning is James L. Mercer. He states that "(s)trategic planning is primarily a process rather than a set of specific products" (1991: 6). This process essentially involves the setting of goals, or at least a general direction in which one wishes to progress. Once particular goals have been identified, then a determination must be made as to how they can be attained.

Strategic planning originated within the Armed Services and became popular with large corporations in the private sector during the 1950s. It was essentially a top-down method of internal implementation designed to reduce risk, train managers, and develop consensus (at least among top-level administrators). "It begins with establishing aims and purposes, followed by formulation of ways and means to achieve those purposes, and provides direction for implementation of operational or tactical planning" (Mercer 1991: 19).

However, as previously noted, there are differences between strategic planning in the private sector and in the

public sector. Differences arise with regard to competition, organizational procedures, risk assessment, political support and budgeting (Mercer 1991). But given the military origins of strategic planning, it does not seem like too great a stretch to utilize this method as a way to anticipate base conversion. While it is important to recognize that there are variations between private and public strategic plans, they should not be overstated.

There are some significant differences in the implementation of strategic plans by local governments which involve the local actors and institutional patterns of operation. These might include stronger grass-roots organizations, local elites who are opposed to certain types of development, different budgeting procedures, greater autonomy among local administrators and innovative bottom-up management reforms. Strategic planning by local governments necessarily involves a more bottom-up approach than one would find at other levels of government due to the necessity of including multiple and diverse actors in the process.

Strategic planning is *not* a form of budgeting. Nor is it particularly long-term in its focus. However, Mercer indicates that both budgeting and long-range goals can--and should be--aspects of a strategic plan. "An effective strategic planning process should be an important link

between comprehensive planning and the annual operating and capital budgets" (Mercer 1991: 7).

Public sector strategic plans are often short- to mid-term in their orientation. But military base conversions generally involve long-term commitments and have long-term implications for local governments, especially when one takes into account the recruitment of private enterprises and other government agencies for extended economic commitments in many conversions. These differences are reconciled however, when one considers the reiterative process of strategic planning. Though original plans may be short-term in focus, they are often periodically updated to account for changes and externalities. This ensures continuity, and the enhancement of efficiency and responsiveness.

According to Mercer (1991), local government strategic planning must account for at least four elements. These include:

1. Evaluation of the total external and internal environment within which the community and the organization exist
2. Identification of major threats and opportunities facing the community
3. Assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the organization and the community
4. Development of a concentrated strategy enabling the organization to effectively harness all community resources and operate within its environment. (Mercer 1991: 6)

Corporate sector strategic planning generally emphasizes only the internal and external factors. Clearly, Mercer's criteria are more inclusive and therefore more helpful to managers in the public sector.

### Environmental Evaluation

With regard to military base conversions, evaluation of the environment includes the physical environment and infrastructural capabilities of the base, in addition to the political culture and orientations of the community, its leaders, institutions and economic elites. The conversion of Bergstrom AFB<sup>2</sup> in Austin, Texas, is a good example of how a community can evaluate the economic potential of a military installation. Austin is the state capital of Texas and has experienced a great deal of population growth in recent years, with almost a million people residing in the City and its surrounding suburbs. There is a clear need for a larger airport. Also, state policy makers have strongly supported innovative trade measures, such as NAFTA, which would place greater demands on the existing infrastructure in Southern and Central Texas (Hansen and Barkdull 1995). Therefore, an easy solution to these problems (at least for

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<sup>2</sup>Bergstrom is a unique case because the community realized that the base could serve a more important infrastructural function for the greater Austin area. Because of this, the base was closed at the request of the community, which is a highly unusual occurrence.

the City of Austin) was to acquire Bergstrom, which they did in May, 1994.

### Threats and Opportunities

Identification of threats and opportunities would involve pinpointing barriers to conversion, such as the Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) phenomenon associated with the development of commercial airports on former military air stations, as well as an assessment of the economic opportunities and up-front costs associated with such a conversion. These problems have surfaced with regard to the plan to convert El Toro Marine Corps Air Station into a commercial airport in southern Orange County, California.

In the elections of November, 1994, the people of Orange County passed Measure A, which provided for the county to implement a conversion plan by 1999, when the base is scheduled to cease operations. However, the conversion plans call for the establishment of an international airport on the site of the base, which has angered residents in the communities closest to the base (Argyros 1995). The Cities of Irvine, Laguna Niguel and Lake Forest have attempted to fight the election mandate, which has resulted in a "city versus county" dispute over governmental jurisdictions. The County, citing the election results and the fact that the base is on Orange County land, has asked Washington to mediate the dispute (Berg 1995, Milbourne 1995). The NIMBY

problem may have temporarily been resolved in favor of the County, but other related problems may impede the progress of conversion, such as possible environmental hazards which are often present at former air stations, the threat from cities in the South part of the county to sue to stop the conversion effort, and possibly attempt to secede over the recent Orange County bankruptcy scandal.

### Strengths and Weaknesses

An analysis of strengths and weaknesses is essential for conversion, because if communities fail to emphasize their strengths, successful conversion is likely to elude them. The small community of Rantoul, Illinois, is often cited as a successful example of how a community can successfully play to its strengths. Rantoul was seen as having little to offer when they lost Chanute AFB, a former pilot training base which sprawled over three square miles of land in the middle of the state. However, its size and existing runway and infrastructure made it an attractive place to open a J.B. Hunt Trucking school (Stodghill and Borrus 1995).

It also attracted a number of other businesses who were interested in expanding with little expense. Since the land was a gift from the federal government, the city could afford to lease it at competitive prices. "After the base closed in 1993, Rantoul's mayor marshalled politicians and

got \$3.5 million in federal aid to ease the transition" (Stodghill and Borrus 1995: 144). The local government, community volunteers and business leaders united in an effort to sell the attributes of the former base in order to diversify the economy, and now they are projected to employ as many people as the base once did. Rantoul has also seen increased revenue from the former military housing, which they have been selling at reduced rates. They have also started collecting property tax revenues, which were not forthcoming as long as the base remained in federal hands (Stodghill and Borrus 1995).

Unsuccessful conversion often results from a failure to identify both strengths and weaknesses. Sometimes strengths are not emphasized enough, or weaknesses become significant barriers to successful redevelopment. In late 1994, the Navy turned control of a 520-acre Training Center near downtown San Diego over to the city. Optimism and expectations about development opportunities skyrocketed. However, in recent months: "Developers and city officials have come face to face with a sobering list of restrictions, costs, environmental issues and outside demands" (Kraul 1995) which threaten to end plans for hotels, yacht clubs, expensive housing and other forms of revenue-generating enterprises. Though some of the reports of the problems associated with conversion of this base are slightly

overstated, it is estimated by the City that redevelopment could take as long as twenty years.

### Strategic Mobilization

Finally, if a community wishes to achieve successful conversion, they must mobilize all relevant facets of the community in a comprehensive, strategic effort. One of the most successful conversions to date--England AFB--in Alexandria, Louisiana, illustrates how this can be done. Like Rantoul, Alexandria also contracted with J.B. Hunt before the base closed in 1992. Then, they were able to convince the Air Force to lease back part of the base for a different mission (Grafton and Funderburk 1993). Since late 1994, the community has been able to attract:

[A] company that tests airplane instruments, an aircraft inspection company, a new local magnet school--the first to be established on a closed base--and a 65-bed hospital that is operated by the state for the region's poor. A year from now, a commuter airline will move to the base from a little airfield 12 miles away. (Gargan 1994: A-1, A-10)

The community now enjoys substantially greater economic growth in the form of lower rates of unemployment (6%), increased home building and retail sales (9%) (Gargan 1994). Increased sales are very important to Alexandria as much of the local budgetary revenues are collected through the local sales tax.

England was successfully converted for several reasons. The City of Alexandria was able to implement a contingency

(strategic) plan which provided for the acquisition of the entire base and the authority to develop it as they saw fit. The plan emphasized the strengths and potential of the community and how to effectively coordinate them. This included the formulation of a number of incentives to attract businesses to an area which had previously been viewed as an economic backwater in a poor state. "Under Louisiana law, the England authority is chartered like a municipality, which gives it the right to issue bonds" (Gargan 1994: A1, A10). This gave the conversion effort sufficient strength--in the form of capital--to persuade corporations to invest in the diversification plan.

The Alexandria area has seen immediate results and has even greater optimism regarding their long-term possibilities. It should be noted that these accomplishments were not realized automatically. It took a great deal of effort and cooperation among local and regional governments, the State of Louisiana, the local Chamber of Commerce and grass-roots support. And none of the new development would have been possible without the relocation of new businesses to the area.

The problem began with the threat of a base closure and the solutions evolved, not only to deal with the problem, but to implement a larger and more significant plan for economic diversification. It is this larger world view and the commitment and mobilization of the City's resources on

its behalf which has enabled Alexandria to proclaim developmental success with their economic conversion of England AFB.

Can strategic plans fail? The answer is yes. They are not infallible. Just because managers agree on a strategic plan is itself no guarantee that they will achieve success at conversion. Melcher and Kerzner indicate that there are several reasons why strategic plans often fail.

The first reason is that public officials neglect to reexamine implementation efforts. There must be continuous feedback in order to achieve success. Second, managers can be guilty of extrapolation, or assuming that the future will be much like the past, when that may in fact not be the case. Third, planners can be blinded by initial success and grow complacent or overly optimistic. Finally, they can be guilty of encouraging over-responsiveness to current trends, resulting in overextension and spreading organizational resources too thin (Melcher and Kerzner 1988: 13-14).

#### Implementation Process

Much of the debate over implementation is in regard to the most effective methods for achieving policy objectives. Traditional theories of implementation--often referred to as orthodoxy--focus on hierarchy and top-down methods of implementation. Within the last fifteen years however, there has been a move towards less traditional and less

hierarchical forms of administration and management styles. Some of this has arisen as a consequence of corporate and governmental downsizing, although this is most likely an effect rather than a cause.

#### Top-down versus Bottom-up

The publication of Mazmanian and Sabatier's *Implementation and Public Policy* (1983) as a response to Lipski's (1976) work regarding new forms of administration, resulted in the germination of a whole new debate about the structure of policy implementation at all levels of government. Since it has been twelve years since the original edition was published, perhaps now is a good time to review the applicability of the model in the new era of reinventing government and Pentagon downsizing.

How valuable is the top-down, hierarchical model to addressing military base redevelopment? This question cannot be answered without taking into account the impact of the bottom-up response presented by Hjern (1983), Elmore (1985) and others. Neither can the context of scarcity of resources in which this debate takes place be ignored.

Some of the most notable features of the Mazmanian and Sabatier model are its hierarchical structure, its causal theory and its six conditions for successful implementation. The feature of hierarchy in the model is noteworthy only in the sense that it produced an intellectual outcry against

it. There are some disadvantages to top-down structures, which will be touched on later, but most bureaucratic models are in fact top-down by nature and this was particularly true at the time the book was authored. A criticism of the model is that it relies too heavily on statute, downplaying other essential non-statutory variables, reinforcing the notion of hierarchy. However, as evidenced by the England case, the enabling statute which established the England re-use authority and gave it the power to issue municipal bonds was key to its success.

Mazmanian and Sabatier emphasize the notion that implementation is only as successful as the causal theory behind the enabling legislation (statute) in their six conditions. Statute can be a constrictive force on successful implementation, but if done correctly it can also be a boon, allowing bureaucrats additional powers and leeway that they did not have previous to legitimation.

While others choose to focus on the top-down structure and reliance on statute, it makes more sense to examine the six conditions for effective implementation, as that is the real contribution of the work to our theoretical understanding of implementation. To briefly summarize the conditions they are:

1. problem definition and prescription are clear and consistent
2. the causal theory is correct and target groups can be directly identified and served by public officials

3. agencies have the means, both financially and otherwise, to work with the target groups
4. the administrators are committed to successful implementation and substantive results
5. there is active support among constituency groups and public officials and
6. priorities are not weakened by competing problems or policies and the original causal theory is not weakened. (paraphrased from Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983: 41)

A common thread which runs through the above conditions is the accuracy of the causal theory as opposed to emphasis on statute. No matter how well intentioned the legislators are, if they have not properly defined both the problem and the solution, then the power of statute and hierarchy becomes moot. With regard to base conversions, if the strategic plan does not adequately define economic developmental goals and projected outcomes, then there will be problems with the implementation of conversion plans, regardless of the implementation structure.

A second problem with the model returns us to the notion of hierarchy. Many academics and anti-bureaucratic, free-market conservatives criticize top-down structures as being undemocratic and unresponsive, advocating more decentralized, bottom-up oriented structures. Bottom-up structures are intuitively pleasing to nonconformists and in situations where hierarchy is clearly not applicable. However, to criticize Mazmanian and Sabatier's model simply because hierarchy is intellectually unappealing is missing a

crucial point. The point is not that top-down modeling is "a bad thing"--it has its uses--the military being the first to come to mind, but by no means is it the only one. The problem with the Mazmanian and Sabatier hierarchical model lies in the inherent limitations of its unidirectional causality.

The notion that communication in organizations is unidirectional is contradicted by those in favor of bottom-up implementation. This is an important aspect of the arguments made by Hjern (1983) and Elmore (1985), that the flows of information and communication are necessarily multidirectional in order for a bureaucracy to effectively carry out its mission. This is especially true for base conversion efforts. The street-level bureaucrats must articulate needs and solutions to the upper level bureaucrats and legislators, who then provide resources and legitimacy to the relevant agencies. The key difference between the two sides in the debate is not so much the directional flow of communication and authority, as it is the degree of discretion that the street-level bureaucrat should be permitted.

Recently the top-down model has come under fire in both corporate and governmental contexts. Large "inflated" bureaucracies, generally modeled in some form of hierarchical fashion have become targets of downsizing in a new era of fiscal and economic austerity. Organizations and

corporations have had to "do more with less" to quote a phrase popular with President Clinton, in order to deliver services and compete with foreign companies. Contrary to previous expectations, there has been no peace dividend, but policy demands seem to have increased with the ending of the Cold War.

In order to meet these demands a greater responsiveness is being required of governments. There can no longer be a Wilsonian division between policy and politics, if there ever was one to begin with. Administrators can no longer be isolated from the public by shielding themselves with layers of bureaucracy. Symmetrical pyramids of hierarchical organization are no longer seen as able to effectively implement policy in certain instances.

The criticism that top-down structures rely too much on statute for their focus of operation, comes chiefly from Hjern's critique of Mazmanian and Sabatier, who place great emphasis on law as a guide or blueprint for administration, when it may actually have detrimental effects.

"Clear and consistent objectives in a statute," assumed to be positively related to the ability to structure and to implementation success, may actually inhibit and hinder the implementing officials from using their leadership skills.  
(Hjern 1983: 303)

Hjern also discusses how Mazmanian and Sabatier downplay non-statutory variables which may affect implementation. He maintains that the two could easily be linked. "A potential for such interrelations is easily detectable in their

scheme" (Hjern 1983: 303). These non-statutory variables as discussed by Mazmanian and Sabatier are: socio-economic conditions, public support, attitudes and resources of constituency groups, support from sovereigns, and commitment and leadership skill of implementing officials (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983: 22).

The second criticism is related to the first, in that if the statutory and non-statutory linkages are established, then the division between politics and administration is removed. This is true because as seen above, the non-statutory variables represent elements of the political process, while the statutory variables represent the structure of implementation. Clearly, the two interact in reality, but Mazmanian and Sabatier do not indicate a formal relationship in their model, although as Hjern indicates an informal relationship is implied. Hjern argues that there is a conceptual link between administration and politics, and that link is policy implementation.

Baumgartner and Jones (1989) argue a similar relationship, although they distinguish between image and venue, rather than administration and politics. However, image as they define it is very similar to the previously outlined description of politics and non-statutory variables. Venue similarly describes the type of implementation a policy is likely to undergo based on institutional involvement. Their contribution to the debate

is the notion that changes in the way the problem is defined generally will result in changes in the way it is implemented. Hence, policy makers will attempt to utilize venues in which they have the greatest chances for success. Many local conversion efforts involve extensive private sector involvement, which is why venues and nonstatutory variables become important.

The third criticism regarding the limitations placed on street level bureaucrats is dealt with extensively by Elmore in his article on backward mapping. In this work he challenges the assumption that policy implementation is controlled from the top-down. "The most serious problem with forward mapping is its implicit and unquestioned assumption that policymakers control the organizational, political, and technological processes that affect implementation" (Elmore 1985: 20). Backward mapping alleges that the problem and solution are defined at the lowest level of bureaucracy and are then sent back up through the structure to receive funding and legitimation so that the solution may be effectively carried out. This idea also challenges the premise of hierarchy, claiming that it is not necessary.

The closer one is to the source of the problem, the greater is one's ability to influence it; and the problem solving ability of complex systems depends not on hierarchical control but on maximizing discretion at the point where the problem is the most immediate. (Elmore 1985: 11)

The most obvious implication of this would be the relative freedom and discretion that lower level bureaucrats would enjoy compared to those under the top-down system. It also places a greater importance on the informal network which facilitates communication in all directions. This could be especially crucial in the formulation of strategic plans for military installation redevelopment. With greater communication and discretion, multiple centers of power are likely to develop, creating polycentric administrative structures, similar to the "technocracy clusters" described by Stillman (1991), or what Fox and Miller call nascent forms of discourse, which are less hierarchical than Stillman's notion of technocracies.

However, as bureaucracies are downsized and restructured, there still remain several important things to consider. If something like nascent forms are to assist in base conversion efforts, who will be accountable with no clear chain of command? With regard to intractable problems which could pose barriers to conversion, such as environmental contamination, an answer to this question becomes that much more crucial. Somehow a system of accountability must be maintained as protection against lawsuits, duplication and corruption. It seems that with decentralization there is a tradeoff between the need for greater communication and responsiveness on the one hand, and accountability and chain of command on the other. In

order to find a more perfect system of administration, these differences must somehow be reconciled.

Elmore seems to indicate that if bureaucracies are structured in a bottom-up fashion, that they will in fact be more representative of the will of the people than top-down structures, with positive results for issues such as base conversion, though this is an inference of mine. The question for Elmore is not one of legitimacy, but efficiency and responsiveness. Mazmanian and Sabatier on the other hand, seem to indicate that it is not the job of bureaucracy to represent the polity, but to implement policy which has been previously legitimized through legislation. In accordance with Wilsonian assumptions of the separation of politics from administration, questions of justice should be addressed by statute, not by bureaucrats. The fear on the part of top-down advocates in this instance is lack of accountability on the part of street-level bureaucrats who might be given too much discretion and accede their levels of legitimate power.

#### Summary

Complex implementation involves the setting of economic development goals, the formulation of a strategic plan designed to meet those goals, and an administrative structure--either an orthodox, top-down hierarchy, or some type of bottom-up, decentralized network--to actualize the

desired outcomes. The central research questions of this work concern whether discourse is a viable way for local governments to effectively engage in the complex implementation processes associated with military base conversions. Some form of economic development is the generally desired outcome of these base conversion efforts. This involves economic growth and some consensual notion of progress. The organizational development process and means by which strategic plans are negotiated and implemented in pursuit of these goals will occupy much of the remainder of this work.

## CHAPTER IV

### DISCURSIVE COMPLEX IMPLEMENTATION

Is discourse a viable means for the implementation of complex solutions to local economic development quandaries? This chapter will attempt to mesh ideas of community development implementation with those of Fox and Miller's discourse in an effort to reach a theoretical resolution of the two canons. Or to put it another way, ideas which seek to explain what to do next and how to do it can be fused in such a way as to make them more useful. At stake are questions regarding national versus local control of implementation efforts, top-down versus bottom-up structural styles, and inclusive versus exclusive politics. Finally, a discussion of the comparative case study and participant-observation methodologies used in this dissertation will be explored.

A discourse is an inclusive, self-regulated, focused type of discussion of what to do next with regard to fairly intractable public policy problematics. A problematic includes a policy problem, its underlying causes and its potential implications. Simple problems need little discussion to come up with implementation plans and procedures. In such instances, previous patterns of implementation may be acceptable. Private disputes which do not call for government action also should not be part of the public discourse. For authentic discourse to be

particularly useful, such dilemmas must be of sufficient difficulty as to necessitate a significant number of participants. A good rule of thumb would be to include all those persons, institutions or groups which are directly affected by the problematic and are in a position to do something about it.

This implies that such dilemmas be public, for if they are not, the scope of the debate will not expand farther than a handful of self-interested private parties. This is not in the interest of the common good, nor is it in the interest of authentic, or ideal discourse. Instead, it is more like Schattschneider's (1983) view of special interest politics, where private interests control the debate, only becoming public when parties on the losing end of the game seek to expand the scope of the discussion by socializing the conflict. Or it is like the institutional behavior arguments of Sabatier (1988) which hold that agency and policy elites with like-minded interests form persistent and competitive coalitions in pursuit of budgetary resources.

Complex implementation efforts can be undertaken by strict hierarchy at the national level, which is how military bases were originally constructed. What is less clear is if complex implementation can be tackled by the other end of the spectrum--with local-level, bottom-up forms of economic redevelopment at those same military facilities. What is even murkier is the relation between local control,

bottom-up implementation and discourse. Are these patterns of political interaction compatible, and can they result in the realization of economic development goals?

### Evaluating Discourse

How can we as political scientists observe discourse? Under other circumstances, the empirical, positivist tendencies of the discipline would call for the operationalizing of those variables which might somehow explain and predict the nature of discursive forms (see Nachmias and Nachmias 1987, Babbie 1989, or Johnson and Joslyn 1991). However, the indications of nascent discursive forms--Fox and Miller's warrants for discourse--do not readily lend themselves to measurement. If one were to find ways to quantify sincerity, situation-regarding intentionality, willing engagement and substantive contribution, and present them to politicians and administrators in a survey, one would still have the problem of having to consider the accuracy, or even honesty, of the responses.

Many local politicians and bureaucrats talk about "inclusiveness" as being a central tenet of their economic development processes. But fewer actually practice it, preferring to implement policy "the way we've always done it"--with top-down, unidirectional forms being the most common. It is one thing for the public to be able to attend

and observe politicians debating policy solutions, it is another thing altogether to have them involved in the discussion of alternatives and implementation of the decisions.

But how can discourse be evaluated if one is not in attendance? Is there a way to empirically operationalize discourse theory? Fox and Miller do not provide one, as their mission was to construct theory in the first place. It falls to later works, such as this, to define the measurement of these concepts. It would be easy to say that the use of discourse will guarantee success, but one finds themselves surrounded by a tautology in this instance, as discourse does not guarantee success or vice versa. Therefore, using success as a measure of discourse is of little utility. It falls to this work to determine a way to infer the practice of discursive complex implementation and escape the circular argument.

The best way to examine the existence and effectiveness of discourse is not from the outside looking in, as most empirical social science research is conducted, but from the inside looking out. The observation of sincerity, intentions, engagement and substantive contributions involves judgments on the part of other participants and direct observers. The reactions of the participants and the behavior of the group will indicate whether someone is violating the norms of the group, or the

warrants for discourse. Such judgments are difficult to make if one is "outside the loop" or utilizing secondary data sources. Quantitative analyses with regard to the subject of base conversions are best reserved for measuring policy impacts and outcomes, where the tangible results of economic development--job creation, investment and the multiplier effects of capital--are more easily operationalized in cost/benefit analyses or other types of policy evaluations.

Participant-observation is a more effective way to examine the discursive processes of local-level complex implementation. According to Nachmias and Nachmias, political scientists can, with the aid of participant-observation methodology, observe "the behavior of occupants of political roles" (1987: 209). Some advantages to this include directness, and witnessing actions and behavior within its particular context. It is on the planning and implementation processes that this particular work focuses, as opposed to outcomes, which demands a more quantitative research methodology. A more in-depth discussion of the participant-observation research method will be considered in the last part of this chapter.

In addition to the observation of the base conversion process through the warrants, there are other ways to operationalize discourse, which may perhaps be the most significant contribution of this work. The structure of the

debate--illustrated by the practice of inclusion, the direction of communication through spatial arrangements between participants and observers, and efforts at community outreach--may be an indication of the practice of discourse. Efforts to include concerned citizens or evaluate the public interest, such as town meetings, regular newspaper coverage or surveys of local attitudes may be other indications. Progress at planning, organization and implementation can also be measured through a comparison of conversion timelines.

#### Discursive Heuristics

Fox and Miller's (1995) warrants for (or, right to participate in) discourse are not only used to determine who should take part in the discussion, but also to evaluate the nature and level of the deliberations. The warrants then are useful as both heuristic guidelines and evaluative criteria to determine the extent of the gains being made towards the ultimate goal of authentic discourse. They are also helpful for determining progress in reaching complex policy solutions. Or, in other words, they help illustrate the process.

#### Sincerity

The first warrant, sincerity, may seem a little too intangible at first glance to be of any use in complex

implementation efforts. However, it is in fact easily observed. Most public servants have a desire to further the public interest, whatever that might be. Sincerity is essential for both elected and appointed officials to maintain a working relationship. Without sincerity there is no trust, and without trust the political negotiating process breaks down. If this process breaks down, then the tangible effects of implementation--policy outputs--fail to appear. Sincerity is also easily faked. Therefore, it is important for those who observe and participate in the discourse to question the sincerity of others by determining whether they are motivated by some sense of the public good, or their own narrow concerns. This is done in order to prevent the self-interested from subverting the discussion.

An example of how sincerity is evaluated is the Lubbock, Texas, County Commissioners' Court. In the state of Texas, the county judge presides over county commission meetings. At these meetings, the judge and four commissioners discuss issues of relevance to the county which range from reviews of simple, day-to-day operations, to contracts and appropriations, to often intractable public policy dilemmas. The dynamics of these groups are somewhat akin to discourse, despite the exclusive nature of the debate. When discussing who should represent the County on the Reese AFB planning committee at the July 24, 1995 Commissioners' Court meeting, there was an obvious

collegiality and respect for each opinion presented within the group. This type of working relationship would not be possible without trust and sincerity. A key indication of sincerity is listening, which appears on the surface to be done in a very courteous and genteel manner by the members of the Court.

#### Situation-regarding Intentionality

Situation-regarding intentionality is important because differing agendas matter when it comes to negotiating resolutions to political problematics. Intentions can be observed from people's comments and actions with regard to specific situations. To return to the example of the Lubbock County Commissioners' Court, it was apparent in the discussion about the Reese planning committee that Commissioner Gilbert Flores had an agenda concerning diversity. His intentions did not interfere with the collegiality of the group, nor did they interfere with the final decision made as to who should be appointed.

The Commissioner argued that there should have been an effort to include Hispanics on the planning committee. However, he did not oppose the appointment of Judge Don McBeath, as he represents the entire county and symbolizes prioritization of the issue for the community at large. Nor did he dispute the appointment of fellow Commissioner Kenny

Maines, whose constituency includes the base, despite the fact that both Maines and the Judge are white men. Partly because of this support, his agenda was given a sympathetic ear by the other members of the group. However, if there were other agendas, they were not presented at this meeting.

Intentionality also implies that action will be taken at some stage of the game in the form of a policy solution. This is what separates discourse as a method of implementation from mere political debate or filibustering. Discourse, according to Fox and Miller (1995), is an engaged discussion about "what to do next." It follows logically that if any action is to be taken, the discussion must include a plan for "how to do it" as well. There is a difference between talking and doing. If discussion takes place, but no plan for action ever evolves from the discussion, then the discourse cannot be accepted as authentic. Therefore, in order for discourse to be a useful method of implementation, there must be an intent to take action by the participants.

### Willing Attention

Willing attention (engagement) requires that the participants be concerned about the policy problematic and the process involved in addressing it. All the Lubbock County Commissioners were engaged in the discussion about the base reuse planning committee. There is a great deal of

concern on the commission with regard to the potential economic ramifications of the base closure. The two most engaged--the Judge and Commissioner Maines--were the two who were chosen to represent the County's interests on the planning committee.

An apparent concern for the eventual outcome is what led Commissioner Flores to place his agenda of diversity behind that of the larger, collective interests of the Commissioners' Court and the County. Listening is also an important aspect of willing attention. Though Commissioners Schwantz and Kitten did not speak very often, they were still engaged, judging by the fact that they were paying attention to the debate and contributed to the final decision on the appointments. Their silence could be considered acquiescence to the arguments presented by the Judge, and Commissioners Maines and Flores.

#### Substantive Contribution

A possible criticism of discourse theory is that it may result in a great deal of discussion, with little tangible output. In order to prevent this, the intention of discourse is to encourage specific actions which will result in changes in ineffective, inadequate recursive practices. Substantive contributions include possible decisions which are proposed, discussed and adopted by the group. If quality solutions are delayed or shot down, one may suspect

the existence of hidden agendas, if they are not already apparent.

The only solution proposed by the Court for the base reuse planning committee was the selection of the two most attentive members to represent the County on the panel. It was decided that the Court would let the City of Lubbock take the lead on the issue before the County became involved with specific economic development policy solutions, since the City was already involved with setting up the planning committee. The County may have had some reason to question the intentions of the City, but little was said at this meeting, as their remarks would have been reported to the public, given the open nature of the Court. In this case, there was not a great deal of substantive contribution beyond the appointment of the two members from the County to the local planning committee. However, at that point in time, there was not a clear need for additional policy, making a "wait and see" approach the most appropriate course of action.

The example of the Lubbock County Commissioners' Court is a valuable illustration in the search for the direct observation of discourse. There seemed to be a great deal of sincerity and willing attention paid to the subject of the conversion of Reese AFB. However, if there are any other agendas besides that of Commissioner Flores (and there undoubtedly must be) they were not articulated or inferred

at the time. The meeting was also short on substantive contribution, probably due to a lack of knowledge on the subject of base conversion and the specifics of the local situation. There was also not a pressing need for policy solutions just then. These factors most likely indicate that the Court represents a political forum characterized by certain nascent discursive tendencies.

However, it does not portray authentic discourse because it is too exclusive and does not fully meet all the criteria (warrants) for discourse. The spatial arrangements in this case clearly indicate differences between participants and observers: Only those who are called to the table where the judge and commissioners are seated are permitted to speak. The group of elected officials is too small to directly represent political coalitions of interested groups, institutions or individuals. There was also no effort made to ascertain the views of the general public on the subject of base redevelopment.

#### Community Development

Do local governments implement complex economic development solutions in their communities? Clarence Stone, Heywood Sanders and others indicate that they do, despite the macro-level controls over the political-economic system presented by federalism. Not only do local governments engage in economic development, they compete with one

another to attract business and capital to their communities. In this type of inter-local market competition, some communities win while others lose, resulting in disparities of wealth and services (Stone and Sanders 1987: 3-6).

The arguments of Stone and Sanders should not be mistaken for the structural Marxism of Paul Peterson (1981). On the other hand, they also do not fall neatly into the pluralist models of Dahl (1961) and Polsby (1980). They instead offer a "regime paradigm" of development policy in which politics matters, though it is constrained by the division between the state and markets. "Development policy is understandably, then, very much a matter in which business and government are jointly engaged" (Stone and Sanders 1987: 18).

This harmony of interests and cooperation between local business and government is a crucial assumption of this work. In order for discourse to serve as a means of implementation for complex economic development plans, these interests and institutions must be able to readily come together in a negotiative forum. Though Stone and Sanders are perhaps not what Fox and Miller would characterize as discourse theorists, they do describe what could be considered nascent discursive tendencies as it applies to local economic development cases. Certainly the practice of inclusion through the creation of political coalitions as

described in their edited volume of case studies can be regarded as a discursive tendency.

Pagano and Bowman (1995) accept much of Stone and Sanders' regime paradigm and add to it. They argue, like Stone and Sanders, that politics matter and that economic development operates within structural confines. Within communities, business, government and other interested parties cooperate in political coalitions designed to enhance development and attract businesses from other communities. Moreover, Pagano and Bowman believe that these coalitions make normative judgments as to how they see their community in relation to others. "Local officials pursue development as a means of reaching an ideal, reflecting an image they hold collectively of what their city ought to be. The cities that their city competes with, then are important" (Pagano and Bowman 1995: 2).

This explanation for the behavior of local governments in deciding which development projects to undertake seems to indicate the presence or practice of something akin to discourse. The normative discussions about what cities should do next imply policy making through negotiation. There is also the implication that these discussions are focused, inclusive and self-regulating. "City leaders thus take action and mobilize capital based on a vision of what they hope and expect their city to become. Cities search for a niche. Cities reestablish, repackage, even reinvent

themselves in an attempt to find their niche" (Pagano and Bowman 1995: 3).

### Entrepreneurial Cities

Stone and Sanders revisit New Haven, the subject of numerous political science studies on community development since the 1960s. They assert that it is much easier to maintain working political coalitions during the consensus-building, promotional phases of development, because there is a tendency for them to break down during implementation, particularly if there are developmental problems. Despite the success of New Haven's Mayor Richard Lee in attracting federal grants and popular support, he was less successful at actual implementation. "The New Haven urban-renewal program mirrored the [entrepreneurial-style] political arrangements that Lee put together; it was long on the politics of announcement and image projection" (Stone and Sanders 1987: 179). But it was exceedingly short on tangible outcomes.

There are several implications for local discursive base redevelopment efforts which can be learned from this case. First, there is a big difference between talking and doing. In sixteen years of governing, despite massive federal aid and personal promotion, the Lee administration was unable to complete its renovations of the downtown area of New Haven. Bruce Wright argues that discourse is not

about anything (1996: 8). Such policy outcomes might serve to substantiate this assertion. Second, particularistic interests can interfere with the realization of the common good. This fragmentation of interests is also characteristic of other entrepreneurial cities. According to Stone and Sanders, this was caused by the imposition of widespread costs to other segments of the community, mainly the better parts of town, which "were not fully compensated for by community gains" (1987: 180). Thus, the failure to provide benefits to all who had invested in the coalition resulted in fragmentation.

Stephen Elkin describes the City of Dallas prior to the 1970s as a "pure entrepreneurial city." By this he means that the attitude of the power elites was that the city should be run like a corporation in order to maximize its development. Fiscal restraint was necessary in order to have high bond ratings so that there would be "little trouble in raising money in the bond market. In turn, this would enhance the city's reputation as a good place to do business" (Elkin 1987: 29).

In the political realm, city council members were elected at-large, and were encouraged to maintain a part-time, nonprofessional system. This worked to the benefit of the business elite, who controlled campaigns and election outcomes with wealth. The bureaucracy, on the other hand, was highly professionalized, due to the merit-based city-

manager administrative system. There was a clear firewall of separation between politics and administration. However, it was clear that the business of the City was the promotion of business. As long as the bureaucracy knew and carried out its mission, it could exist in relative autonomy, with little interference from the council.

By the 1970s, Dallas had evolved into a "complex entrepreneurial political economy" (Elkin 1987: 40). This was characterized by the fragmentation of business interests and the weakening of business-oriented interest groups, and the adoption of single-member council districts due to an anti-discrimination suit. These events have reduced the importance of big money in city elections. However, Dallas still remains a business-oriented city, despite the fact that there are substantially greater numbers of diverse participants in the political-economic system. The role of the city bureaucracy has not changed greatly. Its mission is still to support the expansion of economic development by increasing and maintaining the infrastructure. According to Elkin, Dallas is still very much a corporate municipal entity, designed to increase the wealth of certain interests, even though the number of those interests has increased. Perhaps this fragmentation is an externality of expanded economic development.

From the description of entrepreneurial cities, it appears that they do not encourage anything that might

resemble discourse. This was definitely the case in Dallas, which was controlled by a narrow elite. However, as these cities grow, the number of elites grow and fragment. In order to maintain a cohesive political system, steps must be taken to reassimilate the divergent interests. This, according to Stone and Sanders, manifests itself through the formation of inclusive coalitions between political and economic elites. The existence of their "regime paradigm" suggests a potential progression or evolution towards public discourse in cities which formerly were characterized as entrepreneurial.

In his discussion of New York City's financial problems, Robert Pecorella (1987) argues that the city's fiscal situation provides a context for political interaction between concerned elites. He further indicates that the influx of federal funds also gave rise to coalitions which included groups from outside the business community. This phenomenon may be of particular interest to those communities interested in base conversions, as there are substantial federal grants available for base redevelopment. In New York, the reduction of federal funds contributed to the destabilization of the ruling financial coalition. Pecorella argues that in order to have maximum influence, financial interests must be unified politically.

This argument seems to indicate that federal funding or involvement might also be a catalyst in the progression

towards discourse in complex implementation efforts. Federal funding for economic development usually mandates the inclusion of previously excluded or disadvantaged groups. This can involve granting developmental subcontracts, employment opportunities, or participation in the political decision-making process.

Raphe Sonenshein (1993) discusses the political rise of racial minorities in Los Angeles against the prevailing, business-dominated, entrepreneurial system in that city. He argues that it was only after black, Jewish and Hispanic communities had "taken off" economically that they were able to achieve a modicum of political power. What they lacked in resources, they made up for in organization, taking advantage of the single-member district electoral system. As real estate was one of the most important developmental industries in the city, segregationist housing laws had the direct effect of keeping minorities in the lower class. Once these were repealed, minority groups had the opportunity to become part of the system.

The election of Mayor Tom Bradley, supported by a coalition of reformist whites and racial minorities, was the catalyst for a transition from an entrepreneurial, business-dominated city to a diverse, progressive, multicultural center of economic development aided by an influx of federal and state funds. However, when federal funding was gradually reduced during the Reagan years, the old

conservative, pro-business patterns began to reestablish themselves. The differing developmental interests of the white, liberal community and the black community ultimately split the reformist Bradley coalition. When Bradley fell victim to a savings and loan-related scandal, any semblance of political unity was destroyed. Since then, the old pro-business faction--represented by Mayor Richard Riordan--has regained power. This probably does not represent a return to the *status quo ante*, as the system was forever changed by the Bradley coalition, which made L.A. politics more democratic, but it is probably an indication that the system has once again fragmented.

Sonenshein is describing a situation in which a nascent discursive coalition was formed to deal with the economic problems directly caused by the exclusion inherent in an entrepreneurial system. The Bradley coalition was formed through a network of concerned groups and churches with the intent to take action on what to do next with regard to the problems of *de facto* economic segregation and political exclusion. This new system replaced the old one, and grew with the help of federal funds. However, there seem to be indications that without additional encouragement, these inclusive coalitions can dissolve or break down. This may be caused by the reallocation of economic development projects and funds within the coalition as federal involvement diminishes.

## Inclusive Strategies

Heywood Sanders (1987) contrasts economic decision-making in New Haven with that of Kalamazoo, Michigan, which resisted entrepreneurial development schemes. There are some structural differences between the two which may explain some of the differences. Kalamazoo is required to hold referenda on developmental initiatives in which public funds are to be at risk, New Haven is not. Thus, Kalamazoo is forced through the electoral structure to be fiscally responsible and less adventurous.

In 1959, Kalamazoo became the first city in the United States to build a mall. This was accomplished by negotiations between the city government and the business community. As it was done largely without public funds there was little opposition from the electorate. Plans to expand the mall with public funds were met with electoral opposition a number of times over the next twenty-five years.

The situation here is clear: Complex economic redevelopment is not possible without the full support of the community at large, which in this case includes municipal government, business and the electorate. Though governmental initiatives by themselves have had a tendency to fail, the people are not opposed to development if the private sector is willing to assume the costs and other related risks. When this is agreed to, new projects take

place and are likely to be successful. It seems that in Kalamazoo the political structure is a facilitator for consensus, rather than a tool for special business interests, as in the cases involving entrepreneurial cities. In this case, the political system has always been a forum for negotiation, exhibiting nascent patterns of discourse among diverse interests.

Adolf Reed (1987) writes about the administrative coalition of Maynard Jackson, who was Atlanta's first black mayor. The Jackson years are indicative of how collaboration can be achieved between a poor, black electoral majority, and a rich, white private minority. Jackson's coalition came together around a plan to develop another airport, which was favored by the white business faction. In order to maintain support among his black constituents, however, he proposed to have the airport built on the outskirts of the heavily black, southeastern part of town with minority-owned construction companies.

In order to hold the competing interests together, he resolved their differences by redefining development--not as a contentious redistributive issue--but as an allocational issue from which everyone benefited. Even though Atlanta retains important characteristics of an entrepreneurial city, in this case it behaved in a more consociational manner, representing all the relevant interests, and was successful in its implementation efforts.

Inclusive strategies in which business and government work together with other interested parties to achieve economic development are not always guaranteed to succeed. However, without consensus, success is not likely. This fact is not lost on the Pentagon as it assists communities faced with the redevelopment of military installations. I will return to this point in the next section.

It must be kept in mind that Kalamazoo and Atlanta have important contextual differences. Kalamazoo is a medium-sized, largely homogeneous, white community. Atlanta is a big city, with a great deal of diversity. These contextual factors must be taken into account whenever redevelopment questions are posed or examined, as they will likely have an impact on the outcome.

The rural community of Alexandria, Louisiana, was never an entrepreneurial city, but it has become more like Reed's contemporary, consociational model since the closure of England AFB. This has happened for two reasons. The first has to do with breaking the "good old boy" network. The second has to do with state and federal support for the redevelopment effort.

Like much of the rural South, the communities of central Louisiana have been controlled by local economic elites for quite some time. These "good old boy" networks are based on wealth and personal connections. Such arrangements are not conducive to successful base

conversions because they are exclusive and lack expertise on complex redevelopment. The network in the Alexandria area was only broken with the creation of the England Reuse Authority, which overwhelmed the "good old boy" elites on several levels. The Authority was created by the State of Louisiana and included members from the City of Alexandria, neighboring Pineville, the local parish, school district and others (Morgan 1995).

Alexandria received an award in 1994 from the National League of Cities for innovation in the field of economic adjustment. This award was based in part on a list of seven suggestions for communities facing base closure, which was provided by the England Authority. Four of them involve inclusion and multi-directional communication among the public, political and business leaders. "Throughout the study and implementation phases, the England Authority insisted on open communications with all concerned parties" (Price 3 Oct 1994: 11). The other three suggestions emphasize goals, planning and persistence.

The state gave the power to issue bonds to the Authority and guaranteed matching funds for federal grants. With financial and political power reallocated to the Authority by the state, the good old boy network was overwhelmed and became irrelevant. But this was not before they had contributed to significant delays and difficulties, according to England consultant Bobbi Morgan. In this case

it is apparent that inclusion was conducive to better organization and the raising of capital, which is necessary for any economic redevelopment effort. Alexandria is now considered to be one of the most successful base conversions in the nation.

As far as discourse is concerned, it is definitely more desirable to be inclusive than exclusive. It seems that in most of the entrepreneurial cases policy ideas originate and are implemented from the top-down. Discourse theory favors bottom-up, multidirectional approaches rather than orthodox methods of implementation. This approach is more democratic than the cooptive processes used by economic elite-dominated systems. As stated earlier, in order to provide for discursive implementation of economic development plans there must be a harmony of interests between business and government, and they must be willing to come together with other concerned parties in a forum which facilitates negotiation. Once an agreement is made on what to do next and how to do it, implementation easily gives way to policy outcomes. In fact, complex implementation provides the conceptual link between inclusion and discourse, and substantive results.

#### Empirical Referents of Discourse

This section defines the measurement of the discursive complex implementation process. There are several empirical

referents which can be used to illustrate the practice of discourse. They are: inclusion, self-regulation and policy outputs. The practice of inclusion indicates sincerity and a specific situation-regarding intentionality (agenda) which is focused on what to do next. Self-regulation is an indication of willing engagement, that people are allowed to freely participate in the conversation. Policy outputs are a barometer by which an assessment can be made regarding whether the discussion is about what to do next, how to do it, and that substantive contributions have been made toward these ends.

While inclusion and self-regulation, as well as their corresponding warrants, are unique to discourse, policy outputs, and hence substantive contributions, are not. Outputs and contributions by themselves do not indicate discourse and may in fact be illustrative of some other dynamic. However, outputs are an indication that action is being taken, and when coupled with inclusion and self-regulation, serve to substantiate the claim of Fox and Miller (1995) that discourse is indeed a useful theory of implementation. For this reason I argue that it is unlikely that one would ever observe inclusion and self-regulation without subsequent policy outputs. The practice of discourse therefore, can be empirically verified through the observation of inclusion and self-regulation, while its

degree of authenticity and overall value can be weighed through implementation progress.

Three criteria can be used to determine the nature of inclusion. They involve coalition building, the acceptance of outsiders and community outreach activities. Much of this chapter deals with the idea that local governments form coalitions with discursive characteristics in order to gain support and legitimacy for stated economic development initiatives. This literature indicates that these coalitions must be representative of the community at large--incorporating various political factions, racial groups, business and grass-roots interests--and that local government provides the leadership necessary to coagulate these various interests into a workable unit.

Another manifestation of inclusion is the acceptance of outsiders. Sabatier and Pelkey (1987) suggest this as a measure for their advocacy coalition theory, although for them the outsiders are media elites, interest groups and policy analysts. For local discursive economic development efforts, the outsiders might include consultants or specialized practitioners brought in for specific implementation purposes. Acceptance of outsiders is a good indication of sincerity and agendas with regard to solving base conversion dilemmas, as expertise is required to deal with the technical difficulties associated with defense readjustment. Outsiders which might be invited to

participate in base reuse are consultants, base redevelopment staff, the military and Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) personnel.

A third indicator of inclusion is the practice of community outreach activities. Such activities include, but are not limited to, town meetings, regular media coverage, informative surveys or any other practices which enable public participation. Town meetings must be set up in such a way as to encourage multi-directional communication and should be held on a regular basis at a consistently accessible location. Town meetings can be evaluated by observing the spatial arrangements of the participants and observers, and the format of the discussion (Domahidy and Gilsinan 1992, Goodsell 1988). A roundtable setting is most appropriate for discourse because it encourages a feeling of conversation between equals. Other types of seating arrangements, such as having lecturers on a stage or at a podium in front of an audience, are more conducive to monologic communication, as they stifle participation and the normal give-and-take of conversation by rearranging the "civic space" (Domahidy and Gilsinan 1992, Goodsell 1988).

Regular media coverage can take the form of weekly newspaper columns or television news stories, the substance of which could be evaluated through a content analysis if one were ambitious enough. The media can also keep the community informed regarding the places and times of public

hearings or meetings, rather than simply reporting the results of the discussion after the fact. Informative surveys are a useful tool with which to gauge public opinion and values. They are also a useful way to seek out the ideas of those who may otherwise be unable to participate in regular discussions due to high information or opportunity costs. Self-regulation is an important aspect of discourse. If the group or community is not allowed to "police the discourse" in the words of Fox and Miller, then communication is unequal, hierarchical and non-discursive. There can be no discursive will formation or willing engagement if it is coerced. One indicator of self-regulation is the election of leadership by planning committees and subcommittees. Another might be the negotiation of operating rules and procedures.

A third indication is multi-directional communication. Again, one way this can be evaluated is through the observation of spatial arrangements at meetings. If people are relegated to an audience--by seating them at other tables or in rows of chairs--they are reduced to the status of passive evaluators rather than active implementors, and are hence not allowed to take part in the discussion or its direction. Other ways to create multiple channels of communication are through the innovation of multiple access points, such as providing toll-free phone and fax numbers, or e-mail addresses.

Finally, policy outputs can be used to measure substantive contribution. Fox and Miller argue that discourse has to be about what to do next and that substantive contributions must be geared towards this end. I assert that "how to do it" necessarily follows from the discussion of "what to do next." Whereas Fox and Miller posit that policy solutions can be negotiated through politics and that discourse is necessarily about something, I argue that discourse is not only about something, but that to be authentic with regard to addressing complex policy problems, *it must be specifically about the implementation process.*

There are several steps to policy implementation which include the creation and funding of implementing agencies, the construction of rules and regulations (Cochran et al. 1995) in addition to the daily activities of policy execution. James Q. Wilson (1989) argues that every organization must have a task, mission and the autonomy to carry out policy objectives. These criteria can be used to operationalize the substantive contribution warrant, because they are illustrative of specific actions, which is the goal of substantive contribution. For the purposes of this work, if there are policy outputs which address the military base conversion process, and if they are carried out within a reasonable period of time, then they serve to illustrate whether substantive contributions have been made. If

solutions are not negotiated within a certain amount of time it may be indicative of hidden agendas, stonewalling, poor organization or incompetence, and serve to indicate that there are problems somewhere in the process.

It should be kept in mind that while substantive contribution and policy outputs are necessary for discourse to be effective, they are not by themselves sufficient indicators because they are not unique to discourse. Policy outputs which serve to indicate implementation activity may include organizational development, the application for redevelopment grants, completed strategic plans and their actual execution through the relocation or expansion of private and/or public businesses and institutions. Such activities are not unique to discourse--as are inclusion or self-regulation--but they serve to illustrate the authenticity of discourse through the demonstration of tangible action. In other words, discourse is only authentic if something is being done, otherwise there is no point to having the discussion.

Actual implementation activity is an indication of substantive contribution because there can be no realization of "how to do it" without tangible results. Base conversion implementation is characterized by the marketing of base facilities to private contractors or other governmental agencies, the signing of interim leases to said contractors and agencies, negotiation with the military for surplus

property, and the signing of caretaker agreements to manage the base between the time military operations cease and when the property is finally ceded to the community. Policy outputs of these types are an indication that there is an actual process taking place and that it is focused on the execution of specific policy contributions and solutions.

Conversely, the lack of discursive behavior can also be operationalized through the observation of exclusion, orthodoxy and the lack of policy outputs geared towards problem solving. Exclusion is exemplified through elite control, refusal to include outsiders, and an unwillingness to reach out to the community. Orthodoxy is most easily defined by the practices of appointing officials to a hierarchical system and unidirectional communication. A paucity of policy outputs such as organizational development, grant applications, strategic planning and implementation activity can be noted by their absence, or by the the presence of the very antithesis of discourse-- litigation. Again, it should be kept in mind that policy outputs are a necessary condition of discourse, but are not by themselves sufficient to indicate its practice.

To briefly summarize, the empirical referents of the warrants for discourse are inclusion, self-regulation and policy outputs. Inclusion involves the creation of a broad-based coalition of political factions, racial groups and business interests, the acceptance of outside expertise, and

community outreach activities such as town meetings, regular media coverage or informative surveys. This referent is indicative of the warrants of sincerity and situation-regarding agendas. Self-regulation is demonstrated by the election of leaders, the negotiation of operating rules and procedures, and the practice of multi-directional communication through multiple access points. Self-regulation indicates willing engagement and participation in the process.

Policy outputs include organization development, the application for economic development grants, completed strategic plans and specific implementation activity which is geared toward solving complex redevelopment problems. Although policy outputs are not unique to discourse, they help to illustrate the nature of substantive contributions and provide evidence that discourse can be a useful method of complex policy implementation. These referents will be employed to compare the practice of discourse across case studies involving military base conversions.

#### Field Research Methodology

Discursive complex implementation does not lend itself well to the positivist methods commonly practiced within the discipline of political science. Therefore, a more qualitative--although no less empirical--style of methodology is in order. Earl Babbie (1989) groups all

those qualitative methodologies which have to do with observing socio-political behavior under the category of field research. This category includes the practices of direct observation and interviews, participant-observation and case studies.

There are several advantages to this type of methodology. First, it enables social scientists to conduct research on behavior or theory which is not easily quantifiable. It can also compensate for the reductionism endemic to the operationalizing of quantitative data, providing a more complete picture of the behavior under scrutiny. Field research is also useful for examining behavior which is best understood by understanding the context in which events happen (Babbie 1989: 261-289; Nachmias and Nachmias 1987: 209). This is especially crucial for the base conversion process, as each case has a unique historical, social, political and economic context.

#### Participation versus Objectivity

Perhaps one of the best known practitioners of field research methodology is anthropologist Margaret Mead. After many years of studying primitive cultures abroad, she returned to the U.S. during World War II and discovered an interesting paradox regarding the observation of one's own society. "The obligation of the scientist to examine his material dispassionately is combined with the obligation of

the citizen to participate responsibly in his society" (Mead 1942: 4). It is important that researchers maintain a certain distance in order to ensure objectivity. However, this does not preclude involvement or the contribution of expertise in solving political matters.

Smith and Kornblum (1989) discuss how "ethnographic" field researchers often become deeply embroiled in the situations in which they find themselves. In such instances the researcher "often must reexamine his or her values and attitudes and may be forced to make choices that would not be required in the ordinary course of events" (Smith and Kornblum 1989: vii). While it is important to contribute for what I believe is the good of the community, it is also important not to taint my analysis with an undue amount of personal value judgments. Therefore, certain criteria--in the form of Fox and Miller's warrants for discourse and implementation timelines--are used, not only as a way to judge the level of discourse, but to maintain an objective focus to this work.

There are some disadvantages to the utilization of field research, which should not cause any significant empirical or conceptual roadblocks for this particular work. Babbie indicates that field research measurements may not be as reliable or generalizable as quantitative analysis, though they may have more validity in the sense that measurement is more direct. Also, conclusions are usually

suggestive rather than definitive (1989: 286). Finally, there is a danger that observation is not totally objective and that the conclusions which are drawn may be hasty or biased (1989: 285-89).

Johnson and Joslyn (1991) point out additional advantages to observation. They assert that field research allows a researcher more time to observe behavior than one would have in a laboratory or other controlled experimental situations. Since I have lived in Texas for five years, spending most of my time in Lubbock, I have a particular insight on the contexts involved with base conversions in this state and in the community where I reside.

#### Political Science and Field Research

Johnson and Joslyn also indicate that field research is used recurrently by political scientists. This is often forgotten as newer and better software becomes available to assist us in our quantitative evaluations. However, Richard Fenno has received a great deal of acclaim for his observations of congressional behavior on the campaign trail, in home districts and within the national legislative institutions. Fenno's method of observation includes traveling with members of Congress and candidates and making notes of events and his impressions in a journal at the end of the day. For those who study campaigns and elections,

there is no better method of research than to go on the road with candidates.

Nelson Polsby is known for his observational work on community power in New Haven. He indicates that just because research is qualitative does not mean that it is any less scientific, provided certain criteria are met. "Findings that pretend to scientific acceptability must be verifiable" (Polsby 1980: 5). Answers to research questions must be grounded in reality, easily replicated and falsifiable, according to Polsby, who utilized the participant observation method as a Yale graduate student in the late 1950s.

Another piece which was written about New Haven at roughly the same time as Polsby's dissertation was Dahl's *Who Governs?* (1961). In this book, Dahl was attempting to illustrate the nature of power and influence--concepts which are also not readily amenable to quantitative analysis. His solution was to conduct a number of interviews and collect historical data in order to corroborate what he felt were unsatisfactory operational measures of influence (1961: 330-31). One of the issue areas in which Dahl chose to conduct his analysis was economic redevelopment, which tends to legitimate the appropriateness of this type of method in the study of military base reuse.

The policy case studies used by John Kingdon in illustrating the agenda setting and policy processes are

also well known. Kingdon's plan was to eventually interview elements of the entire policy making community over time, "not just parts like Congress, the presidency, the bureaucracy, or lobbies" (Kingdon 1984: 5). Eventually he collected enough information for twenty-three case studies on changes in health and transportation. "These case studies proved to be quite useful since they provided concrete instances of the processes under study, and since they had a dynamic quality which would not be explored using static methods of observation that concentrate on one point in time" (Kingdon 1984: 229).

In order to test the feasibility of local-level discursive complex implementation, case studies of base conversion efforts in Lubbock, San Antonio and Beeville, Texas, will be examined through the comparative case study-field research method. I have spent a great deal of time attending meetings concerned with base redevelopment-- particularly in Lubbock--and kept track of relevant events and perceptions through a journal, much like Fenno. Personal perceptions of personal and phone interviews as well as observations are augmented by local newspaper coverage of the redevelopment efforts in all three communities. Chapter V will examine the base transition process and how discursive progress can be inferred through a comparison of implementation steps on a Department of Defense (DOD) timeline.

Chapter VI will focus on the discussion of actual redevelopment plans and how the community of Beeville has implemented them. Beeville was chosen because it is similar to the other cases of Lubbock and San Antonio contextually and because it is being hailed as one of the newest base conversion success stories. Since I was not directly involved with the Beeville case, this chapter will rely on more descriptive accounts through documents and elite interviews conducted on a recent visit to the community. Beeville, despite its apparent success, was faced with organizational development, strategic planning and intergovernmental barriers to conversion as well.

Chapter VII will focus on Lubbock and San Antonio, which were notified of the loss of their air stations in 1995. With the Lubbock case there is the additional benefit of participation through the Texas Tech Military Base Conversion and Community Assistance Program, which has provided expertise and has attempted to facilitate community involvement since it became apparent that Reese AFB was a potential target for closure. Documentation on San Antonio was generously provided by the IBASC planning committee, the City of San Antonio and Office of Defense Transition, which are leading the privatization, realignment and economic development efforts at Kelly AFB. Additional information was gathered from interviews conducted on a visit to San Antonio. Inclusion, organizational development,

strategic planning and intergovernmental barriers are underlying themes of all three of these chapters.

## CHAPTER V

### THE BASE CONVERSION PROCESS

This work illustrates the link between discourse and developmental policy outcomes, which is represented by the implementation of complex base conversion plans. The three phases of base conversion and the practical steps which must take place in order to reach success are discussed in this chapter. The reuse efforts of several communities are assessed through a comparison based on a Pentagon timeline for redevelopment. Those communities which organize and create strategic plans within a short period of time may have an edge on those which do not, in terms of success or failure.

The conversion of military installations to private use is one way in which the ideas of local control, bottom-up implementation and discourse can come together in the pursuit of economic advancement. The previous chapter illuminates the inclusive nature of successful implementation efforts, implying the practice of politics through negotiation. In fact, it is not too great of an intellectual stretch to equate inclusion with discourse, as they both have the same aims and ideal patterns of communication.

Fox and Miller (1995) provide an implementation model which should appeal to bottom-up theorists, and advocates of inclusion and local control. Indeed, Charles Fox considers

discourse to be an operative theory of bottom-up administration. The warrants for participation in the discourse are undoubtedly more democratic than what is known in Texas as "good old boy" politics, or economic elitism, which often claims to represent interested factions in redevelopment efforts but in fact does not.

The question which remains is, Does discourse work? The base conversion process is one where inclusion is mandated by the Pentagon. In order to receive federal property, planning and administrative grants, local governments must set up administrative structures which seem to resemble what Fox and Miller characterize as nascent forms of discourse. Many base conversions have resulted in success where these patterns of administration were properly developed. A discussion of these structures and the base conversion process is necessary in order to more clearly understand how local governments in Texas plan, organize and implement complex base redevelopment strategies.

#### Opportunities for Redevelopment

Many communities view base closure with a sense of desperate fear for their economic well being, due to the loss of jobs and federal income. However, base conversions often present substantial economic development opportunities which may eventually create more jobs and generate more income and tax dollars than were previously available

through military spending. According to the Pentagon's Office of Economic Adjustment, "171,177 new jobs have more than replaced the loss of 87,557 DOD civilian jobs" (OEA 1993: 4) at 97 former bases which were closed between 1961 and 1993.

Over one-third of the bases closed prior to 1993 are home to an educational facility of some sort, with four-year colleges, vocational/technical and community colleges being the most popular (OEA 1993). The most recent success story is the new California State University-Monterrey Bay, located on the former Fort Ord, which is located about 90 miles south of San Francisco (Associated Press 29 Aug 1995). Higher education is an important facet of economic development, not only because of short-term job creation and the influx of tax dollars, but because of the long-term effects of having a skilled workforce which can command high-paying, value-added jobs. University-business partnerships are a good way to support technical innovation through research and development grants. Most redeveloped bases are home to some sort of industrial or office park, and almost half of the bases closed since 1961 are home to either a municipal or general aviation airport (OEA 1993). These types of infrastructural redevelopments are essential for the future of local economies as the relationships between cities become more competitive.

## Structural Factors

The transition from military missions to high-dollar, private developments is not an easy one, but it is possible provided certain procedures are carried out. The Pentagon requires that redevelopment efforts be administered by local civilians. "Local community leaders are the real heroes in this adjustment process" (OEA 1993: 4). Though the federal government and many states will provide redevelopment funds, the organization and implementation must be carried out at the local level. The federal requirement that reuse efforts be inclusive contributes to the negotiative--and possibly discursive--tendencies of base conversion politics. The inclusion requirement is designed to foster community consensus and is necessary in order to receive Pentagon recognition of the reuse effort and to be eligible for EDA and other funding as well as the transfer of property (Mayer 1992, *Federal Register* 26 Oct 1994: 740, Morgan and Meyer 1995, Morgan 1996).

There are several reasons for local-level implementation. The Pentagon simply cannot afford the time and resources necessary for the coordination of interests, organizational development and the implementation of reuse plans in all the communities impacted by base closure. Also, federal control is not practical: Many conversion delays are the result of foot-dragging or political haggling

among federal agencies or specific branches of the military service.

Local governments can be more efficient due to the decentralized nature of economic development, and because of their proximity to the situation. A key assumption of bottom-up implementation theory is that the closer one is to a problem, the more likely one will be to accurately assess it, provided there is enough street-level autonomy to do so. "Because public policy almost always works through people to achieve results, policies are not likely to have the desired effects unless target groups make decisions and take actions consistent with the production of policy purposes" (Ingram and Schneider 1991: 334). The old cliché, "If you want it done right, do it yourself," may be an apropos description of local base conversion successes.

#### Base Retention and Closure

Organization of the conversion effort usually takes the form of a successive evolution which parallels the redevelopment process. "Under different names and with varying developmental paths, it is common for a sequence of three organizations to form" (CPS *Conversion Update* 13 July 1995). These include a retention task force, a planning and reuse committee, and the Local Reuse Authority (LRA). The different circumstances which provoke the formation of these organizations will be examined here in greater detail.

Base conversion efforts actually begin to evolve before the base is anywhere near being closed. When the military begins its process of recommending bases for closure, local governments mobilize to prevent this from happening. The usual pattern is to create a retention task force which is charged with lobbying the military, the BRAC commission and political leaders. These task forces engage in what is commonly known as a "dual track," which heavily emphasizes the retention effort while at the same time constructing the initial conversion plans. These plans are kept quiet until the BRAC appeals process is over and the final "hit list" is submitted to the president.

If the base is saved from the budget cutting axe of the BRAC, the task force disappears, possibly to return in a few years during the next round of closures. But if the base is slated for closure, the retention committee persists past the closure/lobbying process and becomes the basis for the conversion planning and reuse committee (CPS *Conversion Update* 13 July 1995), and ultimately the local reuse authority (LRA). It is at this time that local governments must educate themselves about the planning and base reuse processes.

### Gaining Expertise

Most communities hire a consultant to assist with the planning and legitimation processes. Generally speaking,

there is little base conversion expertise among local governments. A consultant can pinpoint barriers to successful redevelopment and deal with the alphabet soup of federal agencies which provide development grants and transition assistance. Many consultants are also experts at organizational development, helping to create an inclusive working relationship among diverse interests.

Consultants play a crucial role in negotiating with the military for surplus and personal property, interim leases, and caretaker agreements. They are also responsible for marketing base facilities and soliciting private businesses to relocate, which is essential for economic development (Morgan & Meyer 1995). The reason why consultants are more desirable to handle these functions than local officials is because many of the things that they do must be taken care of within the first few months after the base has been slated for closure. By the time local officials have learned how to handle property negotiations with the military, write OEA grants and set up an LRA, they may have fallen behind in the process and find themselves ineligible for many federal and state benefits.

#### Reuse Planning and Organizational Development

The retention task force evolves into a planning and reuse committee and may or may not include many of the same individuals involved with closure prevention. As suggested

by its name, this is where and when strategic planning occurs. In order to receive federal seed money for planning, the group must be representative of all factions of the community impacted by the closure. This may include institutions such as municipal, county and possibly state governments, school or special districts and universities, or groups such as regional government coalitions, special interest groups, racial minorities, homeless advocates, and industrial developers. It is important that planning groups be inclusive, because they are subsequently divided into subcommittees and because they are the direct precursors to local reuse authorities (*Federal Register* 26 Oct 1994, Arvin 1996).

Local Reuse Authorities (LRAs) are the officially recognized redevelopment entities which are sanctioned by the Department of Defense. The DOD sends personnel out to the community to evaluate the inclusiveness of the planning and reuse group before it can be sanctioned as an LRA and is eligible for Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) and Economic Development Agency (EDA) grant money or other benefits such as land use and property acquisition. The Pentagon must approve the implementation plans prior to developmental grant funding. These plans must include a strategic plan for (at least) the first year of operation and job descriptions of the staff to be hired (*Federal*

*Register* 26 Oct 1994, Arvin 1996, Curtis 1995, Morgan and Meyer 1995, Morgan 1996).

Any local group or institution which feels it is being deliberately excluded from the planning committee can appeal to the DOD prior to the recognition of the LRA. However, in order to have an effect on the process, they must legitimately claim to represent an important sector of the community, such as a racial or ethnic group, the business community, or another governmental jurisdiction. If differences remain among the concerned parties, they must be resolved at the local level before the Pentagon will sanction the committee and LRA (Arvin 1996). Though at first glance this may not seem to be terribly important, it can represent an impassable barrier to reuse planning and implementation.

The Pentagon usually looks to whichever governmental jurisdiction where the (former base) property is located to head the planning committee and LRA. This function usually is granted to the city or county (Mayer 1992, Arvin 1995, Curtis 1995). Methods of local planning committee and LRA legitimation vary depending upon the types and numbers of actors involved. However, whether they are created through election or by appointment, most have the authority of local districts, which means that their existence is implicitly sanctioned by the states.

Direct legitimation is not required by states, although the smaller the state, the more likely that it will be directly affected, and hence involved in the conversion effort. The State of Louisiana was involved in the establishment of the England Authority in Alexandria, granting it the power to issue local bonds, the eligibility to receive state matching funds, and helping in the federal grant writing process (Morgan and Meyer 1995). Larger states, such as California and Texas have been less involved in the redevelopment process, preferring instead to encourage local efforts. As they begin to suffer the cumulative effects of statewide closures in successive rounds, both states are looking at taking a greater interest in assisting localities with base reuse. However, as of yet there are few substantive manifestations related to this concern. California has discussed state income tax breaks for base reuse in that state, while Texas has created a state-wide consortium of public officials to assist communities, but neither state has allocated many resources to these efforts. Nor has either state attempted to directly involve itself in conversion efforts the way smaller states have.

The size of planning committees and LRAs varies depending upon circumstances and location. Two good Texas examples include Carswell Air Force Base in Fort Worth and Chase Field Naval Air Station in Beeville.

The Mayor's task force in Fort Worth originally included about 80 people on planning committees and subcommittees. This was an "inter-local" policy group which included three cities and Tarrant County. They were responsible for the creation of the strategic plan and LRA bylaws. This group was eventually scaled down to a nine-member LRA. The local governments appointed the officials on the Authority, which included four from the County, three from Fort Worth, and one each from two other small cities in the immediate area. Each of these local entities has veto power over the LRA's activities (Curtis 1995).

There are ten distinct political and business entities in the Beeville area which are represented on its planning committee (the BBCRC), including the city, Bee and Goliad counties, four school districts, the water district, a government-appointed private industry council and the chamber of commerce. There are twenty-three seats on the committee which are allocated according to the size of the entity involved. The newly formed LRA represents the same institutions, with the exception of Goliad County which was replaced by the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, but has been scaled down to fifteen members. Most LRAs do not have such a large membership--usually seven to nine individuals--since they are substantially scaled down versions of the planning committees. Because of the large size of the group, there is no veto power in the Beeville LRA bylaws (Arvin 1995).

Once a planning committee is established and recognized by the Pentagon, an executive director and staff must be hired. These people are directly in charge of implementing the strategic plan and carrying out the day-to-day operations of the reuse effort. They also represent another good source of expertise which can complement that of the reuse consultants. Ideally, some of the same people involved in the planning and legitimation processes, such as city and county staffers or the consultant will be retained for the sake of continuity. Often the executive director is a former military officer who has served as a Base Transition Coordinator (BTC). A BTC is the military's community liaison during the closure process, who may be out of a job at the end of his assignment, depending on his seniority and specialization.

It is essential at this time to appoint an environmental coordinator to oversee the environmental issues associated with the base and the redevelopment efforts. This is a permanent position because environmental remediation is a permanent concern of any reuse program, and is perhaps the most significant barrier to a successful conversion. It is also at this phase that the inclusion of private interests is crucial, since they will be the ones who take most of the risks associated with generating investment and creating jobs. Base reuse is job driven and implementation efforts must be focused on this goal. To

this end, the business community cannot be excluded (Morgan 1995).

### Property Reversion

A way to centralize the local conversion process is to have the property revert to the city in which the former base is located. For those communities who donated land to the armed services with reversionary clauses in the contract, there is the advantage of having to deal with less bureaucracy, both at the local and federal levels. This is not to say that reversionary efforts are exempt from the inclusion requirement, only that the number of groups which claim to have a direct interest is decreased and the city is exempt from certain federal requirements.

Property reversion helps reduce federal delays because it frees localities from having to deal with the DOD's land screening process, homeless and Native American claims, and HUD approval of redevelopment plans. Some of these delays result from the federal government's effort to receive fair market value for its property in order to reduce its costs. Others are designed to assist disadvantaged groups, such as the provisions of the McKinney Act which are aimed at addressing the homeless problem by providing low-cost housing and redressing Native American grievances. The involvement of HUD is to ensure that these procedures are carried out in a fair and equitable fashion. Reversion does

not exempt localities from having redevelopment plans approved by EPA or DOD, nor does it remove the burden of responsibility for environmental cleanup from the federal government.

The example of Austin, Texas, illustrates the advantages of base property reversion to the community. The City of Austin wanted Bergstrom AFB for the site of its new international airport, and unlike other communities, pushed for its closure. As there was already a consensus on what should be done, the City had only to organize its implementation effort and attempt to get the reversion and federal financing for the airport. Though there are a great number of vocal interest and citizens' groups in Austin, their claims and demands were dealt with through a citizens' forum (Steed 1995). Although Austin is an example of a simple (meaning single solution) conversion, the speed with which the airport was planned and funded highlights the advantage of property reversion.

This cursory discussion of the redevelopment process illustrates two main points which deserve empirical verification. The first is that local-level economic development is not only feasible, but desirable. The process, as established by the Pentagon mandates inclusiveness. The second aim of this work is to establish the nature of this inclusion. Do planning committees and LRAs represent nascent discursive formations? Or are they

merely representative on the surface, hiding ineluctable, orthodox hierarchies underneath?

Fox and Miller shied away from empirical verification of their theory of authentic discourse with good reason: It would be very difficult to operationalize the warrants for discourse in a quantitative model. However, this does not preclude other methods of validation. A qualitative evaluation of local base conversion efforts in Texas may shed some light on this intellectual quandary. Cases from other states are used for purposes of comparison.

#### Timelines

Timelines are a way in which progress on planning, organization and implementation of base conversions can be compared and evaluated. The military uses timelines as a way to schedule drawdowns (equipment and weapons withdrawal and personnel reassignment) at bases which have been ordered closed or realigned. Drawdowns last from the time of the closure decision to the actual closure of the base facilities. A community's conversion timeline may last from the closure decision to the end of the implementation of strategic reuse plans. After this time, which varies depending on the community and the scope and duration of the plans, new plans and timelines can be formulated, or the previous ones can simply be updated.

A base which is destined to have its mission permanently closed is known as a "clean kill" in the closure/conversion practitioners' vernacular. These "clean kills" are usually completed within two to four years of the closure decision. Chase Field NAS and Reese AFB in Beeville and Lubbock, Texas, respectively, England AFB in Alexandria, Louisiana, and George AFB in Victorville, California, are all examples of "clean kills." Missions which are redirected or realigned with another base often take longer due to organizational and logistical complications. Examples of this latter type include Kelly AFB in San Antonio, Texas, and El Toro MCAS in El Toro, California.

The distinction is important because those communities which do not experience a "clean kill" have the luxury of formulating longer timelines to plan for the conversion or realignment. However, it seems that this luxury is often lost in certain instances as localities lose sight of the prime conversion goals of job creation and income replacement. A timeline is not a substitute for a lack of inclusion, consensus or organization. How a community progresses on an actual timeline may be an indication of the degree of success at its efforts to engage in discourse, strategic planning and organizational development. Presumably, success at these preliminary activities will translate into successful redevelopment outcomes.

The cases picked for the timeline comparison were chosen because of similar mission, closure schedules, location and facilities. Despite the similarities, there have been many differences in conversion activities and in some of the outcomes. Some of the cases have exceeded redevelopment expectations, while others have accomplished next to nothing. Some may have fallen in between or are too early in the process to tell about outcomes for sure, but are nonetheless useful because of the implications of their early behavior (see Appendix, Table 1).

In the successful cases substantive discourse is evident through the timely creation of planning committees and subcommittees, strategic reuse plans, and the hiring of consultants and reuse staff. Grant applications and awards are further evidence of base conversion progress. In the failure cases, the blame can most likely be placed on a lack of authentic discourse, as there is little organizational development activity and few tangible policy outcomes. As we shall see in the subsequent discussions, this is not due only to the absence of discourse, but the practice of exclusion and inter-local turf wars, which often manifest themselves in the form of litigation. The timeline comparison should provide us with an opportunity to empirically observe this progress and infer the practice of discursive complex implementation.

The cases are discussed in the chronological order of the closure decisions and include: George Air Force Base in Victorville, California; England Air Force Base in Alexandria, Louisiana; Chase Field Naval Air Station in Beeville, Texas; El Toro Marine Corps Air Station in El Toro, California; Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas; and Reese Air Force Base in Lubbock, Texas.

#### George Air Force Base

The former George AFB property is located in Southern California's Mojave Desert, adjacent to the small city of Victorville. A victim of the 1988 round of closures, it has yet to realize its redevelopment potential for essentially two reasons. The first has to do with federal practices and the interference of federal politicians, the second with local fighting. Prior to changes in federal reuse procedures in 1993, the focus had been on attempting to receive fair market value for federal property in order to defray financial costs for the Pentagon. After the advent of the Clinton Administration, the focus was changed to be more helpful to local job creation efforts.

George was unlucky enough to have closed in 1992, prior to the redefinition of reuse priorities. However, as we will see with some of the other cases, this by itself does not guarantee failure. In addition to lack of federal guidance, there has been the interference of elected federal

officials in the local dispute over control of base redevelopment in the Victor Valley. Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-California) from Huntington Beach, which is roughly a hundred miles away from the base property, has interfered on the part of Orange County developers who have teamed with the small town of Adelanto in a protracted attempt to delay the conversion effort. Rep. Dick Armev (R-Texas), the creator of the BRAC process, is also accused of interfering in this case.

However, the biggest problem in the case of George AFB has been the lack of local consensus. In 1988, just after the closure decision had been made, a planning committee was formed which included all of the local cities and San Bernardino County. The Victor Valley Economic Development Authority (VVEDA) had plans for a multiuse facility which included the testing of new jet airliners and a stopover point for Army troops in transit to Northern California. The VVEDA was not terribly representative, however, as it included only five members--one from each affected town and the county--and no business or community members. This prompted the City of Adelanto to sue the VVEDA and other involved governmental entities a total of seventeen times (Marshall 17 July 1993), delaying the reuse effort until late 1995, when they finally ran out of the financial resources needed to keep fighting in court. The VVEDA has since attempted to move on without Adelanto.

## England Air Force Base

England AFB, in Alexandria, Louisiana, fell victim to the 1991 round of closure decisions and was officially closed in December, 1992. During that time the community organized and prepared for redevelopment by including all affected parties in the planning committees and subcommittees, hired consultants and reuse staff, and went after federal planning and redevelopment grants. All this was accomplished within two months of the closure decision. The LRA was created within three.

According to Alexandria Mayor Ned Randolph, these committees were composed of "'a cross-section of the community.' None of the members were elected officials, he said, but they were chosen by elected officials" (Howard 31 Jan 1996: A1). When the base was scheduled to close, the retention organization shifted to the transition (planning) organization, which very soon thereafter became the EEIDD (LRA), otherwise known as the England Authority (Morgan and Meyer 1995). In this case, planning and implementation occurred almost simultaneously, which is why there were three organizations, plus subcommittees in the early going. Also, having a series of organizations of similar scope and position added to the interactive nature of the conversion effort.

The National Organization of Installation Developers (NAID) was brought in early to provide expertise and also

helped to encourage nascent inclusive practices. By February, 1992, they had helped construct a strategic plan with the other conversion agencies and were negotiating with the Air Force for caretaker agreements. To date, Alexandria has received \$16 million in redevelopment grants, has replaced the jobs and lost income resulting from the closure and has added the positions of base transition coordinator and environmental coordinator to the reuse effort, though they were not required to do so. According to NAID consultants Bobbi Morgan and James Meyer, the reuse effort at England involved a total of thirty organizations and hundreds of individuals (Morgan and Meyer 1995). By the time the Air Force left the base in 1993, the England Authority had negotiated for a substantial amount of surplus and personal property on the base, and had arranged for interim leases and caretaker agreements.

Alexandria is being hailed as one of the nation's premier base conversions. "'We're one of three bases out of the '88 and '91 rounds that has fully recovered'" (Howard 31 Jan 1996: A1) according to Mayor Ned Randolph. The combination of an industrial park, an airport, schools and a state-run hospital make England the proto-type for a multifaceted conversion, demonstrating that local governments can successfully engage in the complex implementation of economic development solutions. This multi-solution plan has made the community of Alexandria

less dependent upon a single tenant or industry, which should make it more stable in the event of a downturn in certain segments of the economy.

#### Chase Field Naval Air Station

Like Alexandria, the community of Beeville, Texas, lost its Chase Field Naval Air Station to the 1991 closure round. The station closed in 1993, but not before the community was ready to hit the ground running. The twenty-three members who comprised the planning committee and subcommittees represented a coalition of governmental institutions and local business interests and came together as soon as the closure decision was made in the summer of 1991. Public hearings and "town hall" meetings were held by the subcommittees to encourage community input for as long as the planning process continued.

The initial planning and redevelopment grants were written by Brad Arvin in the fall of 1991, who was consulting on an informal, *pro bono* basis. By January 1, 1992, Arvin had been hired as Executive Director and headed up the eight-member reuse staff. Consultants were hired in the summer of 1992 to help formulate reuse plans and assess environmental problems. Negotiations for surplus and personal property had been completed and interim lease and caretaker agreements were signed by 1993 when the base closed. Though there were some delays and difficulties

caused by the Navy in negotiating the interim leases, they did not result in permanent barriers to the reuse effort. Changes in federal redevelopment procedures have been made, due in part to some of the lessons learned at Beeville.

#### El Toro Marine Corps Air Station

The El Toro MCAS was a victim of the 1993 BRAC and is scheduled to close in 1999. Despite this luxury of time, there has been no consensus on what to do next. In November of 1994, more than a year after the closure decision, Orange County voters approved an initiative which would place the reuse effort under the supervision of the County Board of Supervisors and thirteen other appointed officials and developers, who would then have an international airport constructed on the site. The election results were very close, and the cities surrounding the base are adamantly opposed to a commercial airport because of the potential for increased noise, pollution and risk of crashes.

As a result, no planning committee or reuse organizations have been able to compose any detailed reuse plans. The Pentagon has attempted to mediate the dispute and has ruled in the County's favor in several technical disputes. Nevertheless, the County enjoys little popular support because of the Orange County bankruptcy scandal of December 1994, and local politicians in the cities of Irvine, Lake Forest, Laguna and El Toro refuse to cooperate

or back down. Within the last year the Navy has offered to fund reuse planning studies for both groups but has not indicated how much would be allocated to both factions. The decision was immediately criticized by both sides as a waste of taxpayers' money and duplication of effort (Milbourne and Pasco 8 Mar 1995).

The situation had grown so bad by late 1995 that eight south county cities had sued the County for the right to overturn Measure A. The case was removed from Orange County's courts, as it was determined that County Judges might have a conflict of interest in the outcome. A San Diego Judge is set to rule shortly in the dispute. There is also another election scheduled to overturn Measure A later this Spring. Such activities make it very difficult, if not improbable, to engage in authentic discourse and a successful conversion.

#### Kelly Air Force Base

Kelly AFB is located on the Southwest side of San Antonio and employs about 12,000 workers. Although nearby Brooks AFB was considered a more likely closure target, and an easier conversion prospect, Kelly was nonetheless realigned by the 1995 BRAC. Following an appeal to the president, it was agreed that many of the jobs at Kelly would be privatized rather than eliminated or redirected.

San Antonio now faces having to implement a multi-solution conversion plan for the parts of the base which are to be closed, and having to manage the privatization effort, which is to take place from 1997 to 2001.

Despite this most difficult of base conversion tasks, or perhaps because of it, the local community is prepared. They have not squandered their luxury of time the way other communities have with bickering, infighting and exclusion. The Office of Defense Transition (ODT) and the IBASC planning committee were created just after the realignment decision was announced. The committee had over 150 members and was divided into several subcommittees which had, with help and guidance from the City and ODT, completed the strategic plan by the end of 1995.

A \$500,000 planning grant had been applied for and awarded by September 1995. A request for a land use planning grant had been made by January 1996. Other positions, such as the base environmental coordinator and base transition coordinator were hired in October and November 1995.<sup>1</sup> Homeless screening was conducted in September 1995, and personal property screening began in November. ODT staffers will begin negotiating interim leases and caretaker agreements by mid to late 1996.

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<sup>1</sup>Earlier cases do not have these positions as part of their reuse effort because they were not added as part of the conversion process until after 1993.

Private contractors are scheduled to begin doing work which was formerly done by military workers in early 1997.

A case could be made that part of San Antonio's early success is due to political power, as opposed to its organizational ability. However, the fact that the City incurred most of the planning expenses and was only later reimbursed by OEA, indicates that the City sees the privatization of Kelly AFB as its top priority. Local political leaders have made numerous statements regarding the importance of preserving jobs at the base. Also, the level of organizational expertise exhibited at San Antonio by the City staff and Gen. Paul Roberson's Office of Defense Transition (ODT) surpasses that of most every community in the state. Although it is too early to tell, San Antonio appears to be on the right track for redevelopment.

#### Reese Air Force Base

Whereas Kelly's future seems quite secure, the same cannot be said for Reese AFB, located in Lubbock, Texas. Reese was slated for closure at the same time as Kelly, but is scheduled to close in late 1997, making it a "clean kill." Most operations at the base will probably cease much earlier. Although Lubbock has done some of the things which need to be done prior to implementation of conversion plans, they have not done them all very well or on time. This is not to say that Lubbock is necessarily destined to the same

fate as George AFB and El Toro MCAS. However, they may also never become a shining example of base conversion success.

The City and County created the Lubbock/Reese Reuse Commission (LRRC) through a joint resolution in July, 1995, just after the closure decision. However, unlike Alexandria, Beeville and San Antonio, the membership is composed solely of local government officials and subcommittees were not created until several months later. Some of these did not meet for the first time until January 1996. A \$131,000 planning grant was applied for in October, 1995, and was received prior to the holidays.

There is no reuse staff or transition office, except for the services provided by the Office of the City Planner. The City, which has assumed the role of lead agency, did not request a Base Transition Coordinator or an Environmental Coordinator until February, 1996, despite the articulated concern over the quick pace of transition and contamination problems at the base. Although the City has an inventory list of personal property at the base, there have been no serious negotiations for equipment or matériel. Recently, a shakeup was made in the City's reuse effort, with the City Planner taking over the strategic planning, grant writing and other conversion-related activities.

Since the shakeup, the City has made further progress, though not without difficulty. An Executive Director was hired in early March, 1996. The City was projected to

contract with Pathfinders, a land use consulting firm by late spring, 1996, but was informed by OEA that they had failed to follow proper bidding procedures, which delayed the deal. There have been discussions as to the kind of tenants the community might want to have on the base, but there is no strategic plan or timetable for the negotiation of interim leases or caretaker agreements as of yet. Strategic plans and additional grant proposals are scheduled to be completed by August 1996. Negotiations for interim leases and caretaker agreements are scheduled to begin then as well.

While some action has been attempted, there are few tangible results. What action has been taken has come much later than in Alexandria, Beeville and San Antonio. Procedural disagreements between the City and OEA may contribute to additional delays. While these events do not automatically guarantee failure, they may be an indication of a rough transition.

#### Summary

Base conversions represent the practical and theoretical fusion of discourse, complex implementation and local control. While base closures are not the economic disasters they are portrayed to be, it still takes a great deal of capital and organization to successfully convert a military installation to private uses. There are a number

of procedures in which local governments must educate themselves, such as property acquisition, the organizational structure of base conversions and environmental requirements. The inclusion of all concerned local public institutions and individuals is essential for the success of conversion efforts. In fact, inclusion represents discourse in practice.

There are three sequential steps to a successful base conversion. The first is the "dual track" retention and preliminary planning phase. The second is the strategic planning and organizational development phase. This phase is crucial, because if the planning effort is not inclusive and if certain procedures are not carried out, the reuse effort will stagnate. The third phase is known as complex redevelopment and involves the implementation of strategic reuse plans. This is the topic of the following chapter.

The timeline comparison and subsequent discussion illustrate the importance of the second phase. The actions and resulting success of Beeville, Alexandria and San Antonio imply the practice of discursive politics at this stage of base redevelopment. Those cases which have little substantive results on the timeline also have little to show in the way of base conversion success. This is true for Victorville and El Toro, whose reuse efforts are characterized by inter-local infighting and lawsuits. It is probably too early to tell whether Lubbock will be a success

or failure, as it is substantially farther behind than San Antonio, but at about the same place as Beeville was in its first year, which indicates some degree of progress.

## CHAPTER VI

### COMPLEX REDEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH TEXAS

As discussed in the previous chapter, three phases exist with regard to the base conversion process. The first phase includes a dual-track strategy of simultaneous efforts at base retention and preliminary conversion planning. The second involves more in-depth strategic planning and organizational development. In both phases, the presence of discourse can be inferred by observing the inclusion of affected groups and political self-regulation. In the second phase, the beginnings of complex implementation occur and can be observed by evaluating the progress a community makes at organizational development and formulating strategic reuse plans.

The third phase, which is called complex redevelopment, involves the actual implementation of previously negotiated strategic plans, which can be observed through the existence of policy outputs. This chapter will examine the case of Beeville, Texas, which lost the Chase Field Naval Air Station in April, 1993, as a result of actions taken by the 1991 BRAC. At issue is the extent to which discourse takes place in the third phase of base conversion. If inclusion is shown not to aid in complex implementation efforts, then it is probably little more than a subjective tool for evaluation. If discourse demonstrates its utility, then it will represent a partial vindication for its advocates. A

great deal of the information presented in this chapter was gathered from a personal interview of the Executive Director of base redevelopment in Beeville, Brad Arvin, and from a personal visit to the locality in January, 1996, which also included a tour of the former base facility, the Capehart housing development, and surrounding community.

Much of the background and contextual information was gathered from local newspaper clippings. Two newspapers serve the Bee County area, the *Beeville Bee-Picayune* and the *Caller-Times*. Both provided excellent, detailed coverage of the Beeville conversion effort and the group dynamics involved throughout the process. This regular coverage is a possible indicator of discourse, as it serves as a vehicle for attempting to maintain community interest and to foster grass-roots participation. The cases of Alexandria, Louisiana, Victorville and El Toro, California, are used for purposes of comparison and contrast with regard to base conversion success and failure.

#### Unforeseen Developments

In the late afternoon of July 16, 1992, Beeville redevelopment officials and local leaders stood on a runway at Chase Field NAS and watched the first tangible indication of complex redevelopment materialize from the sky. "Members of the group shaded their eyes from the setting sun as they watched the white jet land" (Bull 17 July 1992: B7). The

Mexican-owned "Aeroejectivos" (which means "Executive Air" in Spanish) Boeing 727 was the first of ten jets which were to be housed in hangars left by the Navy at Chase Field. Entrepreneur Fred Patino, owner of the airline, selected Beeville as the site of his air maintenance depot because of the Chase Field facilities and its proximity to Mexico (Bull 17 July 1995), as well as access to the Corpus Christi free-trade zone which was to eventually be expanded to include Bee County. "Patino said he had considered moving his repair facility into Amarillo, Longview, Texas, and Greenwood, Miss., but he chose Beeville" (Bull 17 July 1995). This seems to give credence to the argument of Clarence Stone, Heywood Sanders and others (1987), who assert that cities compete among one another for economic redevelopment solutions. The view of Pagano and Bowman (1995), who argue that cities selectively engage in developmental solutions in order to reach a purposive ideal about how their communities "ought to be," may also be substantiated to an extent. The question remains as to the applicability of inclusion in the realization of these efforts.

Beeville is a small South Texas town of 13,500 people, located roughly halfway between San Antonio and Corpus Christi. The city and Bee County were named for Confederate General Barnard Bee. The economic mainstays of the area are agriculture and ranching, supplemented by the development of

depleting reserves of oil and natural gas. The region is known for its hot, humid summers, but in the winter the weather is mild and the hunting is good. Overall, the quality of life is good and it has many days of sunshine throughout the year, making it a perfect place for an air station. The Chase Field NAS was the largest single employer during the postwar era, contributing as much as \$27 million annually and employing anywhere from 1,600 to 2,000 people at a time, slightly less than a third of the local labor force. Base facilities include a total land area of 1,772 acres, a modern airfield, four hangars, 200 homes and barracks for 1,000 people (Marshall 17 July 1993). Adjacent to the base is the Navy's former Capehart housing development, which has 400 houses and apartment units.

Closure of the air station was expected to have a devastating effect on the local economy. But, Beeville has become a model for base conversion success. Interest in the closure was harnessed as a nationwide marketing tool. The slogan used by the reuse effort, spearheaded by Executive Director Brad Arvin, was "'Come to Beeville and claim your share of the peace dividend. Yes, it's the end of an era, but not the end of the story'" (Marshall 17 July 1993: 8A). This early marketing effort undoubtedly contributed to the conversion success, but there were other factors involved as well, in addition to the occasional unexpected setback.

By November, 1992, Patino's "Aeroejectivos" company had flown its jets away from Beeville, taking several million dollars in income and as many as three hundred potential jobs with them. While this did not represent a complete breakdown of the Beeville conversion effort, it did represent a temporary lag in the overall plan to develop a multifaceted public-private solution to the closure of the Naval Air Station. The failure to secure the Aeroejectivos airline contract, as well as two others, was not the fault of the local reuse effort, but of the U.S. government. According to the *Los Angeles Times*, the largest barrier to redevelopment in the Beeville case was federal interference. While the community fought a losing battle with BRAC to save its base in 1991, by 1993 Bee County residents were fighting another battle--this time with the Navy--for the right to control the Chase Field facilities and contract with private investors (Pine 5 March 1993: A1).

The problem with federal interference manifested itself at Beeville in three different ways. The first involved the failure of the U.S. Navy to provide for an organized drawdown. "Potential investors swamped the agency with inquiries, only to find that the military's timetable for withdrawal from the base was uncertain" (Marshall 17 July 1993: 8A). The second problem resulted from the Pentagon's failure to negotiate interim leases with the reuse board and parcel out the base property in a timely manner. The third

involves stronger environmental protection legislation which obligates the military to clean up what it has polluted on former military bases which are to be transferred to civilian administration. While this practice is desirable for both public health and economic reasons, it is low on the military's list of priorities and can sometimes result in inordinate delays.

All three types of federal foot-dragging slowed the Beeville conversion by several months, although in the end, no permanent damage was done, as both the community and the military made a stronger effort to engage in an inclusive, sincere, results-oriented discussion to prevent future problems. This assertion is supported by the visit of high-ranking military officials to Beeville in 1993 to consult with BBCRC members and the community in order to resolve the dilemma. These renewed channels of communication between the locality and the federal government seem to be an indication of discursive behavior during the complex redevelopment phase, as the community was anxious to admit outsiders to their discussion about implementation.

It should be noted that federal involvement with base conversions is not always such a negative experience. Many of the problems encountered at Beeville were not the result of malicious intent on the part of the federal government, but with their relative inexperience in dealing with the

base conversion process and poor communication about the nature of redevelopment. It is safe to say that without federal involvement, the Beeville conversion effort would not have been as successful. Federal law is what encourages communities to administer their own reuse efforts. This is supported with expertise from OEA and EDA, which is often accompanied by sizable redevelopment grants. To date, the Beeville community has received \$10 million in federal and state support for the reuse effort. Besides financial support, in August of 1991, just after the BRAC closure decision, an OEA representative made the trip to Beeville to instruct them on the various federal requirements associated with conversions, how to apply for grants, and to convince the community that they could survive the closure and even prosper.

#### Dual Tracking in Beeville

Beeville engaged in a dual-track strategy to save their base and draw up preliminary reuse plans just as other communities have done. However, Beeville has an advantage that they have capitalized on ever since Chase Field was designated for closure: They were one of the first in the state of Texas to go through the conversion process, and as such, have a head start on other communities which are just now beginning to engage in economic development on former military bases. This has given them an advantage in

applying for development grants and in attracting private business to the facility. In fact, the executive director indicates that the reuse effort has had to turn away prospective tenants, because there is not currently room on the base to accommodate them.

During the retention fight, hundreds of Bee County residents showed up and participated in public meetings to discuss what to do next with local officials. Privately, conversion solutions were discussed, but nothing definitive was settled on until after the closure decision had been made by BRAC. Ironically, despite maintaining an open and inclusive process after the closure decision was made, public interest in the issue began to fade. Nascent patterns of discourse appear to have taken place between members of the community, reuse consultants, the Navy and local public officials as the process moved from dual tracking to the planning and organizational development phases. Patterns of communication among concerned individuals became clearer as time progressed.

According to local attorney and rancher Jay Kimbrough, the Navy was going to use the closed base for touch-and-go land and take-off exercises with jets from nearby Kingsville and Corpus Christi Naval Air Stations. Kimbrough, who is a member of the Beeville/Bee County Redevelopment Council (BBCRC), said that the local community would never have been able to recover the \$5 million asset (meaning the base) from

the Navy, had they chosen to keep it for those types of operations. Upon hearing the pleas of the affected community and local institutions, the Navy decided against this course of action and allowed Beeville to obtain the property through an EDA grant.<sup>1</sup> Navy Captain Mike Durgan, the base commander, seemed intent on helping the community to have as smooth a transition as possible, but eventually acknowledged that at the time the Navy generally did not have much experience with such matters, which contributed to some of the conversion problems. Again, inclusive discussion between the Navy and BBCRC representatives seems to have helped make the difference between success and failure in the early phases of base reuse.

#### Planning and Organization in Beeville

The day after the Navy announced its closure decision in late 1991, local politician Wil Galloway began to mobilize the conversion effort by contacting both business and political leaders (Marshall 17 July 1993). Shortly thereafter, the planning committee, the Beeville/Bee County Redevelopment Council (BBCRC) was formed through a joint resolution. This committee, which eventually was to evolve into the LRA, was unusually representative considering that most developmental ventures in South Texas are usually

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<sup>1</sup>However, title of the facility has yet to be transferred, representing a potential barrier to planned capital improvements on the former base property.

dominated by local "good old boy" economic elites. According to Brad Arvin, these elites are usually opposed to high rates of economic development because of the possibility of inflationary effects on the local economy. Bee County and the City of Beeville were the lead agencies of a 23-member group which included representatives from ten separate public institutions.<sup>2</sup>

The emphasis on public institutions was so that private, unaccountable interests would not gain control of the redevelopment effort, although there was not a problem with them having a minority interest in the planning process. The consensus was that officials from elected political institutions would be more accountable and responsive to the will of the people and have a greater sense of the public interest. This is not to say that the business community was excluded from the effort. In fact, the Beeville redevelopment effort acknowledges the importance of their involvement.

However, there was a realization that the interests and agendas of business might differ from those of the rest of the community. The Beeville private industry council is made up of people appointed by local government, in part to provide more representation for Hispanic business people. The inclusion of the private industry council was also an

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<sup>2</sup>The City of Beeville, Bee County, Goliad County, four school districts, the water district, a private industry council and chamber of commerce.

attempt to counter the powerful conservative interests of the Chamber of Commerce. There were also racial representation issues involved as well, due to the fact that the Chamber was exclusively the domain of white males and often acted without regard for the interests of the sizable Hispanic population. In practice, the structure of the planning and reuse effort was not designed to totally outweigh business interests, but to make sure that no faction of the community was excluded or under-represented.

The BBCRC held regular public "town meetings" at the Bee County Coliseum and encouraged public participation. There appears to have been a close working relationship between the BBCRC and the base commander at Chase Field, Captain Mike Durgin, who oversaw the transition and took a pro-active role in the debate. The way the public meetings were portrayed by the local media seem to indicate that an open, honest discussion took place among the participants, although the nature of the spatial arrangements was in the traditional speaker-audience form. The meetings were designed to give institutions and individuals the opportunity to be heard and for solutions to be negotiated, signifying willing engagement.

Concerns by the school districts and community college about falling enrollment were discussed at one meeting, along with questions regarding the base housing and environmental reclamation. According to one of the local

papers, these concerns were taken very seriously by the council members, implying that the discussions were focused on what to do next. The eventual manifestation of positive outcomes also seems to indicate that there was an intent to take action by those involved in the process and that substantive contributions with regard to implementation were made. This is inferred from the eventual policy outputs.

The BBCRC was divided into seven subcommittees, each containing no more than four members. They included: economic development, personnel, housing, aviation, bylaws and nominations, education and retraining, grants and funding, and governmental relations. Subcommittee meetings were public and conducted in the "town meeting" format. The subcommittee members sat on a panel before concerned citizens and responded to questions and suggestions. There was also local media coverage of several of these events. The efforts to include citizens and foster public involvement in discussions about what to do next in Beeville are indications of discursive behavior.

The Mayor and County Judge were largely responsible for bringing the community together and for encouraging local institutions to work together, while Brad Arvin and his redevelopment staff provided technical expertise along with the consultants. Most local institutions were in favor of the complex redevelopment plan. However, according to Brad Arvin, the local Chamber of Commerce began to oppose these

efforts once the initial crisis had passed because they feared an increase in the standard of living and a dilution of their economic power. Race may also have played a role in the opposition of the Chamber, which may have felt they were being overwhelmed by the Hispanics, which comprise roughly half the population of Bee County.

An initial planning grant was approved in October, 1991, which was written by Brad Arvin prior to his hiring as Executive Director. The City of Beeville was the applicant of record and handled the grant when the money came. On May 21, 1992, officials from the Department of Defense visited the community and awarded an additional \$189,000 planning grant to the BBCRC. DOD's Dr. Carl Dahlman met with local officials and inspected the drawdown at Chase Field. Dahlman listened to the concerns of the BBCRC regarding the Navy's recalcitrance in bargaining for surplus property and equipment, negotiating interim leases and a caretaker agreement for maintenance of the facility following the Navy's departure.

These discussions seemed to have a positive effect, as the Navy made more of an effort to correct mistakes associated with the conversion effort (Latcham 23 May 1992). The Navy appears to have been engaged in the process and listened to the requests and substantive contributions of the local community, judging by its responsiveness and changes in procedure. Although from the initial slowness,

it appears that the Navy was reacting to problems as they arose instead of acting to prevent them. They eventually worked the bugs out of their drawdown process by borrowing procedures from the Air Force, which had more institutional experience in dealing with the implementation process involving interim leases, property negotiations and caretaker agreements (Latcham 23 May 1992). "'It shamed and humiliated the Navy so much they redoubled their efforts' to make the transition work" (Marshall 17 July 1993: 8A) according to the Executive Director of Redevelopment, Brad Arvin.

By the summer of 1992, consultants and eight permanent staff had been hired, and a number of studies connected to the reuse effort had been conducted. Brad Arvin had been hired as Executive Director and had been given a temporary office at the Beeville City Hall just after the first of the year. A Houston-based engineering firm hired by the Navy had completed the Environmental Impact Statement and presented its findings at the June 23 public meeting, while a land use consulting group based in Tulsa continued to work on an interim reuse plan throughout the summer. As the reuse organizations were developed and as debate among the participants progressed, it became clear that a single solution would not adequately address the economic problems of the area or the differing community interests.

Instead, a multifaceted solution was negotiated which included elements of both private and public investment, involving different levels of government and different types of businesses. By December 1992, the strategic plan was approved. Local conversion leader Wil Galloway described the politics-through-negotiation process as one which was aided by the fact that the conversion effort was under local control. "'It helps that we were a small community,' Galloway said. 'In a week we could touch everyone with a stake who could make or break the effort. Turf wars were minimal'" (Marshall 17 July 1993: 8A).

Participants, including the Navy, consultants, reuse staff, the BBCRC and community members agreed to a complex solution in principle, but had differing ideas as to the specifics. A commercial real estate complex, wildlife preserve, drug rehabilitation center, warehousing and commercial business center, recreational facility and aviation-related businesses all received serious consideration by the redevelopment participants at one time or another (Bull 24 June 1992). The solutions which were finally agreed upon and implemented by the community included "a major state prison facility and correctional training center, a light aircraft manufacturing plant, a builder of commercial structures and an industrial equipment manufacturer" (Marshall 17 July 1993). In addition, the

reuse staff negotiated with flight-training companies to replace the lost airline contracts.

The chosen solutions all have several things in common. They are all focused on the long term, designed to bring and keep investment in Beeville, and alleviate unemployment. Besides the infrastructure and location of the base, Beeville also has a population of unemployed airplane mechanics and technicians which make it an attractive site for companies which need workers with those particular skills. Due to the comparatively low standard of living, companies are able to offer jobs at reasonable wages, which benefits both the workers and employers. Payrolls are not excessive, which works to the advantage of business, and wages are high enough to provide workers with a decent standard of living. While each faction of the community may not have gotten everything they wanted out of the conversion plans, the synergy of the discursive negotiations enabled everyone to come away with something positive, which in turn should benefit the community at large.

#### Complex Redevelopment in Beeville

By examining complex redevelopment in Beeville, we can infer the results of a discourse which was inclusive, self-regulating and focused on the implementation of substantive policy outputs. To this end, the Beeville case is more helpful than certain others because a greater amount of time

has passed since the closure and there are policy impacts, such as job and income replacement, in addition to implementation activities and outputs.

Property screening and negotiations with the Navy were conducted between October 1991 and June 1992. Interim leases and caretaker agreements were negotiated from the end of 1992 to February 1993, just prior to the Navy pullout from Chase Field. The State of Texas assisted the reuse effort by attempting to reduce governmental impediments. The Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission (TNRCC) was helpful in assessing potential environmental barriers to the strategic plan, while the Texas Attorney General's office was instrumental in providing legal assistance during negotiations with the Navy.

By the end of 1993, the new tenants, including the State of Texas and private contractors, had begun to move onto the former base property. The State prison includes a training facility and dormitories for law enforcement personnel in addition to the detention facility. Three large manufacturing companies have moved into the hangars, with one more scheduled to move in shortly. The recruitment of private companies was geared toward those businesses which focus on international commerce and distribution, taking advantage of Beeville's proximity to Mexico.

While there has been some job displacement and temporary loss of income, the redevelopment effort has

generated \$30 million in annual income and 1,700 jobs to replace the \$27 million and 1,600 jobs which existed under Naval administration of the facility. By the end of 1995, \$10 million in redevelopment grants had been awarded to the Beeville redevelopment effort. A total of \$1 million in planning grants, \$2 million in job retraining and relocation, \$4.5 million in EDA grants, and \$1.5 million in State of Texas capital funds. An addition \$6 million is expected within a relatively short time. Much of the funding from the job retraining grants was allocated to the local community college, which has played an important role in diversifying the skills of the labor force.

The Capehart housing development, adjacent to the base, was purchased by the BBCRC from the Navy for \$168,000, about \$420 per unit (*CPS Conversion Update*, 13 July 1995). Of the 400 units in the complex, 90% are occupied. Whereas the Navy lost \$2 million annually administering Capehart, the BBCRC has created a \$1 million annual profit from rent in each of the last two years. This has happened despite (or perhaps because of) a considerable investment in refurbishing many of the Capehart homes and apartments. The \$2 million total is going to be reinvested in a sewage treatment plant on the former base property. This will be matched by an \$8 million EDA grant to cover the \$10 million cost of building the plant. Arvin has indicated that Capehart will be sold for \$10 million by late 1996. That

works out to be about \$2,500 per unit, which is almost a 600% increase in value.

The combination of local formulation of complex reuse plans along with federal and state dollars has resulted in a complete reversal of potential economic misfortune. Full recovery is considered to be the greatest accomplishment of the Beeville effort. According to Brad Arvin, Beeville is "better off than if the Navy was still here" and the redevelopment effort has yet to realize the full economic capabilities of the former base. Part of this is due to delays in the economic conveyance process of transferring title to the property. However, this should be negotiated within a reasonable period of time by the newly formed LRA.

In the complex redevelopment phase, the emphasis of discourse is on substantive contribution. Whereas in the earlier phases an inclusive, self-regulating discussion results in the negotiation of reuse plans, in the latter phase the focus is on initiating policy outputs. At this juncture, implementation is carried out by the conversion experts, which are usually the local reuse staff and base conversion consultants. Other participants, such as the grass-roots or institutional representatives, seem to engage in behavior which represents something akin to an oversight or evaluative function. As unanticipated problems arise during implementation, the existing discursive formations debate how to handle them. The dilemma of "what to do next"

may not automatically disappear with the approval of strategic plans. It instead may depart and reappear periodically, despite the change in focus at this stage towards "how to do it." This seems to have been the case during the Beeville conversion.

The next step for Beeville is to plan for the reinvestment of current profits into future developments, so that more of the potential of Chase Field can be realized. Plans to relocate the small Beeville Airport to the site have been shelved, but could be revived again. If such a move is implemented, the community would be eligible for additional redevelopment grants, if available.<sup>3</sup> This is similar to the City of Austin's plans to redevelop the old Austin Airport once their Bergstrom International Airport opens. They also should be eligible for additional redevelopment grants, since the closure of the old airport is directly related to the closure and conversion of Bergstrom AFB.

The influx of public and private capital has resulted in a gradual spillover of economic development to other sectors of the local economy. One reason for this is because the former base's economy is more directly

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<sup>3</sup>One of the advantages of being one of the first major closures was that there was an almost unlimited supply of grant money. Due to an increased number of closures in recent years and budgetary gridlock, there may not be much in the way of future grants. Brad Arvin believes that after 1997 there may be no more EDA grant money at all. This places the entire future of the agency in doubt.

integrated into the local economy. The first new construction in twelve years has begun with both local and out-of-town developers (chiefly from the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex) participating in the building of new homes. In addition to new apartments and housing tracts, a giant H.E.B. grocery store has gone up in a new shopping center. Where Navy personnel and their families used to shop on base at the Base Exchange (BX), private employees now spend their increased earnings in town. And where personnel used to reside chiefly at Chase Field or at Capehart, workers and their families are moving into brand new, privately contracted houses on the newly developed north side of town.

Three years after beginning the implementation of the initial strategic plan, problems have again resurfaced. A fifteen-member LRA is scheduled to replace the BBCRC planning committee as the legitimate redevelopment authority in early 1996. The composition of this group has become somewhat contentious as the Chamber of Commerce, which favors the status quo, seeks to control the LRA, and according to Brad Arvin, slow the pace of development. The Defense Transition staff is attempting to reunite the community once again by updating the strategic plan. The new version of the plan is due to be completed by March 1996, but may face barriers in its implementation until title to the property is officially transferred to the LRA. This situation will be resolved by a renewal of the

inclusive, self-regulating patterns of communication which were established during the prior phases of redevelopment.

### Assessment

Discourse seems to have played a vital role in the conversion of Chase Field NAS, although it was more elite-oriented, having only involved the twenty-three people on the planning committee and subcommittees, and eight on the reuse staff. However, it seems that it was no less responsive or representative, and local residents were informed through regular newspaper coverage and were encouraged to participate through "town meetings" organized by the reuse planning committee and subcommittees. Part of the reason why the community chose to have the planning committee comprised of institutional representatives was to counter the economic elites who controlled the local means of service and production. Although it should be kept in mind that these business elites were not excluded from the process, as they still were seen as vital contributors to the conversion effort. The subcommittees were composed of the planning committee membership, eliminating hierarchy. Also, a substantial effort was made to hold public hearings and collect input from ordinary citizens.

The empirical referents of inclusion, self-regulation and policy outputs are apparent in this story. They indicate the existence of the warrants for discourse in this

base conversion case. Inclusion--through the practice of local coalition building, the acceptance of outsiders, such as the State of Texas, the U.S. Navy, and reuse staff and consultants, as well as the practice of community outreach activities, such as regular town meetings--help to infer sincerity and situation-regarding intentionality. The lack of hierarchy, self-regulation and practices which encourage multi-channelled communication, such as town meetings and regular media coverage, are all indications of willing engagement.

The policy outputs of the conversion effort indicate substantive contribution and the intent to take action. Timely organization of planning committees, subcommittees, reuse staff, the hiring of consultants, the application for redevelopment grants, completed strategic plans which focused on the twin goals of job and income replacement, are all conversion outputs. The actual implementation of strategic plans through the marketing of base facilities, the negotiation of interim leases and caretaker agreements also serve as indicators of substantive contribution and demonstrate that at some point the debate eventually shifted from a focus of what to do next to that of how it should be done.

The results of Beeville's complex redevelopment plan illustrate the benefits of discursive complex implementation and is one of the few clear instances where discourse and

policy implementation success can be linked. Were it not for the inclusive, negotiative process which resulted in a consensus of how to carry out the strategic plan, there would probably not be a full recovery in place at present levels of income and employment. Had local economic elites controlled the redevelopment effort, presumably without the benefit of federal funds, Beeville would be experiencing a protracted economic depression. Instead, the local area is experiencing positive externalities associated with increased capital investment. Future reuse opportunities are soon to be realized as current profits are reinvested back into the community.

Several different lessons have been learned from the Beeville reuse experience. Since it was one of the first in the nation, the Pentagon was able to correct mistakes made at Beeville so that they could be avoided in the future. Brad Arvin said that the reuse process at the time of the closure of Chase Field was not as rational as it is at present. By altering certain reuse procedures, the Clinton Administration has changed the focus of base conversions at the federal level from that of recouping fair market value, to job creation. Though the amount of federal funding for base conversions might be declining, the Defense Department has become more helpful and user-friendly to local governments by removing federal barriers to local control and encouraging inclusive, bottom-up implementation.

The nature of discourse during the complex redevelopment phase is different from the earlier phases. Conversion experts and staff are charged with the day-to-day implementation of strategic plans, but other participants engage in discussions as to how unexpected problems or externalities should be addressed. An inclusive, self-regulating authority can play a vital policy evaluation role at this point. Once the initial plans have been implemented, there will be renewed debate regarding what to do next. Sincerity, agendas, engagement and substantive suggestion remain useful tools for monitoring the nature of discussions and for the formulation of additional plans or immediate problem solving.

Local efforts at community outreach are important indicators of discourse. These help to substantiate Fox and Miller's warrants as evaluative and operational criteria. The democratic and multi-directional nature of the communication at "town meetings" encourages discursive behavior. Though the spatial arrangements at these meetings were not of a "round table" discussion, there were substantial opportunities for questions and qualitative evaluation of the discussions. Regular media coverage also represents an effort to inform the public and encourage public interest and participation, which had dropped off after the immediate crisis had passed.

Coalition building is yet another important indication of discursive complex implementation behavior. The nature of the redevelopment coalition in Beeville was sufficiently representative, judging from the composition of the reuse committee and subcommittees. However, it was dominated by representatives of political institutions--albeit for the purposes of responsiveness and accountability--but was elite-oriented nonetheless. Though business and racial minorities were included, they were probably not truly represented in proportion to their actual numbers or potential contributions. This elite-dominated inclusion does not represent pure, unadulterated discourse, but something of lesser authenticity, although it does not seem to have been any less effective. The nature of the community outreach activities and the format of public meetings indicates that perhaps the Beeville case instead represents an emergent discursive formation.

#### Comparison and Contrast

When it comes to conversion success, Beeville is not an isolated story. It is however, an undervalued success, as the closure seemed to generate more national media coverage (Arvin 1996) than the recent conversion accomplishments. Other communities, such as Rantoul, Illinois, Fort Worth, Texas, Alexandria, Louisiana, and Chandler, Arizona, have been the subject of a great deal of national media attention

for their conversion efforts. By the same token, there have been cases in which the conversion effort has been derailed for a variety of reasons. San Francisco, San Diego, El Toro and Victorville, California are such examples.

It is conceptually useful to compare the Beeville case with similar cases which demonstrate both success and failure in order to show the difficulty of translating diverse policy demands into tangible results. There is not enough space to discuss them all, so only a few have been chosen. The case of Alexandria, Louisiana, is used because England Air Force Base was closed at about the same time as Chase Field NAS and faced the base conversion process within a context that was similar to what Beeville encountered. Alexandria is a small city, centrally located in rural Louisiana. They, too, experienced a "good old boy" economic elite who disapproved of changing the status quo beyond resolving the immediate crisis. The economy of Central Louisiana is, like South Texas, mainly agricultural and faces a gradual decline in the importance of the once-powerful oil industry. One noteworthy contextual difference between the Alexandria and Beeville cases is that the State of Louisiana played a more active role in the conversion process than the State of Texas.

A contextually similar case which demonstrates failure is Victorville, California, which lost George AFB to Pentagon closures in 1988, but achieved little in the way of

redevelopment because of a breakdown in the initial effort to establish discourse. Victorville is located in the high desert of Southern California, within a few hours' drive of major metropolitan areas, but is sufficiently isolated to not generate much media attention. It is similar to Beeville because it was an air base located in a rural area, did not have much state involvement in the conversion effort, and faced problems from status quo-oriented elites.

A second case which demonstrates failure is El Toro, California, located in southern Orange County, which until recent years was a predominantly rural and suburban area. However, with the recent economic expansion into the area and growth of nearby cities, particularly Irvine, El Toro, Lake Forest and Laguna, the base has found itself hemmed in by sizable municipalities. The competing interests of the County and neighboring cities has resulted in a great deal of conflict and confusion over what to do with the Marine Corps Air Station when it closes in 1999. All four of these cases involve air bases of some kind and have a similar infrastructure, and hence, one would assume, comparable solutions to the base conversion dilemma.

#### Complex Redevelopment Success in Alexandria

From the closure decision in 1991, Alexandria was determined to exceed expectations and do more than just

survive the closure of England AFB. The early hiring of the National Organization of Installation Developers (NAID) as consultants was a step in the right direction, as they had learned the importance of inclusion from past experiences. NAID provided vital expertise with regard to the structuring of communication patterns and implementation procedures, and was on the cutting edge of multi-solution base conversions. One reason for their success was the focus the consultants placed on job creation as the prime goal of the reuse effort. They also made sure that the business community was not excluded, since their role in risking capital and hiring workers was crucial to the establishment of long-term strategic plans and a stable conversion (Morgan and Meyer 1995, Morgan 1996).

The England Authority, as it came to be called,<sup>4</sup> was very representative and divided the seats on its ten-member board between the City of Alexandria, the neighboring City of Pineville, the local parish (county), Chamber of Commerce, as well as affected school districts and the State of Louisiana, with Alexandria having a plurality of seats and playing the role of lead agency (Morgan and Meyer 1995, Morgan 1996). A great deal of emphasis was placed on reaching a community consensus and educating the people of Central Louisiana through inclusion and marketing on the

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<sup>4</sup>The actual name is the England Economic and Industrial Development District, or EEIDD (Gargan 28 November 1994).

opportunities which could be garnered from the successful implementation of a good strategic plan. In addition, the reuse effort chose to focus on positive developments, rather than dwelling on the occasional setbacks or negative possibilities. As mentioned above, the England Authority encountered some resistance from established economic elites and also from local defense workers who had trouble adjusting to the closure (Morgan and Meyer 1995, Morgan 1996).

However, these were mitigated by the reuse effort's utilization of discourse to create consensus by focusing on community values and the prime goal of job creation. Another problem arose when the Air Force refused to negotiate in good faith for surplus and personal property on the base. However, the England Authority was persistent in its negotiations and challenged the Air Force's agenda of taking as much of the property as they could when they left (Morgan and Meyer 1995, Morgan 1996). The negotiations were not confrontational, but there were what has been described as "vigorous discussions" over the disposal of \$90 million worth of property, which included X-ray equipment, fire and rescue trucks, chairs, tables and lights (Gargan 28 Nov 1994). The Authority was also very successful in negotiating interim leases and caretaker agreements in preparation for the military's departure in 1992.

These victories for the Authority were possible for two main reasons. First, they challenged the intentions and sincerity of the Air Force in their negotiations. Second, they reached a consensus among those concerned institutions and the general public about what should be done next. This solution was job creation. The Authority, along with expert help from their consultants, then negotiated a strategy for reaching the desired end.

Another reason for Alexandria's success was the ability to get large sums of federal and state redevelopment money. Due to state involvement, the Authority was able to get early approval of most of their redevelopment grants. This happened because they were operating under the state's fiscal year, which begins well before the federal fiscal year. Early approval gave them an edge over other communities applying for the same grants. The state sanctioned the Authority as a special district, which gave them the authority to issue revenue bonds, like a municipality. Funds generated from the bonds were used to attract private businesses to the former base facilities. The England conversion was well organized and planned. The strategic plan was written with short-, mid- and long-term solutions in mind. The initial plan is designed to guide the community for the next twenty years (Morgan and Meyer 1995, Morgan 1996). This was the product of local inclusion and self-regulation of the conversion in Alexandria.

Current conversion solutions on the former base property involve thirteen new tenants and include a J.B. Hunt truck driver training school, an aircraft maintenance depot, as well as several minor military missions contracted by the Pentagon (Morgan and Meyer 1995, Morgan 1996, Gargan 28 Nov 1994). Due to the overwhelming demand for England facilities, the former base has run out of hangar space for air- and industrial-related enterprises. These businesses have replaced the 4,000 lost jobs and lost income caused by the closure.

Public, as well as private, solutions play a large role in the redevelopment of England. The State of Louisiana has reopened and runs the base hospital which serves the region's poor (Gargan 28 Nov 1994). Education has expanded to train the workforce and to provide more opportunity for local people. The newly opened Phoenix Elementary magnet school is one of the best elementary schools in the area and is one of the reuse effort's greatest accomplishments (Morgan and Meyer 1995). Also, higher education has found itself a niche on the property. LSU-Alexandria and Northwest Louisiana College have expanded to include vocational and air maintenance training. Base housing has been converted to a retirement community in order to provide safety and ready access to health care for retired military and other senior citizens (Morgan and Meyer 1995).

The mixed public/private solutions were crafted intentionally so that the community would not become economically dependent upon one industry, as they had been during the Cold War. One of the greatest problems faced by the closure of England was unemployment. This fear was articulated by many individuals at local meetings. The accommodation of grass-roots interests by the Authority in the alleviation of this problem is further evidence of inclusion. A total of a hundred jobs were created from caretaker agreements to maintain the property once the Air Force left the base. As private companies moved onto the property and as the state became more involved in the health care and educational sectors of the local economy, there was less pressure for the Authority to directly employ large numbers of people. "The result has been a dramatic surge in jobs, home building and retail sales," according to LSU economics professor, Loren Scott (Gargan 28 Nov 1994: A10).

Initially, the reuse effort attempted to allay unemployment by conducting a number of surveys and employed a staff of twenty people to engage in these and other related reuse activities. The information gathered from these operations was used to formulate details in the strategic plan. This represents an important effort to encourage community feedback and participation. The fact that the opinions of ordinary citizens were sought out and incorporated into reuse plans is an indication of inclusive

behavior. These actions let the citizens know that their ideas were of value and that the policy implementors were listening.

The practice of discourse can be inferred from the attempt to reach a community consensus on reuse plans and goals. The inclusion and self-regulation of an inter-governmental consortium of actors from the state and surrounding area is evidence of discursive activity. Coalition building, the involvement of outsiders and the aforementioned community outreach activities helped to solve the problem of developmental inertia caused by the established local economic elites (Morgan 1996). Also, the nature of the negotiations between the Authority and the Air Force provides more evidence of discourse in practice. The fact that the military was invited to participate in local redevelopment discussions and plead their case to the community is in itself significant. In the self-regulating negotiations which took place, agendas were challenged and there were substantive results afterward.

#### Conversion Failure in California

In contrast to the implementation success stories of Beeville and Alexandria are the stark failures of Victorville and El Toro. There are many steps along the way in which a community can become sidetracked in its conversion effort. These are most likely to happen in the

planning and organizational development phase, as illustrated by Victorville and El Toro. Some of the consequences of failing to establish or maintain discourse in this phase involve not only the possibility of some faction or institution attempting to impose top-down administration, but contentious fights, distrust, stonewalling and even protracted legal action. As the presence of the warrants for discourse can be inferred through verification of the empirical referents, so too can the lack of it be ascertained by their absence. Exclusion, inter-institutional conflict, the presence of hierarchy and lack of substantive policy outputs are indications of a failure to establish discursive patterns of behavior.

As institutions and individuals fight over leadership and administrative roles, as well as potential solutions and the base property itself, many hundreds or thousands of workers are unemployed and the communities are without many millions of dollars in income. Such is the case in Victorville, California, where George Air Force Base became the focus of an uncivil dispute between the cities of Adelanto, Victorville, San Bernardino County and three other small desert towns, all located in the Victor Valley, about ninety miles from both Los Angeles and Orange Counties. There was apparently an attempt at inclusion and discourse among the members of the Victor Valley Economic Development Authority (VVEDA), which is led by the City of Victorville

and San Bernardino County (Hastings 26 Mar 1995). However, the City of Adelanto allied itself with rich Orange County developers and opted out of the VVEDA. In order to disrupt the planning and implementation efforts, Adelanto has sued the member institutions of VVEDA at least fourteen times over five years (Hastings 26 Mar 1995, Marshall 17 July 1993).

Although Adelanto has lost most of its lawsuits, they represent victory for the small town of 12,000 because of the delays they have caused. This is in accordance with their agenda to derail the VVEDA-led conversion effort. Also, Orange County politicians have intervened on behalf of their contributors, which have allied themselves with the Adelanto stonewalling effort. In the meantime, Japan Air Lines scrapped its plans to test new planes and train new pilots at former base facilities. "The Army, which wanted to land troops there on their way to a desert training base north of Barstow, gave up when local authorities could not stop squabbling" (Marshall 17 July 1993: 8A).

The tone and level of the discussion between the affected parties is indicative of the lack of discourse and inclusion in this case. Victorville City Manager Jim Cox has lashed out at the Pentagon, Air Force, both political parties, Orange County politicians and the City of Adelanto for the failure of VVEDA's reuse effort (Marshall 17 July 1993). He reserves his sharpest barbs for the City of

Adelanto and its Mayor, Mary Scarpa. "'They have taken a scorched-earth policy. If Adelanto can't have it, no one can. They'd rather have a weed patch'" (Marshall 17 July 1993: 8A). Mayor Scarpa alleges that her city had no choice but to fight, as they figured to be on the losing end of numerous four-to-one votes. She argues that her town is "small, outnumbered, with no clout" (Marshall 17 July 1993: 8A).

Although other evidence, such as the town's association with wealthy developers and powerful politicians, such as Dana Rohrabacher (R-California) and Dick Armey (R-Texas), and the cash reserves employed to file and fight numerous lawsuits seem to belie that statement. It does seem that by 1995, Adelanto's effort to derail the conversion of George AFB ran out of steam, and that the VVEDA is finally beginning to pull together plans for redevelopment (Hastings 25 Mar 1995). However, the surrounding desert communities have been subjected to a great deal of political divisiveness, expense and economic losses during the course of this battle, which was fought simply because a single municipality wanted to control the entire redevelopment effort by itself and engage in the politics of exclusion.

Such practices are not conducive to discourse or politics through negotiation. The dispute between Adelanto and the VVEDA was characterized by a lack of sincerity, hidden agendas, and little substantive contribution. There

were few community outreach activities in the form of media interest, surveys or town meetings. Perhaps the VVEDA set itself up for the conflict by maintaining an exclusive membership in the form of four cities and the county. A larger, more inclusive planning committee composed of ordinary citizens working closely with a reuse staff and consultants might have been able to mitigate the inter-local disputes by exposing hidden agendas. Such a group might have been better able to resist outside interference from politicians and developers for the same reasons. There was also little in the way of self-regulation, as the VVEDA was held hostage to the institutional hierarchies of its member cities.

The dispute over the El Toro Marine Corps Air Station revolves around what to do next, which might be an indication that discourse is still applicable to resolving the problems in this case. The time between the closure decision and the actual closure date--from 1993 to 1999, a total of six years--gives Orange County the luxury of time and reduces the impact of delaying tactics employed by South Orange County cities. The dispute over what to do next involves quality of life issues, economic and international trade issues, inter-local administrative conflict, and a regional North-South, old money versus new money struggle among County residents. Further complicating these issues is the Orange County bankruptcy scandal of late 1994, which

calls into question the administrative ability of the County, which maintains a decentralized, non-professional system. This system has been blamed for the scandal, as well as for unresponsiveness and unaccountability.

In November 1994, county voters approved Measure A, an initiative which requires that a commercial airport be built on at least part of the property (Argyros 8 Jan 1995). The initiative just barely passed, with north county residents heavily supporting it, while south county residents opposed it in droves. Many Orange County leaders assert that the county will soon outgrow John Wayne airport and needs another air travel outlet (Berg 8 Feb 1995). South county cities argue that a commercial airport would disrupt their idyllic quality of life (such as it still exists) with additional noise and pollution, and that the County government does not have the competence to administer such an undertaking. A planning committee composed of the five County supervisors and thirteen others from the south county region has fallen apart due to the dispute. Because these issues have not been resolved, the Pentagon has been asked to step in and mediate the conflict (Milbourne and Pasco 8 Mar 1995).

In what has been called a "Solomon-like decision" by the Pentagon, Orange County has been granted the power to be the lead institution in the El Toro redevelopment effort, while the federal government will fund two redevelopment

studies--one for the County and one for south county cities who oppose the airport plans. Rather than quelling the dispute, this decision seems to have fuelled the fires even more, with both sides condemning the decision as soon as it was made (Milbourne and Pasco 8 Mar 1995). The south county faction is gearing up to make a more serious challenge to the County's authority in this matter on several fronts. There is another ballot initiative scheduled for the spring of 1996 which would overturn Measure A. Also, a number of alternative reuse suggestions are being made, including a minimum-security federal prison, a Disneyland-like amusement park, and an industrial park similar to those at places like Beeville and Alexandria.

Institutional conflict has erected barriers to the attempt at discourse in the El Toro case. There is a lack of sincerity and trust between Orange County and the cities near the base, as evidence by the lack of any attempt at inclusion. Local politicians regularly question the competence of the County to engage in complex implementation endeavors due to the Orange County bankruptcy scandal. There are apparently hidden agendas on both sides, and there have been few substantive contributions, judging by the lack of policy outputs. Also, Orange County, with its population of three million, may be too large to create a sense of "community" which is a necessary precursor to inclusion. Nevertheless, "town meetings" could be held and broadcast on

local cable TV stations, public opinion surveys could be taken, and reuse organizations could be constructed which include ordinary citizens, developmental interests and politicians.

Though the outcome of El Toro has yet to be determined, any workable solution will have to include elements favorable to each side. The breakdown in communication has resulted in a fragmentation of ideas as to what should be done next. This failure to establish discourse has resulted in the failure to establish adequate reuse plans and has delayed implementation and policy outcomes. In addition, the longer the fight goes on, fewer federal redevelopment dollars will be available for the reuse effort. The cases of Victorville and El Toro are perfect examples of how not to conduct a base conversion and illustrate the importance of discourse by the absence of its empirical referents.

#### Discourse Revisited

The cases of Beeville and Alexandria serve to illustrate the applicability of discourse theory as a method of complex implementation. Patterns of inclusion are established in the early phases of planning and organization. What to do next, as well as who is permitted to participate, dominates the debate during the early stages. During the complex redevelopment phase, the nature of inclusion changes, as the focus changes from "what to do

next" to "how to do it." Base reuse staff carry out the previously negotiated strategic plans, but require more discursive input when externalities arise. At this stage discourse becomes more evaluative, serving to address minor problems and to project future strategic plans.

Examples of base conversion failure, such as the El Toro and Victorville cases, illustrate the value of discourse in local complex implementation efforts in a backhanded way. The practice of exclusive administration is not a useful method for creating a sense of community or in negotiating redevelopment plans which are acceptable to local businessmen, institutions, competing municipalities or individual citizens. As the conflict becomes more prolonged, the chances for the development of discourse, and hence implementation success, become more remote.

The empirical referents of discourse enable the observation of administrative behavior throughout the base conversion process. Inclusion can be identified through coalition building, the acceptance of outsiders and the practice of community outreach activities. Self-regulation of the discussion can be discerned through the election of leadership and multi-channelled communication, such as the type found at town meetings. Policy outputs such as organizational development, grant applications, strategic plans and implementation activity can indicate that substantive progress is being made. These activities can be

taken with policy impacts, if any are available, to judge the degree of policy success.

Conversely, exclusion, in the form of elite control, the absence of outside expertise, and a closed-door decision making process is indicative of the lack of discourse. In this situation, hierarchy, institutional infighting and even litigation can take the place of a self-regulating, action-oriented discussion about what to do next and how to do it. In such instances there are few policy outputs--and judging from the cases of Victorville and El Toro--little in the way of implementation success.

## CHAPTER VII

### DISCOURSE VERSUS TOP-DOWN IMPLEMENTATION

The discussion in the previous chapters focused on the base conversion process and how the complex implementation process provides a conceptual link between discourse and policy outcomes. A comparison of the case studies of Reese Air Force Base in Lubbock, Texas, and Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas, will demonstrate the dual-track nature of the initial phase of the base conversion process as well as the second phase of the process--strategic planning and organizational development. Most of the information on the Lubbock case was gleaned from my participant-observation of five meetings of the Lubbock/Reese Redevelopment Commission (LRRC) which were held between August and November 1995, and my participation in one planning session with members of the City staff, the Air Force and the Texas Tech University Center for Public Service. Additional information was gathered from local newspaper coverage and first-hand experience with the community outreach activities of the Texas Tech University Military Base Conversion and Community Assistance Program, administered by the Center for Public Service, and from serving as an Associate Faculty member at the Lubbock branch-campus of South Plains College.

Much of the information on San Antonio was gathered from a field trip to the city, where members of the city staff and Office of Defense Transition were interviewed, and from a city council meeting in which applicants for positions on the LRA board were in the process of being selected. Local government documents, such as timetables and complex redevelopment plans were provided by the San Antonio Initial Base Adjustment Strategy Committee (IBASC), who constructed the initial strategic plan. Contextual and background information was gathered from local newspaper coverage in San Antonio which was generously provided by the Office of Defense Transition.

The presence of discursive patterns of behavior in the dual track retention phase and the planning and organizational phase is evident. However, whether authentic discourse actually exists in these particular cases is another matter entirely. It is possible that institutional barriers exist which prevent the development of authentic discourse--and by inference, successful implementation--in the redevelopment of military bases. A potential way around this could be to initiate an open planning process emphasizing individual contributions over institutional agendas.

### Dual-Track Retention in Lubbock

Lubbock, Texas, is a medium-sized city of about 200,000 people. It is known as the "Hub City" because of its central location on the South Plains of West Texas. Because it is the largest city on the South Plains, smaller communities rely on it as a center of commerce and to provide certain services that they are unable to furnish for themselves. It is a diverse economy with health care, government, higher education, and agriculture representing the largest sources of employment and services.

The installation, which is located less than ten miles West of the city, has been an air training base "almost continuously since 1941. Reese opened in June 1941 as Lubbock Army Airfield on 2,000 acres donated by the City of Lubbock" (Durbin 1993: 10). The original wartime mission included the training of fighter, bomber and transport pilots. The field was closed during postwar demobilization and reopened in 1949 as Reese AFB under the Air Training Command (ATC), which designated the base "as one of the five Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) bases" (Durbin 1993: 11). Currently the base is home to fighter and transport training and uses T-37, T-38 and T-1A aircraft. The UPT program graduates about 400 pilots annually. "As stated in the IRP manual, Reese AFB has a force of approximately 1,650 enlisted personnel, 500 permanent party officers, and 570 civilians" (Durbin 1993: 12).

Reese Air Force Base was named for Army Air Corps Lt. Augustus Franklin Reese, who died in a volunteer bombing and strafing mission over Sardinia in 1943 (Durbin 1993, Lee 2 July 1995). Lt. Reese was a decorated P-38 fighter pilot who flew numerous missions in North Africa and Italy during World War II. He was a native of nearby Shallowater, Texas, and a graduate of Texas Tech University, which was known as Texas Technological College at the time (Lee 2 July 1995). His sister, Katherine Reese Shepherd, has been very active in attempting to maintain the memory of her brother and was a strong supporter of keeping the base. Despite the closure, "Shepherd has her eyes on the future. She sees dozens of possible uses for the base--everything from colleges to factories" (Lee 2 July 1995).

#### The Closure Threat to Reese

In the spring of 1994, few in the Lubbock area suspected that Reese AFB was in any danger of being closed. This lack of concern on the part of the citizens and political leaders may have been partly responsible for the base closure. Compared to other localities against which Reese was forced to compete to remain open,<sup>1</sup> Lubbock was better able to absorb the loss of federal dollars, which made it a bigger target. Lubbock had escaped previous

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<sup>1</sup>Del Rio and Corpus Christi, Texas, Enid, Oklahoma and Columbus, Mississippi.

closure threats with minimal effort, which may have contributed to the relative lack of concern until it was too late. The other communities also had fought off previous closure threats and were more concerned about the potential effects of closure, due to the fact that their local economies were more dependent on military spending.

The City of Lubbock was once again aware of the closure threat in the spring of 1994, but took a low-key approach in its retention effort until the initial Air Force recommendation to close the base was released to the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) commission. Reese had survived previous closure rounds in 1991 and 1993 with little effort on the part of the city or community at large. There was little evidence to suggest that the 1995 round of closures would be much different. However, as more undergraduate pilot training bases were closed, competition between the remaining bases became more intense.

When the danger of closing appeared imminent in early 1995, the City began its dual-track strategy of attempting to save the base while exploring reuse alternatives. The retention effort was highly publicized, with members of the City Council and upper-level staff taking trips to Washington, D.C., to lobby politicians and the Air Force. The City Council also spent \$200,000 on a consultant-- defense lobbyist Christopher Lehman--whose job was to give advice and campaign full-time on behalf of base retention.

The City did not publicly place any emphasis on lobbying the Air Education Training Command (AETC)<sup>2</sup> at Randolph AFB in San Antonio, Texas, which was the most important step in lobbying the military bureaucracy. However, according to Assistant City Manager Quentin Thomas, the City consulted with a recently retired AETC Colonel who spoke with the AETC Command on the City's behalf.

While the lobbying efforts were going on, it was rumored that conversion plans were being discussed within the City bureaucracy. Some of the suggestions which filtered out during this time were the establishment of an industrial park, a medical complex, and a retirement community. The early conversion effort consisted mostly of education about the base conversion process, with little emphasis on planning, specific solutions or how to implement them. Conversion ideas would resurface with a greater degree of seriousness once the BRAC made its initial recommendations and final closure decisions.

By the spring of 1995, it was apparent that Reese AFB would not survive the budget cutting axe of the BRAC. The unenviable position in which the community found itself during the closure process was that the disadvantages regarding the Reese AETC mission were easily quantifiable,

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<sup>2</sup>The Air Training Command (ATC) was changed to the Air Education Training Command (AETC) in 1992 as part of Pentagon reorganization. The headquarters remained at Randolph AFB.

whereas the advantages were more subjective and not easy to measure. Hence, the advantages were left out of the analysis. The way the criteria were weighted also may have had an impact on the closure decision. It was rumored that the economic impact of base closure was given a higher weight by the Air Force, which would not help Reese. Despite the efforts of the City to mobilize public support during the BRAC visit, it seemed that the retention plan would be ineffective. Lubbock has a sizable population of veterans and pro-military citizens which could have been mobilized to direct and participate in the dual track phase. However, the retention effort had only limited grass-roots support. The failure of the retention effort placed a greater degree of importance on reuse planning. Following the closure decision, local public officials urged the community to pull together for the conversion effort. Although they advocated an inclusive planning strategy, politicians and institutions really were unsure about what to do next. Also, given the closed nature of the retention effort, they were somewhat farther behind than other communities in their preliminary inclusion effort.

#### Dual-Track Retention in San Antonio

San Antonio is a major city of about a million people and is located between South Texas and the Hill Country of central Texas. It is within a few hours drive of Houston,

Austin, Corpus Christi, the Rio Grande Valley, the Mexican border and the Gulf Coast. For most of the post-war era, the economy and population of San Antonio grew by leaps and bounds as the Air Force expanded their presence in the area. Scientific, logistical, training and command missions characterized the work done at Brooks, Kelly, Lackland and Randolph Air Force Bases. The Army also maintains a presence at nearby Camp Bullis. As defense budgets have diminished in the post-Cold War years, San Antonio has tried to take advantage of their strategic position on the North-South trade route between Mexico and the rest of North America, while at the same time trying to preserve the influx of federal defense dollars and thousands of military-related jobs. Tourism also represents a large sector of the economy.

In the spring of 1995, the greater San Antonio community was faced with a situation similar to that of Lubbock, but with an additional twist: two of the five military bases in that community were indirectly placed in competition with one another. This was because both Brooks AFB and Kelly AFB were under consideration for downsizing, despite their different missions. Of the two, Brooks was considered the most vulnerable, while the possibility of the closure or realignment of Kelly was considered a long shot.

Therefore the primary retention effort was aimed at demonstrating the military and economic value of Brooks.

Texas Governor George W. Bush lobbied BRAC on behalf of all the endangered bases in Texas and gave San Antonio the impression that Kelly was not in much danger of closing. "The U.S. government would be smart to increase the number of workers at Kelly," Bush said. "They have proved to be a cost effective deliverer. I think Kelly should have a bright future" (Driver 28 Feb 1995: 1A).

The City of San Antonio took the lead in the retention effort by creating the "Mayor's BRAC '95 Task Force," which included members of the City Council, Staff and Chamber of Commerce and was given a \$250,000 budget. A three-pronged strategy was crafted by City Councilwoman Lynda Billa Burke and retired Brigadier General Paul Roberson which emphasized: (1) the military value of Brooks' three technical missions; (2) the economic benefits of retaining the base, and (3) community support for the military in San Antonio (Price 28 Feb 1995: 4A). The three missions at Brooks include the School of Aerospace Medicine, the Center for Environmental Excellence and the Armstrong Laboratory. Gen. Roberson emphasized Brooks' "unique synergism" or relationship with the local medical and scientific community, as well as with its own three missions" (Price 28 Feb 1995: 4A) that would be disrupted in the event of closure or realignment.

In addition, a compelling argument was made with regard to the expense of closing the base. Roberson asserted that

if the three missions at Brooks were redirected to other bases that the cost to taxpayers would be at least \$300 million. This would defeat the cost-cutting purpose behind closing the base. The cost argument is probably what saved the missions at Brooks. However, it presented another dilemma: Kelly was much more vulnerable with the retention of Brooks than if it had been slated for closure. In addition, given the scientific, research and development orientation of the missions at Brooks, it would have been much easier to redevelop than Kelly, which has a primary mission of air logistics and supply.

An interesting development during the San Antonio retention effort was the inclusion of economic elites and grass-roots community support from the very beginning. The typical practice in most base closure/retention activities is to not encourage community action until the military has submitted its preliminary "hit list" to the Secretary of Defense. Following this sequence of events, the population is mobilized to make an impression on the BRAC commissioners. Sometimes this strategy is effective, as in the cases of San Angelo, Texas, and Meridian, Mississippi, where community support was cited by the 1991 and 1993 BRACs as one of the reasons why they voted against closure. However, at other times it is ineffective, as demonstrated by the cases of Lubbock, Texas, and Long Beach, California, which attempted similar strategies and failed to save Reese

AFB in 1995, and the Long Beach Naval Shipyard in 1992, respectively.

What is interesting about the San Antonio strategy is that they were in a much better position to plan for the conversion of Kelly when it was realigned, because of the organization already established to fight the closure of Brooks. In fact, preliminary conversion plans for Brooks were already being discussed during the retention effort. The nature of the retention and redevelopment efforts were much closer to discourse than that of most communities, given the early emphasis on inclusion. There was an immediate reaction from the Bexar (pronounced bear) County Judge and Commissioners, the state representatives and City Councilmen, who promised to make immediate efforts to mobilize the local community. Councilwoman Lynda Billa Burke proclaimed, "Now we call the neighborhood presidents together, church groups and retired people. We're mobilized. We're ready to fight this fight" (Williams and Phillips Gonzalez 1 Mar 1995: 5A). This effort at community outreach made it much easier for San Antonio to continue the retention effort, make the initial conversion plans, organize the redevelopment effort and apply for planning grants in a timely manner.

Like other communities, San Antonio engaged in a dual-track strategy, although at the time it was denied so as not to send the wrong message to BRAC, according to Gen.

Roberson, who was acting as a representative of the Chamber of Commerce. However, it was still an unexpected shock when BRAC announced that Kelly AFB would be realigned, while Brooks was spared. Of particular concern were the 12,000 jobs at Kelly and the potential economic and political consequences of their departure. Most of the people employed at Kelly are Hispanic, which contributes to the highly charged political aspect of the realignment and subsequent conversion plans.

The inclusion and mobilization of the people of San Antonio--in particular the Hispanic and business communities--was sufficiently well organized and publicized to draw the attention of President Clinton. The White House remains concerned about the large voting bloc of Hispanics in South Texas who generally vote Democratic, as well as the economic repercussions for the country's second largest state. As a result of San Antonio's lobbying, the Clinton Administration formulated a privatization plan designed to soften the impact of the realignment. This was followed by a \$500,000 planning grant and a personal visit from the President.

While partisan and racial politics might have been partly responsible for the attention focused on Kelly, inclusion and self-regulation are probably responsible for the grant allocation. The degree of organization which was exhibited by the retention effort, and the degree of public

support for job preservation by the San Antonio populace helped create a synergy which was harnessed by local government in pursuit of the dilemma of what to do next. In early August, 1995, the newly created Office of Defense Transition (ODT) established open channels of communication, not only within the community, but through all levels of government. The federal government, which has as its policy the nurturing of such nascent tendencies in base conversion efforts, rewarded San Antonio for its organizational progress.

#### Planning and Organization in Lubbock

The blame in Lubbock for the closure decision of Reese AFB was mostly levelled at BRAC, not the City. Nevertheless, throughout the spring and summer of 1995, the City adopted a quietly introspective posture, maintaining a closed-door policy with regard to what to do next despite public assurances to the contrary. They also began to isolate themselves from other public institutions and excluded the community at large from the early part of the conversion effort. This strategy did not help the City when it encountered unexpected problems.

In the weeks following the closure decision, the City government initiated contact with the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) in order to discuss the allocation of planning grant money. OEA reportedly awarded the City a

small \$31,000 grant to hire staff and work on conversion-related activities--but the money never arrived--and OEA contact Col. Joe Gorman was reassigned and was not replaced by OEA in a timely manner. By maintaining an exclusive debate, the City sealed themselves off from other sources of planning money, such as that which could have been raised by local financial institutions and professional business associations. In addition, if the community had been galvanized for the conversion effort in a manner similar to that of San Antonio, they might have generated greater interest and support from the federal government.

Part of the reason for the City's behavior can be attributed to the fact that they are the largest local governmental institution in the community, and as such they are usually responsible for providing leadership on most policy issues which affect the Lubbock area. Along with leadership comes the inevitable criticism when plans are not effectively implemented, or when externalities arise. It could be that the City was not attempting to behave in an exclusive manner, but that their introspective demeanor was designed to formulate strategies to ward off unwarranted criticism and that this was misinterpreted by other local institutions. The City was probably shell-shocked from the unexpected loss of the base, while at the same time they were faced with having to formulate the best course of action as part of its dual-track strategy.

## The Politics of Exclusion

During the summer of 1995, rifts began to develop between the City staff and County officials, the business community, Air Force and the Texas Tech Center for Public Service, which was attempting to establish local patterns of communication through the community outreach part of its Military Base Conversion and Community Assistance Program. City officials may have felt they were being threatened or unfairly criticized by these other groups and institutions, and hence isolated themselves so as to avoid further criticism until they had created firm plans.

County Judge Don McBeath and County Commissioner Kenny Maines were concerned about the conversion of Reese for both political and liability reasons. South Plains College has a branch campus on the base and wishes to expand their vocational training on the facility. Neighboring Hockley County, the City of Levelland and members of the South Plains Association of Governments (SPAG), a regional consortium of local governments, were also very interested for economic reasons. A large number of individuals, departments and colleges at Texas Tech expressed interest in utilizing Reese facilities for research and development, participating in the conversion effort, or engaging in University-business partnerships.

On July 13, 1995, the City and County, through a joint resolution, created a planning and reuse board known as the

Lubbock/Reese Redevelopment Committee. Originally it included three representatives from the City and two from the County. On the surface, the County Judge and commissioners welcomed the inclusion of their institution, because most of the base falls within the County, not City limits. However, privately the County officials still remained somewhat mistrustful of the City. It should be noted that institutional infighting is not unusual during the preliminary stages of most base conversions. In fact, compared to some other communities, such as El Toro and Victorville, California, and to an extent, Austin, Texas, the disagreements in Lubbock were rather civil. By joining together, the City and County took an important step towards the creation of a nascent discursive formation designed to facilitate the complex implementation process. However, the nature of this new commission was still very exclusive.

It soon became apparent that if any progress was to be made, the various factions, which seemed to involve the City on the one side, and all the other governmental and business entities on the other, would have to come together. NAID consultant Bobbi Morgan had emphasized this point at a Center for Public Service-sponsored grant planning seminar on August 4, 1995. While she was in Lubbock, an effort was made by the Center's base conversion program to reach out to professional business associations who might be called upon to risk capital, labor and other resources in the Reese

redevelopment effort, and brief them on the reuse process. The local business community has a great deal of expertise and capital which is necessary for successful redevelopment.

#### Institutional Representation

Following the joint action by the City and County, South Plains Association of Governments (SPAG) members phoned City officials and argued that they, South Plains College, Texas Tech University, Frenship Independent School District, and neighboring Hockley County should be represented on the board. The City then expanded the board membership from five to seven. Eventually, after more debate by the City Council, the planning committee was expanded to nine members and included the original three from the City, two from the County, one each from South Plains, Texas Tech, Frenship ISD, and SPAG. The three members from the City include Mayor David Langston and Councilmen T.J. Patterson and Max Ince. Patterson is the only racial minority on the committee.

The County members are Judge Don McBeath and Commissioner Kenny Maines, whose electoral district includes the base. The interests of Hockley County and the City of Levelland are looked after by South Plains College and SPAG, whose members include South Plains president Gary McDaniel and Mayor Don Kendrick of Slaton, Texas. Texas Tech was represented by Dr. Robert Lawless, the University president

(until his resignation in March, 1996). Frenship ISD is represented by school board president and businessman, Mike Wright. Notably absent from the committee are representatives from professional business associations. The City received some criticism for this from the public and academic communities. The City's official view was that the elected officials from the City--the Mayor and two Councilmen--adequately represented the business community by virtue of the fact that they had run small businesses prior to being elected, which include a law firm, an insurance company and a small, minority-oriented newspaper.

#### The Need for Discourse

The first meeting of the planning commission, the Lubbock/Reese Redevelopment Committee (LRRC) was held on August 11, 1995, at Reese AFB and was hosted by the wing commander, Colonel Randal Gelwix. Future meetings would be held at least once a month and the location would rotate between the base, Lubbock City Hall, SPAG and the Levelland campus of South Plains College, in order to be more convenient for members from outside the City of Lubbock. Although all meetings of the LRRC are open to the public, little effort was made initially to include members of the general public. Changing venues for the commission meetings is also not a good way to encourage community involvement.

At the first meeting, the only person in attendance not connected with a public institution or the media was a representative of SPARTAN, a local anti-tax group. The business community was notably absent. The spatial arrangements at the meetings were indicative of single-direction communication. Those of us who were not on the LRRC sat at a separate table at the back of the room, and were presumably observers rather than participants. The opinions of those not on the reuse planning committee generally were not sought or encouraged at the early LRRC meetings. The format of the meeting was highly structured, with the Mayor and City staff dominating the conversation. By maintaining exclusive seating arrangements and hence, limiting participation, and by controlling the content and direction of the discussion, the City government sought to stifle extra-institutional contributions and citizen involvement.

In his opening remarks, Mayor David Langston spoke at length about the closure and conversion processes, praising the political leaders from Texas Tech, South Plains College, South Plains Association of Governments (SPAG) and the private sector who had shown interest in the conversion of Reese AFB. It is his wish that the conversion focus on value-added solutions, including skilled, private sector jobs and education. Job replacement and creation is the primary goal of the LRRC. Raising income through skilled,

high-paying jobs is a priority. Stability and long-term plans are also a concern. The Mayor is not in favor of any kind of federal transition for these reasons. He also is not in favor of "job shifting," or in other words, he believes in job distribution as opposed to redistribution.

Perhaps because of these remarks and the need for strong goal articulation and leadership, Mayor Langston was selected as LRRC chair by acclamation. Dr. Gary McDaniel (President of South Plains College) and Mike Wright (of the Frenship ISD school board in nearby Wolfforth) were both nominated as vice chair. Wright withdrew in favor of McDaniel in the interest of collegiality. By attempting to provide strong leadership, the Mayor and others were seeking to build a consensus among the participants and the institutions they represented.

It should be noted that the City of Lubbock's track record on successful implementation of economic development or infrastructural-related ventures is not good. They have had little success with the water reclamation project at Lake Alan Henry, located South of Lubbock, because the City neglected to negotiate the mineral rights to the land which was to be submerged by the lake. A number of oil wells still remain on the property, and as long as they are functioning the dam must remain open. The Mayor's efforts to secure a Department of Defense accounting office and a local multipurpose arena ended in failure as the Pentagon

awarded the accounting office to San Antonio and the multipurpose arena ballot initiative was defeated. Plans to redevelop economically depressed parts of downtown and East Lubbock have also been largely unsuccessful. Perhaps one reason for this consistent failure is the repeated exclusion of prominent local financial, real estate and industrial interests from these efforts.

Despite what might be viewed as multi-million dollar mistakes, the Mayor has not had a serious electoral challenge in quite some time and seems to remain reasonably popular. It is difficult not to compare Mayor Langston with New Haven's Mayor Richard Lee from the community development studies of Wolfinger (1963), Dahl (1971) and Polsby (1980) which were researched in the early 1960s. Like Mayor Lee, Mayor Langston articulates policy goals well and maintains a reasonable level of political support; however, there are few tangible results which can be observed over time. It seems that his administration is strong on the politics of policy articulation, but weak on substantive implementation.

County Judge Don McBeath has spoken of doing away with institutional turf wars in order to create a single entity (an LRA) which would foster a greater sense of community and trust among the participants of the conversion effort. Despite these remarks, rumor was that County officials still remained distrustful of the City staff. The Judge may also be concerned about the Mayor's track record on development

ventures, but remains publicly silent on these issues. Despite these possible misgivings, there seemed to be a realization on the part of many of the officials that their political attachments to the institutions they represented could be a hindrance to the conversion process, although there was never any serious attempt made to remedy this potential barrier.

One way in which this could have been done would have been to expand the LRRC and its subcommittees to include citizens not affiliated with political institutions. Also, local financial interests could have been included on the board. Although the City government did establish a temporary toll-free number for citizens to call with reuse suggestions, they made no effort to go out into the polity to draw in interested parties. Greater efforts at community outreach could have been attempted through the use of opinion surveys, the organization of veterans' groups, racial minorities, and the establishment of regularly held "town meetings." A fax number or e-mail address might also have been helpful, but these types of activities were never publicly discussed or attempted.

#### Strengths and Weaknesses

City Planner Jim Bertram and Assistant City Manager Quentin Thomas have both been involved with the strategic planning process. At the first LRRC meeting, Mr. Thomas

addressed the public criticism that the business community was not adequately represented on the planning board. He asserted that the Mayor and Councilmen on the committee represent business and that businessmen will play prominent roles on all the planning subcommittees. As the Mayor is a lawyer by profession, and Councilman T.J. Patterson is the co-publisher of a small, minority-oriented paper for East Lubbock, this claim seemed rather weak. Councilman Max Ince owns a small insurance operation, but does not represent Lubbock's financial or developmental interests. The only one on the LRRC who can make a justifiable claim to represent the interests of the business community is the Frenship ISD representative, Mike Wright, who is also president of the American Bank of Commerce in nearby Wolfforth, Texas.

According to both Bertram and Thomas, mistakes will be made in the conversion effort, the trick is to try to minimize them with an adequate strategic plan which outlines goals and identifies needs, as well as emphasizing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. They maintain that they wish the process to be inclusive, meaning that they will accept public input.<sup>3</sup> However, despite this claim, only the members of the board were taken seriously at most of the meetings. The Air Force transition personnel

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<sup>3</sup>The City's notion of inclusion is much narrower than the empirical referent used to evaluate the complex implementation process in this work.

have answered technical questions about Reese and military drawdown procedures. On the whole, they have been quite friendly and helpful for the entire group, despite the fact that they disagree with the LRRC on the property reversion issue.

At the August 11, 1995, LRRC meeting, Mr. Thomas spoke of "passing the baton" to different (business) groups and subcommittees as the planning process advances. Major decisions would be made by the LRRC, with the subcommittees and staff playing a secondary role. This process did not sound like inclusion or discourse--but top-down, orthodox administration and hierarchy. As the discussions wore on it became apparent that the top of the organization where these decisions were being made was not ACM Quentin Thomas' office, but from the Mayor himself, as he stridently supported Thomas' argument and explained the rationale behind certain actions. The City recommended the reuse commission adopt eight subcommittees. Again, this seems to have been a top-down decision. The subcommittees included: (1) aviation, (2) marketing and base planning, (3) economic development, (4) education, (5) environment, (6) housing/homeless, (7) human resources, and (8) medical.

Each subcommittee was to have roughly 12 members and at least one staffer, once grant money became available. The chairs and membership would be selected by the LRRC. It should be noted that despite these early discussions,

subcommittee members were not actually selected for three months from lists submitted by the LRRC members. Of even greater importance, all personnel decisions were made behind closed doors during executive sessions of the LRRC.

Token support from the business community was encouraged in late October by including twenty-nine members on the economic development subcommittee, but the appointments to this and the other subcommittees came comparatively late in the process. Some of the subcommittees--although they were appointed in October--did not meet until January 1996. For the most part, there was not a great deal of attention given to the subcommittees. There was little media coverage and citizens were not openly encouraged to attend and participate. The practice of exclusion and organizational hierarchy indicate a lack of sincerity, possible hidden agendas and little opportunity for willing engagement.

During the first six months after the creation of the LRRC, the City did not make any serious effort to negotiate with the Air Force for obtaining any of the base's surplus property. Nor was there any attempt to secure the appointment of a Base Transition Coordinator, Executive Director or Environmental Coordinator in a timely manner. All of these positions must be filled and an assessment of facilities and material must be made in order for the community to progress to the complex implementation phase.

People who are hired to serve in these capacities also contribute substantive expertise to base conversion discourse, aiding in decisions regarding what should be done next and how to do it. This organizational inertia contributed significantly to planning delays and subsequent implementation errors.

### The Reversion Dispute

Often forgotten by the other participants in the complex implementation process at Reese AFB is the Air Force itself. The Air Force is an active participant in the transition process, and in fact has an agenda. They are up front about the military's interests. This seems to be an indication that they are an institution which is truly attempting to engage in a sincere, action-oriented discussion about what to do next. Their practice of maintaining open channels of communication through their base transition office and their participation at LRRC meetings and planning sessions are indicative of an attempt at willing engagement.

Though the official closing date for Reese is September 30, 1997, the Air Force has stated publicly on a number of occasions that they will likely pull out most of the aircraft and cease operations much sooner, probably in early 1997 or even late 1996. The last undergraduate pilot training class will graduate by April, 1997. Transition

officers from Reese have indicated that there probably will not be much more than a skeleton crew at the base after this date. Other participants in the process do not seem so concerned about this potential time constraint on the redevelopment effort. However, caretaker agreements for when the Air Force leaves and interim leases for preliminary redevelopment must be negotiated before the Air Force leaves in order to have a smooth transition. In addition, the Air Force has generously provided the City staff with inventory lists so that the LRRC can negotiate with them for surplus property. The City and LRRC has thus far made no attempt to begin these negotiations.

The nature of the difference of opinion over the property reversion dispute between the City and the Air Force has become clear. The original deed, signed in 1949 by the City of Lubbock and the U.S. Air Force, provided the Air Force with 1,387 acres, with the stipulation that the land be returned to the City in the event that operations at the base were terminated. In 1950, the deed was renegotiated. The reversionary clause was removed in exchange for a guarantee that the base would exist as a permanent installation. The City believes that the original deed supersedes the subsequent agreement, given the fact that the Air Force wishes to terminate its guarantee of permanent occupation.

The Air Force believes that maintaining operations for forty-five years constitutes upholding the intent of the agreement. The City believes that 'permanent' constitutes some period of time longer than forty-five years, and pressed their claim to the property. Since 1950, the base has expanded to include 3,954 acres, including an auxiliary airfield in Terry County, south of Lubbock County. There is also the issue of base housing, which is located directly across the street from the front gate of the base and is within City limits.

The City wishes to acquire all the land, base housing and two million square feet of building space through reversion. Following the October 18, 1995, meeting of the LRRC, State Attorney General Dan Morales ruled on the validity of the City's claim, and believes that it is legally binding. In the meantime, the Air Force insisted that they deserve fair market value for the land and base property. The law, federal regulations and different interpretations of local history cloud the reversion issue.

At the September 21, 1995, LRRC meeting, Major Steve Rakel of the Reese transition office indicated that Lubbock will have to do some serious negotiating with the Air Force if it wishes to succeed at winning the property reversion dispute. The implication of his argument is that the City had done little in the way of bargaining with the base transition personnel. A consultant could provide the City

with guidance on how to better conduct negotiations with the Air Force, but as of early 1996 none had been hired. Within a few short months, the City had given up its reversionary claim, forfeiting a potential shortcut to reuse implementation.

### Assessment

Overall, the City of Lubbock has made more of an effort to include others in the process as they become more familiar with the nature of base redevelopment. However, there is still reason to question their sincerity and agenda. The exclusion of the general public by changing meeting venues, the exclusion of the business community from the reuse board, closed-door sessions, foot-dragging on subcommittee and administrative appointments, and creating an economic development subcommittee which is too large to be workable all appear to be deliberate moves on the part of the City. Although the possibility exists that they may simply be incompetent, the consistent pattern of intangible results--as opposed to undertaking careless or irresponsible endeavors--seems to imply an intentional agenda of inaction.

There is an effort to encourage the appearance of inclusion--for instance the creation of a toll-free phone number for making reuse suggestions to the City--but no direct contact or two-way communication with personnel, and hence little resemblance to authentic discourse. There is

little substantive effort at community outreach. There are no opportunities for public feedback such as real "town meetings," opinion surveys or the like. Local newspaper coverage is irregular and one-sided, with few opportunities for anyone other than the City government to comment on base reuse. The nature of the redevelopment coalition is exclusive--so exclusive that one is hard-pressed to call it a coalition at all--as it represents governmental institutions with only token representation from the business community and little involvement from private citizens, racial minorities or veterans.

Despite the effort to expand the number of actors, communication still has monologic overtones. For example, all personnel and real estate decisions are discussed in exclusive executive sessions and then announced to the subcommittees and general public. The spatial arrangements at planning committee meetings enhance elite control, with members seated at a "head table" and encouraged to participate, while others are relegated to a non-speaking, observational role in an audience. Closed door appointments and decisions, the appearance of unequal communication and hierarchy demonstrate the lack of democratic autonomy and self-regulation.

There is considerable doubt about the intent to provide reuse solutions, and there are few substantive policy outputs. The City staff has become well informed on base

conversion procedures, as are other actors in the process, yet there is little in the way of progressive results, such as the establishment of a reuse organization or the publication of a strategic redevelopment plan. The failure to effectively organize the redevelopment effort suggests a lack of substantive contribution on the part of certain individuals and institutions.

What appears to be happening is that the City of Lubbock has an anti-inclusive or anti-discursive model for planning and implementation. Decisions are made at the upper echelon of city government and then sold to the LRRC membership and the public. This process is slow and difficult as institutional agendas prevent the City from engaging in outright cooptation of other community interests. The time that it takes for reuse ideas to percolate through this system has the potential to significantly delay the implementation of complex strategic reuse plans at Reese AFB. The Lubbock case comes closest to orthodox or monologic administration than any case encountered thus far.

#### Planning and Organization in San Antonio

Rather than dwelling on what to do next, like other communities have, San Antonio came up with plans to deal with the realignment in an incredibly short period of time. While the City of Lubbock was attempting to reestablish a

dialogue with the other institutions of its community in early July, 1995, San Antonio had already established such connections during the retention effort and was moving ahead. By August 14, the Kelly reuse planning committee (known as the IBASC) had met under the guidance of newly elected Mayor Bill Thornton, who expressed a desire to maximize job creation at the base through privatization. Each of the eight planning subcommittees had already been established and had met for the first time by September 6, 1995 (Kelly 21 Newsbriefs 6 Sept 1995).

The lead institutions in the privatization effort are the City of San Antonio, Office of Defense Transition, Chamber of Commerce and the Air Force. The chairs and vice chairs of the subcommittees include representatives of the Hispanic community, the Catholic Church, the City Council, the business community, neighborhood associations and the military. Despite this, the focus of the realignment effort is not on institutional representation, but individual participation. In addition, the Clinton Administration has maintained close contact with the planning and reuse effort. The timely awarding of the \$500,000 planning grant was essential for establishing the Office of Defense Transition, located in City Hall. The appointment of retired Brig. Gen. Paul Roberson as executive director provided expertise, as well as continuity as the community shifted gears from retention to redevelopment. The planning committee also

invited a variety of federal and military officials to their strategic planning retreat, held September 9 at Kelly, and sent representatives to other communities to examine successful redevelopment efforts.

One advantage that San Antonio has over Lubbock is that the proposed redevelopment timetable is much longer--five years--as opposed to two years. This gives San Antonio more time to discuss and prepare for the downsizing of Kelly. Despite this luxury of time, they have not dallied. Strategic redevelopment plans were completed by the end of 1995. The LRA was formed in early 1996, while privatization plans and local economic development initiatives are scheduled to begin by early 1997. By 2001 the Air Force is supposed to have completed its drawdown and realignment processes.

Discursive patterns in the San Antonio case involve multi-channelled communication not just between policy elites and grass-roots organizations at the local level, but also among inter-governmental actors as well. Maintaining strong ties within the community and with federal officials has undoubtedly contributed to the early success of the San Antonio redevelopment effort. Whereas the Lubbock community was still in the preliminary planning phase by the end of 1995, San Antonio had already progressed to the organizational development phase and had made significant progress on its strategic plan.

## Discourse in San Antonio

Why has the San Antonio community progressed at such a quick pace while the Lubbock community has seemingly fallen behind? The answer may lie in the political circumstances which existed when the IBASC, or Initial Base Adjustment Strategy Committee was formed in San Antonio to negotiate a strategic plan. Shortly prior to the BRAC's realignment decision, newly elected Mayor Bill Thornton was searching for an issue to unite the community and build political support. The Mayor had won a narrow victory in a highly divisive campaign and was governing from a position of weakness during the early weeks of his administration. At the elite level, he joined with politically popular Councilman Juan Solis, Assistant City Manager Rolando Bono (who had been in charge of developing preliminary reuse plans during the retention effort), and Paul Roberson (Gen. USAF, ret.) of the Chamber of Commerce, in order to decide what to do next with regard to Kelly's realignment. The City Manager's office had a proposal for the council within a week of the closure announcement (Lopez 1996). The proposal involved establishing a planning committee and an administrative office.

The City of San Antonio allocated fifteen staff members from three local agencies; Economic Development, City Planning and the City Attorney's office. Paul Roberson headed up the Office of Defense Transition (ODT), which

hired seven staff in the next few months. The City generally incurred most of the expenses of the early conversion effort, knowing that they would be reimbursed by redevelopment grants. The Mayor appointed Councilman Juan Solis, Tullos Welles from the Chamber of Commerce, and local attorney Jose Villareal, formerly of the 1992 Clinton presidential campaign, to serve as tri-chairs of the IBASC planning committee. The structure of the IBASC and the working relationship between the IBASC, City of San Antonio and the Office of Defense Transition is perhaps the best example of a true discursive base conversion in Texas.

The formation of the IBASC was publicized by the City's Public Information Office almost immediately after the realignment decision. Aside from the initial political appointments, the members of the realignment planning and implementation organizations did not represent public institutions. Individual private citizens were encouraged to take part in the formulation of the strategic redevelopment plan. Anyone who expressed an interest would be included, and everyone was heard. One hundred sixty-seven people from diverse professions and backgrounds volunteered for the IBASC. An executive council of twenty-two members was created to help select subcommittee chairs, coordinate planning goals and timelines (Dimaline 1996). The chief architect of this strategy was Paul Roberson, who was strongly supported by the Mayor, Council and City staff.

The IBASC was not organized in a hierarchical fashion, as it was determined that such a structure would not be conducive to inclusion. Instead, the subcommittees, City staff and ODT maintained open, lateral lines of communication among themselves. The subcommittees included: a Master Planning board designed to formulate long-term goals, a Human Resources panel to deal with hiring and personnel issues, a State and Federal Liaison group to deal with intergovernmental dilemmas, a Citizen and Neighborhood Impact panel to consider potential externalities on the community, a Transportation board to deal with joint public-private runway use, a Privatization subcommittee to deal with the transfer of jobs from the Pentagon to the corporate sector, a Commercialization group to deal with the proposed creation of 10,000 new jobs, and a Land Use, Infrastructure and Facilities panel (IBASC 1995).

Each subcommittee held public hearings twice a month from September to November, 1995. These were often in the form of "town meetings" at local high schools, emphasizing the Mayor's vision of community involvement to generate public and political support. The local newspaper provided excellent coverage of late-breaking activities on a weekly basis and was a positive force in organizing community interest. Largely because of these efforts there was no NIMBY opposition to suggested redevelopment plans. Due to the subcommittee focus on individual involvement rather than

institutional representation, agendas were more easily discerned and dealt with (Lopez 1996), while substantive suggestions were encouraged.

While the IBASC subcommittees negotiated strategic plans, ODT provided leadership and negotiated with the Air Force for surplus property. The chief players in this process were Paul Roberson and Tom Ruffini (Col. USAF, ret.). Both individuals have served at the base in the recent past and have a basic understanding of Kelly's mission and people. ODT represents an important link between the community, the city government and the base, and played an important role as facilitator of the discourse.

Community outreach, coalition building and the involvement of outsiders are all evidence of inclusion in San Antonio. The election of subcommittee chairs and open "town meetings" are evidence of self-regulation. These practices were established by design. While there may have been political reasons behind it, the benefits should soon be apparent.

### Opposing Agendas

The previous discussion is not meant to imply that there was no disagreement about what to do next in San Antonio. There was dissension from the employees' union at the base. However, this seemed to be based on opposition to the concept of privatization in general, instead of specific

opposition to community involvement in the realignment process (Hutton 1 Dec 1995). Eventually the union came to support the idea of employee stock ownership, which is being discussed as part of the privatization effort (Driver 21 Dec 1995). The union also seemed to resent the exclusion of institutions, namely itself, in favor of individual participation. However, the labor leadership seems to have recognized that if they did not jump on board the realignment effort they would be left behind.

Local environmental groups have raised concerns about groundwater contamination and gas fumes from chemical storage tanks. However, these problems should not cause any significant delay for the realignment effort. The Air Force is already in the process of environmental remediation at a groundwater treatment center South of the base and have made guarantees of compliance with clean-up laws. Those concerned about local contamination seem to be reasonably satisfied with the Air Force's efforts.

One potential stumbling block for the realignment effort is the existence of the so-called "60-40 rule," which mandates that 60% of all depot maintenance funding be allocated to military workers, while private contractors are limited to 40%. Rep. Frank Tejeda (D-San Antonio) has proposed a bill to do away with the rule so that all maintenance work can be reallocated to private contractors. The bill has bipartisan support from area Congressmen

including Henry Gonzalez (D), Lamar Smith (R), Henry Bonilla (D), and from Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R). Tejeda argues that passage of the legislation would substantially ease the pain of the privatization process for San Antonio and help to keep 6,000 jobs on the base property (Martin 6 Jan 1996: 3B). In addition, the City is pushing for the expansion of enterprise zones near the base. Present enterprise zones on the East and West sides of town have generated 1,595 new jobs and \$285.4 million in new investment since 1988 (Konstam 4 Jan 1996: 1F).

#### Moving On

The next step in San Antonio's realignment effort is to establish a Local Reuse Authority (LRA). The LRA is intended to function like a non-profit public corporation and will be composed of seven unpaid members. Its mission will be three-fold. The privatization effort is the top priority due to the large number of jobs involved in the Air Force drawdown. There are also other sections of the base which will have to be redeveloped in the fashion of a normal base conversion. Finally, there are sections of the base which will be transferred to neighboring Lackland AFB, which may present some local housing and access problems.

Positions on the LRA were advertised just prior to the end of 1995, but received little response. Another attempt to get the word out was made after the first of the year

which generated eighty applications for the LRA. Forty of those were selected to make presentations to the City Council. The Council was looking for people who have some connection to Kelly AFB and some expertise with legal and economic development issues. "'The (redevelopment authority) needs to be very pro-business,' said Mayor Bill Thornton. 'It needs to be the size and nature that will work with defense contractors and companies that will be coming here'" (Williams 14 Nov 1995: 3B).

### Assessment

There are several indications of authentic discourse which can be inferred from the San Antonio case. First, the redevelopment coalition is broad-based and representative of the community as a whole, with significant involvement from the local business and Hispanic groups, as well as non-profit and religious interests. The priority that the City of San Antonio has placed on having an inclusive realignment effort is a crucial element of their success. This is evident from the amount of personnel, resources and expertise which has been allocated for the IBASC and ODT. Second, the non-hierarchical, non-institutional orientation and structure of the IBASC planning committee and subcommittees is conducive to multi-directional communication. The "town meeting" orientation of the planning sessions promotes community involvement and

provides a forum for discussion and an atmosphere of self-regulation.

Finally, there are tangible policy outputs of the planning and organization activities in the form of a completed strategic plan, a defense transition office, and a \$500,000 planning grant. These activities probably would not have been completed within the six month time frame without open, discursive patterns of administration, because discourse encourages the solicitation of expertise and a certain degree of publicity inherent in the practice of politics through negotiation. The only problem with the San Antonio case is that it has not yet progressed to the point where implementation success can be judged, making any claims linking the practice of discourse and successful policy outcomes impossible.

## CHAPTER VIII

### CONCLUSION

Base conversions represent the practical and theoretical fusion of discourse, complex implementation and local control. While base closures are not the economic disasters they are portrayed to be, it still takes a great deal of capital and organization to successfully convert a military installation to private uses. There are a number of procedures in which local governments must educate themselves, such as planning, grant writing, property acquisition, the organizational structure of base conversions and environmental requirements. The inclusion of all concerned local public institutions, business interests and individuals is essential for the success of conversion efforts.

#### Discursive Complex Implementation Theory

Discursive administration--the theoretical explanation of inclusion--is characterized by politics through negotiation. Sincerity, agendas, engagement and substantive contribution must all be present in order for discourse to be authentic, according to Fox and Miller (1995). This administrative ideal is derived from the works of Arendt (1963), Berger and Luckmann (1966), Dahl (1971), Cochran (1982) and Habermas (from Calhoun 1992), among others.

These works have contributed to the notions of multi-directional communication and bottom-up administration inherent in discourse theory.

Complex implementation is the idea that economic development goals can be articulated and fulfilled through the strategic planning process. The most important economic development goal is job creation according to Aharoni (1977) and Frey (1983). However, Stein (1990) argues that local governments regularly engage in other types of developmental activity as well, including capital investment and the creation of infrastructure. Mercer (1992) advocates strategic planning as the best method for localities to achieve developmental goals. Though the strategic planning process was originally a militaristic, top-down practice, a less hierarchical approach may be more useful at the level of local government.

Central to the idea of local-level complex implementation is the notion of consociational coalition building, or inclusion. This is described by Stone and Sanders and others (1987) as the "regime paradigm," in which consensus is reached on developmental goals and their implementation. Local-level complex implementation provides the conceptual link between discourse and public policy outcomes, which in this work are represented by military base conversions.

## Process and Outcomes

The base conversion process follows three stages, which are commonly represented by the evolution of three different organizations. The first phase is the retention and preliminary planning phase and involves the creation of a retention organization. The second phase is the strategic planning and organizational development phase, and involves the transition of the retention group to the planning committee and subcommittees. This phase is the most crucial because if discursive patterns of administration are not established, then implementation efforts will be hamstrung by a lack of consensus and a withholding of federal assistance. The final phase is complex implementation, which is generally supervised by a Local Reuse Authority (LRA). Strategic economic development plans are put into action at this stage with the hope of replacing lost jobs and income. Many base conversions, if done correctly, can create even more jobs and generate even more income than was possible under federal administration of the base.

Conversion timelines are a way in which the progress of planning and implementation can be observed. The existence of substantive outcomes can help us infer the practice of discursive complex implementation. Within the first year of a BRAC closure decision, certain procedures must be carried out in order to have a successful conversion. Planning committees and subcommittees must be created in a timely

fashion. They must involve individuals who sufficiently represent the community, but are not bound by institutional agendas. These committees cannot be restricted by hierarchy or one-way patterns of communication if they are to be considered inclusive.

The local business community must be involved in all phases of base planning and implementation, as they serve a crucial function in redevelopment. Consultants and reuse staff, including an executive director, base transition coordinator and environmental coordinator, must be hired in order to contribute a sufficient level of expertise. These specialized staff and business interests play an important role in channeling discursive patterns of planning and implementation to make sure that the focus on job creation is not lost. Developmental grants must be applied for and received within a reasonable amount of time. Screening for surplus property as well as homeless and Native American claims must be negotiated along with interim leases and caretaker agreements.

The cases used in the timeline comparison illustrate success, failure and possible points in between (see Appendix, Table 1). Alexandria, Louisiana, as well as Beeville, and San Antonio, Texas, completed most of the requisite first year steps. Both Alexandria and Beeville can claim success from the creation of multi-faceted reuse solutions which have more than replaced the lost jobs and

federal dollars caused by base closure. Though it is too early to view tangible results in San Antonio, there is no reason to assume that their planning success will fail to translate into implementation success.

Those cases which failed to complete the first year preliminary reuse steps have no tangible redevelopment results to speak of. This is true of Victorville and El Toro, California, which have been unable to reach a consensus on reuse plans or procedures. It is apparent from the lack of substantive policy outcomes that inclusion was not practiced in these cases. Lubbock, Texas, has completed some, but not all of the first-year requirements. It should be kept in mind that as of this writing, it has not yet been a year since the BRAC made its closure decision about Reese AFB. Though Lubbock is substantially behind San Antonio-- which was designated for realignment at the same time that Lubbock was designated for closure--it is not much farther behind where Beeville was in its early conversion effort.

#### Base Conversion in Texas

Inferring discursive complex implementation by viewing steps on a timeline or by observing policy outcomes is not the only way (nor is it necessarily the best way) to evaluate the applicability of discourse theory or the practice of local-level economic development. Field research contributes a great deal more to our understanding

of these ideas. The cases of Beeville, San Antonio and Lubbock were examined through participant-observation methodology and personal interviews. Local newspaper coverage was used in all cases to clarify the chronology of events.

These cases were chosen because of similar missions and reuse solutions as well as a similar social, historical and political context in Texas. None of these cases has environmental problems which could be considered serious enough to derail the conversion efforts, although Lubbock does have TCE contamination of local groundwater supplies, which may cause a bit of uncertainty. A lack of serious environmental problems is important so that the assessment of discourse is not distorted. In instances of reuse where environmental problems are of little importance, conversion failure is more easily attributable to a lack of inclusion or authentic discourse.

#### Beeville Revisited

The case of Beeville provides a good example of a successful conversion from start to finish. The inclusion of individuals from all affected local institutions and the business community, as well as the hiring of expert staff and consultants was essential for success. The use of town meetings to formulate community consensus as well as sincere negotiations with the Navy is indicative of discursive

practices. The strategic plan for a multi-use solution to the base closure dilemma was the result of this negotiative process.

Implementation of the plan was aided by the judicious awarding of redevelopment funds from both state and federal governments. Expansion of the Corpus Christi trade zone was helpful in attracting new businesses to the area. The creation of the state prison is most likely a permanent form of state funding. The migration of new businesses to the former base facilities has had substantial spillover effects, as the new base economy is more closely integrated into the economy of Beeville. This is evident by the construction of new homes and grocery stores in recent months.

Though the crisis has passed, the full potential of the former base has yet to be realized. The jobs which were lost have been replaced, as has the income, but still more jobs can be created which will generate yet more income. In order to reach a consensus on further development, another strategic plan is currently being formulated. According to Executive Director Brad Arvin, local economic elites oppose additional development because they fear increases in the standard of living, and hence, costs associated with higher wages as well as changes in the status quo. However, the rest of the community remains committed to further development.

## San Antonio Revisited

The community of San Antonio seems to be on the road to success. They have engaged in an inclusive planning and administrative process. Besides verification from direct observation, there are tangible results on the timeline as well. This implies that discourse is a viable theory and method of policy implementation. However, the plans for privatization and redevelopment have not actually been implemented, so the final assessment is yet to come.

In January, 1996, the City Council of San Antonio was interviewing people for positions on the Kelly Reuse Authority. This again demonstrates that they are well ahead of Lubbock and most previous cases in their development efforts. The seven-member LRA will be composed of community volunteers which have some connection to the base (from prior service or otherwise), expertise about economic development and tax issues, as well as experience with political and legal processes and issues. Again, in this process there is evidence of discursive behavior and community consensus.

It should also be noted that the expertise provided by Paul Roberson's Office of Defense Transition is unparalleled by other conversion efforts. The political connections established by the ODT and City of San Antonio with the Clinton Administration have provided them with a competitive advantage for planning and redevelopment funds. However,

had these factors not been present it would be difficult to say that San Antonio would be behind in its effort. Mayor Bill Thornton provides strong leadership and has made the Kelly privatization effort his top priority, so much so that in the event of failure his political career would probably be terminated. However, based on the evidence, that is not likely to happen. Again, the effort made by the Mayor and Council to encourage nascent discursive behavior and channel it in positive directions is the crowning achievement of San Antonio's conversion effort.

#### Lubbock Revisited

It is clear that the biggest barriers to discourse in the case of the Reese redevelopment effort is the lack of community consensus and organizational development caused by institutional distrust. There is not enough sincerity between the City, the business community, the County, and the Air Force. The one meeting at which representatives of some of these institutions participated in a sincere, action-oriented discussion showed great promise. However, this did not spill over to the LRRC planning committee meetings. Also, only a token effort was made to include those who would be called upon to risk capital and hire workers in new ventures at the base. Changing venues for the LRRC meetings also made it difficult for grass-roots organizations and concerned citizens to attend and voice

their opinions or ask questions. There was little effort at community outreach.

While some progress may have been made following the dual-track phase at bringing public officials and institutions together, the reuse effort bogged down in the strategic planning and organizational development phase because of the failure to take action. The reuse timelines called for the hiring of a consultant, executive director, base transition coordinator, environmental coordinator and the establishment of the base transition office, all within a few months of the closure decision. However, these plans were not sufficiently implemented on time. Although some progress had been made with the hiring of an executive director and consultants by March, 1996.

However, the success was short-lived. Soon after, the Office of Economic Adjustment phoned the Lubbock City Planner's office to inform them that there were problems with the way they took competitive bids in their consultant selection process. The discrepancy involves differences in procedure between the State of Texas and the federal government. As OEA planning funds were to be used to pay the consultants, the agency has reserved the right to enforce the following of their particular procedures. The implications of this problem are serious because it could force Lubbock to start over in the grant application and consultant selection processes. This could result in a

six-month delay. This might have been avoided had reuse experts been hired early on in the planning and organizational development phase.

The result of the weak effort at inclusion was a great deal of discussion by government, with little substantive action taken by anyone. Without organizational or implementation progress, it is difficult to assess the level of discourse. These results seem to indicate the failure to establish inclusion and possibly an active attempt to initiate top-down administration. However, Lubbock is still in the early stages of redevelopment, so it remains to be seen whether the delays will result in permanent failure.

#### Findings and Discussion

The research questions presented in the first half of this work focused on whether discourse was a viable method for local governments to successfully engage in the implementation of complex economic development plans. The examination of military base conversions in Texas seems to indicate a positive answer. Base conversion success is apparent or predicted where inclusive planning and implementation is practiced. From the cases utilized in this study, it may be possible to construct models of both success and failure of base conversions.

The conceptual link between discourse theory and policy outcomes is complex implementation. This is demonstrated by

the sequential link between inclusive planning (discourse), redevelopment (complex implementation), and tangible base conversion results (policy outcomes). Most of these activities take place in the second and third phases of base conversion. Any model of success must take these conceptual steps into account, whereas failure will be the result of a breakdown in the sequence.

### A Model of Success

From the examination of the previously mentioned base reuse case studies, several common characteristics appear. They are: local control, inclusion, expertise, planning, organization and investment. A successful base conversion is one where planning, organizational and implementation progress is made in pursuit of job creation and income replacement which is sufficient to compensate for the loss of the installation.

### Local Control and Inclusion

Although it is true that the federal government provides procedural guidance and redevelopment grants, control of planning and implementation must be done at the local level. Federal agencies are too far removed and lack the time and resources necessary to directly administer base conversions in an efficient manner. Local control also is a better guarantee of solutions which will benefit the

community. All successful base conversion success stories, in particular the ones discussed in this work, like Beeville and Alexandria, demonstrate local control. Cases which are characterized by outside interference are doomed to failure, as evidenced by Victorville, California.

When control is delegated to local governments, a reuse consensus must be negotiated. It is very seldom that a single governmental entity has the benefit of a direct property reversion. Other local institutions and community members will also have a stake in the policy outcome. Therefore, inclusion becomes a useful tool with which to mediate competing interests. The nature of inclusion must be broad-based and--in order to maximize usefulness--be structured in a bottom-up or non-hierarchical fashion. The most authentic discourse is one which is not bound by institutional loyalty or rivalries. The example of San Antonio, which emphasized individual contributions over institutional agendas, is an excellent example of inclusive administration.

#### Expertise, Planning and Organizational Development

As most localities are not experts at economic redevelopment, particularly when it involves specialized procedures, like base conversions, experts must be brought into the process. Reuse consultants and a specialized staff are necessary and should be encouraged to participate in the

discourse. These people have an eye on the big picture and can help police the discourse and maintain a community-wide focus on conversion goals. They can also anticipate problems caused by federal agencies, and are useful at fundraising, grant writing and the formulation and implementation of strategic plans. The cases of Beeville, San Antonio and Alexandria all demonstrate the vital role played by conversion experts.

Strategic planning is an essential part of all complex redevelopment efforts. Plans must focus on goals, the means to attain those goals, as well as strengths and weaknesses of a community. Successful communities emphasize the strengths of their locale and base facilities. Despite the occasional setback, such as the one experienced by Beeville, when the Navy interfered with the interim leases negotiated by the BBCRC, localities cannot lose sight of their goals. Strategic plans can be used to create and maintain consensus and can be updated when consensus begins to break down or when the goals change.

In order to provide for a successful conversion, the reuse effort must be sufficiently organized. As mentioned above, it must be inclusive and provide for a certain level of expertise. In order to avoid falling behind, organizations should be constructed in a timely fashion. This means that planning committees, subcommittees, reuse staff and LRAs must follow the reuse phases in a sequential

fashion. Alexandria and San Antonio created all of their reuse organizations (planning committees and subcommittees, transition staffs and local reuse authorities) within the first six months of the conversion, and as a result, found themselves ahead of schedule. Lubbock's leaders created only their planning committees and subcommittees during the same amount of time and are beginning to fall behind and lose sight of reuse goals, although they might not agree with this assessment.

### Investment

Finally, investment in local military base conversions must be encouraged. To this end, local business and financial interests cannot be excluded. Consultants and reuse staff can apply for millions of dollars in federal and state grants, but these do not represent a permanent source of income. Instead these funds must be wisely invested in order to encourage private reuse of base facilities. The primary goal of any base conversion is job creation, so capital investment and marketing of base facilities must be designed with this end in mind. Public spending which is related to this goal should also be considered. Higher education in the form of vocational and technical training has helped retrain displaced workers at Beeville and Alexandria. State funding of the hospital at the former

England AFB has also contributed to the quality of life in the central Louisiana region.

#### A Model of Failure

Base conversion failure can be caused by poor planning, lack of organization and specialization, and delayed implementation. Although every conversion encounters some unintended barriers, most of these can be surmounted with local ingenuity or federal assistance. There are, however, certain actions which can have almost irreversible consequences. Environmental problems, federal interference, institutionalism and lack of community consensus can derail even the best intentioned conversion plans. As this work was not about environmental problems, these will be discussed in some future endeavor.

While the federal government can provide a great deal in the way of funding and guidance, they can also represent an intractable barrier to base conversion. This is particularly true for closures which occurred as a result of the 1988 and 1991 BRACs. Since then, the Clinton Administration has attempted to reduce federal delays and has encouraged faster transitions to local control. However, the Navy's interference with interim leases at Beeville resulted in a setback, and the Pentagon's indecision at which side should administer the conversion of El Toro MCAS has contributed to increased fighting between

the County and municipal governments in south Orange County. Federal officials also took sides in the Victorville-Adelanto dispute over George AFB, which resulted in protracted legal action. The federal "60-40" law which restricts contracting out on military bases might impose a significant barrier to San Antonio's privatization effort if it is not changed soon--having the effect of disrupting an otherwise well-planned and organized effort.

Another barrier can result from the absence of sincere, action-oriented discourse. This is also known as a lack of community consensus, which can be a result of institutional infighting, hidden agendas and poor communication. According to NAID consultant Bobbi Morgan, this is the most common barrier to successful conversions. Institutions which often fight amongst themselves in these situations are cities and counties, such as in the El Toro and Victorville cases. Disputes in the Lubbock case seem to involve a split between the public and private sectors--with the Air Force on the outside looking in, attempting to provide help with technical information and transition suggestions. If the business community is not given more than token encouragement to participate in the reuse effort, they will not have any reason to invest in the former base. The apparent hierarchy in the structure of the Lubbock reuse effort may contribute to poor channels of communication and may lead to misunderstanding as time goes on.

This work has attempted to reach some conclusions on the process and nature of base conversions. Discourse and complex implementation have provided useful theoretical guides, but due to the contextual nature of base conversions and the small number of cases, generalizations are difficult. Nevertheless, the brief discussions involving conversion success and failure are useful for both practical and conceptual reasons. Clearly more research on these topics is necessary and needed.

As time goes by, a greater number of cases with substantive outcomes for the model of success will be increasingly available. One of the problems associated with any kind of quantitative analysis of base conversions is sample size. Though over a hundred bases have been designated for closure, there are few cases with tangible results, as most of the cases are a result of the 1993 and 1995 BRACs. Most are somewhere in the planning and organization phase, much like Lubbock and San Antonio.

Therefore, in order to find more complete models of success, we must look back to previous closure rounds, which involve only a few success stories. Of these, there are only a few cases which are similar contextually. This makes generalization difficult. However, additional case studies may help to substantiate the usefulness of the model of success for reuse practitioners and local governments.

Failure cases may also provide useful information for communities, practitioners and public administrationists. The model of failure, which is inferred from the cases used in this work needs more substantiation. Work on the environmental policy implications of base closures and conversions, both in the U.S. and abroad, would be useful because of the international and developmental implications. Additional work on federal interference has implications for the nascent public policy administration subfield of intergovernmental relations. Institutional barriers and lack of local consensus brings up questions regarding the persistence of hierarchical administration and our concept of "community," which is being debated by communitarians and those who favor a return to decentralized federalism.

#### Discourse Revisited and Revised

The second chapter discussed the nature of discursive formations. A hypothetical continuum of patterns of communication can be derived from Fox and Miller's discussion of discourse. At one end of the spectrum is what they characterize as "monologic manipulation," which can also be interpreted as a reflection of top-down administration. At the other end is what they describe as "anarchic Babel," which refers to the postmodern condition of societal fragmentation and hyper-pluralism (Fox and Miller 1995).

Between these two extremes lie nascent opportunities for discursive behavior. The ultimate goal of authentic discourse probably exists somewhere above this continuum, as it is not clear if this ideal will ever be realized. However, there appear to be early indications of inclusive administration which could eventually evolve into authentic discourse. The base conversion cases used in this study can be placed along this continuum through the reader's own subjective determination.

The author views the placement of these cases based on the degree to which the warrants for discourse can be observed, as well as substantive progress in planning, organization, community outreach and implementation activities. The one case which comes closest to the monologic end of the spectrum is Lubbock, Texas, which has muddled through the early months of its conversion with exclusive communication patterns and top-down administration. As a result, there are few planning and organizational outcomes. At the anarchic end of the continuum are the cases of Victorville and El Toro, California, who have little to show from years of inter-local bickering.

In between these two extremes we can observe differing degrees of inclusive administration. The author categorizes the Beeville case as an example of a nascent form, which is closer to the monologic end of the discourse spectrum. The

San Antonio and Alexandria cases represent discursive policy networks, which are closer to the anarchic communication on the continuum than nascent forms, but which represent potentially authentic discourse. The structure of their conversion efforts, as well as tangible policy, community development and organizational outcomes support this assertion.

This practical evaluation of inclusion has implications for discourse theory. A criticism which is sometimes levelled at discourse theory is that it has little practical utility. "Discourse is not *about* something. Theory does not signify, nor point to objective reality beyond theory itself" (Wright 1996: 8). Fox and Miller's warrants for discourse are designed to provide a practical framework, which is what distinguishes their notions from those of other discourse and proto-discourse theorists. The observation of discursive behavior in practice presented in this work should also cast doubt on this critique.

Another criticism which can be levelled at Fox and Miller's discourse is that the nature of discourse tends to be elite-centered--resembling the public policy notion of "iron triangles." The base conversion cases demonstrate that elites can provide a much needed leadership and goal-articulation function. However, inclusion as it is practiced in San Antonio and Alexandria emphasizes a synergy between local government and ordinary citizens. This seems

to indicate that discourse is not necessarily elite-bound and that it might resemble something more akin to "issue networks," which involve the same elite policy actors as iron triangles, plus grass-roots interests.

These cases also serve to illustrate that discourse is in fact a viable form of bottom-up implementation. The transcendence of hierarchy and the formation of a greater sense of community is evident in the base conversion success stories. The success cases also serve to substantiate the consociational "regime paradigm" of local economic development articulated by Stone and Sanders (1987), who assert that local governments do engage in complex redevelopment plans with the support of federal funding. Discourse theory, through the practice of inclusive administration, can help to provide the responsiveness which people desire from their governments. Discursive complex implementation can lead to substantive policy outcomes which provide jobs and income for localities and can foster a greater sense of community.

Saying that the practice of discourse will result in positive discursive complex implementation outcomes is something of a tautology. In order to avoid this, empirical evaluations of both the process and outcomes are necessary. As this work focuses on the theory of implementation processes, evaluation of policy outcomes will have to wait for a future work. Nevertheless, policy outcomes can be

projected based on certain procedural criteria which lead to predictable outcomes. Community outreach is an indication of both inclusion and of local implementation success. Community outreach efforts can include, but are not necessarily limited to: broad-based coalition building, "town meetings" which are characterized by open discussion, public opinion surveys and public relations, regular newspaper coverage, and the structuring of spatial arrangements between political elites and ordinary citizens at political discussions.

Community outreach is offered as a potential fifth warrant for discourse. The practice of political coalition building, public relations, "town meetings" and the spatial arrangements of participant-observers at these meetings are empirically observable--as are the original warrants contributed by Fox and Miller. The use of such outreach activities helps to make discourse theory less elite-bound, more democratic and inclusive. These new ways to observe discourse might be the most significant contribution of this work.

#### Implications of Base Conversion Research

On a recent broadcast of CNBC's "Industry Week's Management Today," Paul Taibl of the Business Executives for National Security said that there would probably be seventy-nine more base closures by the year 2002 (Taibl 19 Dec

1995). Although some research has been done on base closures, the BRAC process and post-Cold War declines in defense spending, little has been done on how to avoid the impact of closure. Such a topic would pose interesting questions as to whether communities should in fact fight future BRACs, given the opportunities inherent in base reuse. There may be models of base retention success or closure failure which might be of use to local governments interested in keeping their bases safe from BRAC. The role of discourse in the initial closure/retention phase could use more exploration than has been presented in this work. Could discourse provide a better method of base retention than current practices? That remains to be seen.

Since this work focused on process, perhaps a shift in emphasis toward outcomes in future works is appropriate. However, the measurement of outcomes is held hostage to the same sampling and measurement problems associated with further explication of the success and failure models. But perhaps a quantitative analysis of the different types of conversion solutions and the economic implications of job creation, redevelopment grant allocation and multiplier effects would help shed additional light on the subject. Currently, 100 major bases and 250 minor installations are somewhere in the redevelopment process (Taibl 19 Dec 1995). As more of these near completion of their initial strategic plans they will become more useful for academic research. It

is much easier to formulate a set of testable hypotheses regarding policy outcomes as opposed to processes, which is why most quantitative work focuses on outcomes (see any study involving voting behavior, cost-benefit analysis or policy evaluation), while process models are more often qualitative in nature (see Kingdon 1984, Stone and Sanders 1987, or any of the policy process or community power literature).

To conclude, this study is important for several reasons. The verification of the applicability of discourse theory holds out hope for those who seek alternatives to orthodox patterns of administrative hierarchy. Inclusion and bottom-up administration are more consistent with basic democratic values than top-down, centralized forms of governing. Second, the fact that local governments can engage successfully in complex economic development activity shows that localities have greater control over their own destinies than previously thought. With the assistance of federal dollars, communities can create more jobs and generate more income than direct implementation by the federal government.

Third, community outreach activities can be used as another warrant, or way to measure discourse. The extent to which communities practice inclusion can be inferred from such activities as coalition building, surveys, newspaper coverage, regular "town meetings" and by the nature of

seating arrangements and discussions at those meetings. This indicates that discourse is in fact about something, which should allay criticisms that discourse theory is little more than a great deal of talking. All of these contributions have broad reaching practical and theoretical implications for local policy implementation as American citizens attempt to redefine the parameters of their federal system.

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APPENDIX

## Comparative Cases

Many factors go into the selection of cases for analysis in case study research. This is done to avoid the "apples and oranges" problem of examining unlike units. Each of the cases utilized in this study had several important commonalities, as well as significant differences. In his study of child health care policy in the United States, Malcolm Goggin chose five states to compare based on similarities of policy implementation and differences in outputs. This was done to simultaneously account for both variability and contextual likenesses. The cases in this study were likewise selected for their similarities and differences, as well as convenience.

Military base conversions in Texas have several contextual similarities. The uniqueness of Texas politics, which emphasizes local control over state intervention is one. The anti-discursive, "good old boy" style of governance, which accentuates economic elitism, is another. The missions of the closed or realigned bases were also taken into account. Interestingly enough, most bases which have been closed or designated for closure or realignment in the past several years have been air bases of some kind. As far as this development is concerned, Texas is no different. This could be due to the fact that all branches of the armed services have an excess of air strike and support capability. But whatever the reasons for the closures and

realignments, the examination of air bases lends potential for generalizability to this study. The cases of Beeville, Lubbock and San Antonio all have these characteristics in common. In addition, all of the bases used in the comparison study had relatively minor environmental problems. This is the most significant variable which needs to be controlled for, because it has the potential to delay complex implementation without regard for discourse. Environmental problems involve a greater degree of federal intervention and oversight, which would diminish local control and slow the process.

There are also important differences among these three cases. The first is the size of the communities and the economic impact of downsizing. San Antonio is a big city, whereas Lubbock is medium-sized, and Beeville is a small, rural town. San Antonio and Beeville were greatly affected by the closure and realignment of their respective bases, Lubbock is not. Each of these communities have different patterns of policy implementation as well. San Antonio practices inclusion with regard to other types of policy implementation in order to involve the different affected subcultures of its community, and to develop grass-roots support for local politicians. Citizens' groups are generally included when large-scale economic development proposals are being discussed or implemented, or when environmental concerns arise. Lubbock and Beeville, on the

other hand, have tended to emphasize elite control over their local politics in the past.

For purposes of control, cases from other states were used. Alexandria, Louisiana, is very similar contextually in terms of its politics, military mission, economic impact and size to the Beeville case. It was also designated for closure at the same time as Beeville's Chase Field NAS. The process by which it went about its conversion was similar to the early efforts of the San Antonio case. It also had a strong history of economic elitism similar to Lubbock and Beeville. Cases involving base conversion failure were added in order to demonstrate what happens when there is no attempt at authentic discourse. Both El Toro and Victorville, California, were selected based on their contextual similarities to the other cases. Both were air stations, one is in a rural area, the other urban, and both have been subjected to elite control of policy implementation, which has backfired miserably.

Texas cases which were not used are also noteworthy because of their contrast with those that were. The main problem with using Austin, Fort Worth and Texarkana is that they are outliers compared to other cases, and hence would skew the validity, reliability and generalizability of the study. Austin's differs significantly from other base conversions because the community wanted Bergstrom AFB converted to an international airport and lobbied for it to

be included on the BRAC closure list, and because the base property was given back to the City through a property reversion. Bergstrom also had significant environmental problems and was designated as an EPA "superfund" site, increasing the degree of federal control. Carswell AFB in Fort Worth, Texas, was designated for closure by the 1991 BRAC, but was realigned by the 1993 BRAC, forcing a change in conversion plans back from local control to a federal transition. The Red River Army Depot near Texarkana, was designated for realignment by the 1995 BRAC, but was too different in terms of its mission to warrant inclusion in the study. Also, there was very little information available with regard to its transition.

#### Process and Authenticity

Implementation processes are more difficult to measure because they are not as easily quantified as policy outputs or outcomes. Measurement of the process was perhaps the greatest challenge of this work. Nevertheless, procedures can still be systematically observed in order to paint a clearer picture of how to address complex policy problems (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, Goggin 1987, Heclo 1977). In each of the case studies used in this work, a narrative was constructed in order to tell the story of how localities deal with the implementation of complex base redevelopment plans. The narratives were derived from whatever media coverage and

documents were available. In the case of Lubbock the narrative was constructed mostly through participant-observation. Discourse theory is presented as a way to explain the nature of base conversion policy implementation.

From much of the narrative, it is possible to discern how this process works. Where it is less apparent, personal and telephone interviews were conducted so that more in-depth information could be gathered to fill whatever gaps might exist in each story. Specifically, the interview questions were geared towards determining the practice of discourse through the existence of its warrants as judged by the empirical referents. By examining indications of inclusion, self-regulation and policy outputs, it is possible to determine the authenticity of discourse and to illustrate the nature of the implementation process simultaneously.

#### Interviews and Coding

The interviews consisted of both open- and closed-ended questions in order to enhance the narrative and to find specific answers which are comparable across the cases and on the implementation timeline. Some were quite short--only about thirty minutes--while others were very long, lasting several hours, depending on the time constraints and willingness of the respondents. The responses were coded according to whether action had been taken with regard to

the procedures in question. As discourse is a theory of implementation, evidence of action taken in pursuit of solving the policy problem seems appropriate to its observation. Each observation was recorded as an affirmative response if specific action had been taken, and a notation was made as to what it was or when it took place. The information was then systematically presented on the implementation timeline which appears in Chapter V. The authenticity of the discourse was judged in the case studies presented in Chapters VI and VII, based on whether the community practiced inclusion, self-regulation and had produced policy outputs. The cases were then compared in the concluding chapter.

#### Interview Questions and Respondents

The following questions were asked of the individuals who were chiefly responsible for writing the grant applications for the cases of Beeville, San Antonio and Lubbock, Texas, and Alexandria, Louisiana. The Executive Director of the Fort Worth conversion and individuals involved with the Bergstrom Redevelopment Authority and State of Texas were also interviewed. This line of questioning was designed to fill in any gaps in the historical narratives and policy process, as well as to establish the link between discourse theory and policy

implementation through the observation of the empirical referents of discourse.

#### Inclusion and Self-Regulation Questions

1. How did your community establish its base reuse organization?
2. What bears the most responsibility for your community's conversion success to date?
3. Of the individuals, groups and institutions involved in the conversion of your community's base, which do you feel have made the greatest contributions to the redevelopment effort?
4. When did the community leaders begin making strategic plans and setting up the reuse organization?
5. How many committees or subcommittees were there?
6. How many people were involved with the base conversion process?
7. Who brought them together?
8. When did the community leaders contact OEA and EDA about base conversion/realignment procedures and grant writing processes?
9. When were the different administrative positions filled? Base Transition Coordinator? Environmental Coordinator? Land Reuse Consultants? Executive Director and staff?

#### Policy Output Questions

10. How many grants were written and who wrote them?
11. How much grant money was awarded and when was it received?
12. When were the strategic plans completed? What are they?
13. When did property screening begin and when was it completed?

14. When did screening for the homeless begin and when was it completed?
15. When did environmental evaluation begin and when was it completed?
16. When were the interim leases and caretaker agreements negotiated?
17. When did you receive HUD, OEA and EDA approval of reuse plans?
18. What barriers to the implementation of your strategic plans have been encountered thus far? How can they be avoided by others?
19. What do you feel is the greatest accomplishment to date of your conversion effort?

#### Persons Interviewed

Brad Arvin, Executive Director, Beeville Redevelopment Authority, Beeville, Texas, 12 January 1996.

Jim Bertram, Director of Strategic Planning, City of Lubbock, Texas, 1 February 1996.

Derrick Curtis, Executive Director of the Carswell Redevelopment Authority, Fort Worth, Texas, 25 April 1995.

David Dimaline, Assistant to the Assistant City Manager, Rolando Bono, City of San Antonio, Texas, 10 January 1996.

Frank Gray, Environmental Coordinator, Bergstrom Redevelopment Authority, Austin, Texas, 1 March 1996.

Jesse Lopez, Special Projects Coordinator and Assistant to the Executive Director, General Paul Roberson, (USAF retired), Office of Defense Transition, San Antonio, Texas, 11 January 1996.

Anne M. "Bobbi" Morgan, Grant Writing Consultant for the National Association of Installation Developers (NAID), Alexandria, Louisiana, 25 April 1995.

Richard Pautz, Executive Director, Bergstrom Redevelopment Authority, Austin, Texas, 1 March 1996.

Jim Steed, Attorney and Community Liaison, Bergstrom  
Redevelopment Authority, Austin, Texas, 25 April 1996.

Kevin Walker, Director of Community Economic Development,  
Texas Department of Commerce, Austin, Texas, 29  
February 1996.

Table 1: Phase II Planning and Organizational Timeline

<u>Locale and Closure Date</u>	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June
Victorville VVEDA (1988)												
Alexandria CPC/ (1991) grants+ consult.		grants*	EEIDD					strat. plan/ caretaker				
Beeville (1991) BBCRC/ subcmnts.			grants**+ property screening			hired	ED and staff	Land use/ Environ. consultants	Strat. plans			Int. Leases
El Toro (1993)					Measure A plan cmt. (1994)							
San Antonio (1995) ED, ODT staff IBASC/ subcmnts.			grants* homeless screen.	BTC# BEC# property screening		Strat. plans	LRA	(projected) Land Use Econ. Devel. consultants				(projected) Interim Leases
Lubbock (1995) LRRC			grants* subcmnts.					BTC# BEC#	ED (projected) consultants			**
Suggested Reuse Timeline		planning cmts/subcmnts.	BTCs# BECs#	LRAs		Strat. Plans approved	Property/ Homeless screening					BRAC

# BTC = base transition coordinator. BEC = base environmental coordinator. Neither position was recommended as part of the reuse process until 1993.  
 \* Refers to date initial planning grants were applied for. They are usually awarded shortly thereafter.  
 + State grants. \*\*Lubbock's strategic plan, leases and caretaker agreements, August 1996.