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Abstract:
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Kyrgyzstan has experienced two regime changes since 2005 . The first , called the ‘Tulip Revolution’ , which was modeled on ‘color’ revolutions aimed at democratization in Serbia , Georgia and Ukraine , changed the arrangement of elites in the power structure , but did nothing to weaken the vertical presidential system of power that perpetuated an unstable regime cycle . The second ‘April’ revolution in 2010 brought the creation of a parliamentary system with broadly decentralized power and drastically curtailed the powers of the president . Parliamentary elections in October 2010 created a broad representative body that has improved stability despite the difficulties of elite adjustment to parliamentary dynamics . Successful presidential elections in October 2011 further reinforced the legitimacy of the new system of government .
Despite considerable progress , a deep divide between northern and southern elites , pervasive corruption , economic collapse and ethnic turbulence exacerbated by decades of unchecked nationalism all threaten the consolidation of Kyrgyzstan’s nascent democracy . Each of these problems will pose a significant challenge to the political elite , who now have a shared responsibility for the success or failure of policy . How elites react to this challenge will determine whether Kyrgyzstan will continue to gradually consolidate its democracy , or revert to a centralized power structure that has proved inherently unstable . |