|
Abstract:
|
This paper tries to determine to what extent US diplomatic and military support for Former Soviet Union (FSU ) countries influences these countries’ decisions to become more assertive in the region , thereby provoking Russia’s aggressive behavior . It employs Robert Jervis’s framework of ‘deterrence and perception’ which , among other things , suggests that a weaker state will or will not be deterred from initiating a conflict against its stronger adversary depending on whether this state receives strong signals of third -party support and whether this state receives strong signals of threat . The case studies explored are Georgia and Ukraine , with particular attention to both countries’ relations with the United States (as the source for third -party support ) and Russia (as the source for threat ) . The main finding is that Georgia’s perception of the US support was not sufficient to motivate Georgia to invade South Ossetia and thereby initiate a five -day war with Russia in August 2008 . Georgia’s perception of Russia’s threat to carry out the policy of “creeping annexation” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was the primary motivator behind Georgia’s behavior . |