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Abstract:
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The dissertation analyzes why legislators fail to use their oversight powers over bureaucracy in democratic Mexico . While dominant institutional theories assume a unidirectional flow of authority from politicians to bureaucrats , in Mexico there is a bidirectional negotiation process ; as such , principals have formal rights to control the agents , but agents have informal leverage over principals , as well . Due to the absence of a Weberian state and extensive state intervention , bureaucrats are able to control resources that legislators require in order to advance their careers . By distributing resources that politicians can use for patronage purposes , bureaucrats obtain legislators’ consent to design and implement programs as they wish . Consequently , members of Congress renounce their control powers in exchange for securing resources for their constituents or cronies . Furthermore , informal mechanisms of influence neutralize the formal control powers that legislators have over bureaucrats . Public officials’ power and the lack of legislative control over bureaucracy are documented by analyzing the budgetary process and health policy in Mexico between 1997 and 2006 . The main implication of the dissertation is that although democratization produced changes that gave more formal powers to Congress , it has not eliminated the informal mechanisms used by bureaucrats to influence legislators . As a result , public officials continue to enjoy ample leeway in implementing public policies and programs . |