The naive conception of material objects: a defense

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dc.contributor.advisor Sainsbury , R .M . , (Richard Mark ) en_US
dc.identifier.oclc 182626849 en_US
dc.creator Korman , Daniel Z . en_US 2008 -08 -28T23 :51 :11Z 2014 -02 -19T22 :34 :01Z 2008 -08 -28T23 :51 :11Z 2014 -02 -19T22 :34 :01Z 2007 en_US 2008 -08 -28T23 :51 :11Z
dc.identifier.uri http : / /hdl .handle .net /2152 /3489
dc.description.abstract I defend a naive conception of material objects , according to which there are such things as stones , statues , cats and their tails , but no "strange fusions" of such things as my nose and the Eiffel Tower . Virtually everyone in the literature rejects the naive conception in favor of some revisionary theory of material objects . Eliminativists (e .g . , Unger , van Inwagen , Merricks ) deny that there are such things as statues and stones and , in some cases , cats as well . Universalists (e .g . , Lewis , Rea , Sider ) hold that for any objects you like - -even my nose and the Eiffel Tower - -there is a single object composed of those objects . These revisionary theories are manifestly counterintuitive , but there are powerful arguments for preferring them to the naive conception . The first part of the dissertation is devoted to showing how these arguments can be resisted . First , I assess the charge that , given the correctness of the naive conception , it would have been a miraculous stroke of luck for us to have hit upon the privileged conceptual scheme . Second , I examine the Lewis -Sider argument from vagueness for unrestricted mereological composition , Third , I show that the grounding problem for coincident modally discernible objects can be solved . Fourth , show that the causal exclusion argument as applied to ordinary objects can be resisted without either systematic overdetermination or epiphenomena . In the second part of the dissertation , I argue that the prima facie conflict between revisionary theories and our ordinary discourse , beliefs , and intuitions about material objects proves to be an insurmountable problem for those theories . First , I argue that existing attempts to reconcile revisionary theories of material objects with folk discourse are unsatisfactory , Second , I provide a perspicuous statement of the "challenge from folk belief" and argue that the standard strategies for meeting the challenge are unsatisfactory . en_US
dc.format.medium electronic en_US
dc.language.iso eng en_US
dc.rights Copyright © is held by the author . Presentation of this material on the Libraries' web site by University Libraries , The University of Texas at Austin was made possible under a limited license grant from the author who has retained all copyrights in the works . en_US
dc.subject.lcsh Object (Philosophy ) en_US
dc.subject.lcsh Universals (Philosophy ) en_US
dc.subject.lcsh Vagueness (Philosophy ) en_US
dc.subject.lcsh Ontology en_US
dc.title The naive conception of material objects : a defense en_US
dc.description.department Philosophy en_US
dc.identifier.recnum b69360339 en_US
dc.type.genre Thesis en_US
dc.type.material text en_US Doctor of Philosophy en_US Doctoral en_US Philosophy en_US The University of Texas at Austin en_US Philosophy en_US


The naive conception of material objects: a defense. Doctoral dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin. Available electronically from http : / /hdl .handle .net /2152 /3489 .

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