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Abstract:
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Timing analysis poses a significant challenge for the mix based anonymous systems that wish to support low -latency applications like web browsing , instant messaging and Voice over IP (VOIP ) . Research in this area so far has been done through simulations on ad hoc simulators or non practical local area networks . We developed SubRosa , an experimental platform for studying timing analysis of real time anonymity systems to facilitate the study of Tor like low -latency anonymous systems .
We present results of experiments on a real distributed network test bed PlanetLab , where we studied timing analysis attacks and some of the defenses to protect against such attacks . We validate the simulated results obtained for defensive dropping by Levine et al in 2004 on PlanetLab using SubRosa . We also propose a new light weight defense based on the basic mix principal called γ -buffering and evaluate the initial results from the experiments with γ -buffering on PlanetLab . |